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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation traces the progress of the personified imagination from the 
twelfth-century De planctu Naturae to the sixteenth-century Faerie Queene, arguing that 
the transformability of the personified imagination becomes a locus for questioning 
personification allegory across the entire period. The dissertation demonstrates how, even 
while the imagination seems to progress from a position of subordination to a position of 
dominance, certain features of the imagination’s unstable nature reappear repeatedly at 
every stage in this period’s development of the figure. Deep suspicion of the faculty 
remains a regular part of the imagination’s allegorical representation throughout these 
five centuries. Within the period, we witness the imagination trying to assert its 
allegorical position in the context of other, more established allegorical figures such as 
Reason and Nature. In this way, the history of the personification of the imagination is 
surprisingly continuous from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. This “continuity” is 
not absolute but functions as a consistent recombination of a standard set of features of 
and attitudes toward imagination that rematerializes regularly. In order to understand this 
phenomenon at any point in these five centuries, it is essential to examine imagination 
across the entire period. In particular, the dissertation discovers an alternative, more 
nuanced view of the personified imagination than has thus far been posited. The 
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imagination is a thoroughly ambivalent character, always on the cusp of transformation, 
and nearly always locked in a power struggle with other allegorical figures. At the same 
time, as the allegorical imagination repeatedly attempts to establish itself, it becomes a 
locus for intense questioning of the meaning and process of personification. The 
imagination remains transformative, uncertain, and at times terrifying throughout this 
entire period. 
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Introduction 
 
Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge 
is limited. Imagination encircles the world. 
--Albert Einstein 
 
I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the Heart’s 
affections and the truth of the Imagination. 
--John Keats 
 
 
 
The “imagination” as a creative entity has continuously been an object of 
fascination since the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romantics tried to codify its 
features and operation. As James Engell has pointed out, the idea was so fascinating that 
it developed simultaneously in various contexts in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, including religion, philosophy, criticism, literature, and science.1 Engell’s 
argument rightfully notes that the imagination as we understand it today was the creation 
of the eighteenth century.2  
Despite the fact that Engell’s book was published in 1981, earlier iterations of the 
literary imagination have not been explored in the same depth as the Romantic 
imagination. Medieval scholars have not followed suit and investigated the literary 
development of the imagination in the medieval period. Although studies of the 
philosophical development of the imagination before and after the influx of Aristotelian 
texts into Western Europe abound, there are no in-depth analyses of the simultaneous 
evolution of the allegorical figure of Imagination in medieval literature. We are thus left 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
1 James Engell, The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), vii.  
 
2 Ibid.!
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with a drastically incomplete literary history of the imagination, one that emphasizes 
uniformity between the Romantic period and our current understanding of the 
imagination but fails to delve back deeper into literary history to understand whether 
these ideas are continuous, fragmented, or somewhere in between. As Michelle Karnes 
has noted, there is no dearth of studies of the imagination, but most of them relegate the 
medieval imagination to a place of significant inferiority.3 The imagination, in these 
accounts, is triumphantly invented by Plato, elaborated upon by Aristotle, and then enters 
a “dark” period of feeble development until finally emerging as a prestigious agent of 
human creativity in the eighteenth century.4 These accounts display glaring inaccuracies 
and fail to recognize the reality of vivacious and often vicious debates about the 
imagination in the medieval period. In fact, there is certainly one way in which our 
modern conception of the imagination is closely related to the medieval conception: the 
medieval imagination was similarly a source of considerable mystery and fascination. 
Vibrant debate about the imagination was a regular part of philosophy and literature in 
the medieval and early modern periods, so ubiquitous in fact that it is surprising that there 
is not more scholarship on each and every aspect of the medieval imagination, including 
its literary development.  
This dissertation seeks to remedy in part this lack in the literary history of the 
imagination before the eighteenth century. The period from 1150 to 1590 begins and ends with 
strikingly similar challenges leveled at the imagination. In the twelfth century, Neoplatonic 
philosophy expresses suspicion of the imagination’s distortion of original truths. In the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
3 Michelle Karnes, Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the Middle Ages (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1-2.  
 
4 Ibid. 
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sixteenth century, Reformation theology fears the imagination’s ability to proliferate false idols 
in the mind. Across the entire period, fear of the imagination is based on fundamental concerns 
about distortion of reality and the natural world. This fear takes on many different forms across 
the period, but it is always a strikingly present element of the allegorical representation of 
imagination. The flourishing of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
creates, on the surface, a more accommodating and less suspicious environment for the 
imagination. In these two centuries, the imagination develops with the most latitude, at times 
flouting Reason and demoting Nature. Yet within this imaginative freedom lurk concerns about 
the imagination’s power that become manifest in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.   
This dissertation traces the progress of the personified imagination from the twelfth-
century De planctu Naturae to the sixteenth-century Faerie Queene, arguing that the 
transformability of the personified imagination becomes a locus for questioning personification 
allegory across the entire period. The dissertation demonstrates how, even while the 
imagination seems to progress from a position of subordination to a position of dominance, 
certain features of the imagination’s unstable nature reappear repeatedly at every stage in this 
period’s development of the figure. Deep suspicion of the faculty remains a regular part of the 
imagination’s allegorical representation throughout these five centuries.  
Within the period, we witness the imagination trying to assert its allegorical position in 
the context of other, more established allegorical figures such as Reason and Nature. In this 
way, the history of the personification of the imagination is surprisingly continuous from the 
twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. This “continuity” is not absolute but functions as a consistent 
recombination of a standard set of features of and attitudes toward imagination that 
'!
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rematerializes regularly. In order to understand this phenomenon at any point in these five 
centuries, it is essential to examine imagination across the entire period.  
In particular, the dissertation discovers an alternative, more nuanced view of the 
personified imagination than has thus far been posited. The imagination is a thoroughly 
ambivalent character, always on the cusp of transformation, and nearly always locked in a 
power struggle with other allegorical figures. At the same time, as the allegorical imagination 
repeatedly attempts to establish itself, it becomes a locus for intense questioning of the 
meaning and process of personification. The imagination remains transformative, uncertain, 
and at times terrifying throughout this entire period. The medieval period was not simply afraid 
of the imagination, however, as is often posited.5 As this dissertation amply demonstrates, the 
period engaged with a form of rich questioning of the imagination that rendered it a highly 
dynamic and constantly changing force in the allegorical landscape.  
Sensitivity to the ways in which different discursive areas treat the imagination 
constitutes a central portion of the dissertation. In many cases, the literary imagination does not 
develop in precisely the same way as the philosophical imagination. The personified 
imagination has the tendency to resist its own intellectual-historical development, often 
remaining rooted in the past. Many chapters thus demonstrate the manner in which the 
personified imagination does not reflect contemporary advances in faculty psychology but 
remains more firmly in dialogue with its literary forebears.   
Scholarship on the medieval imagination has focused mainly on the imagination in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. My dissertation tells a longer history of the medieval 
imagination beginning in the twelfth century, examining the moment before the influx of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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(!See Karnes, Imagination, 2-3, for an account of the common scholarly view that imagination 
produced nothing but fear and trepidation in the medieval period.  
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Aristotelian imaginative theory into England, and continuing to the sixteenth century. The 
dissertation thus traces a longue durée of the development of the allegorical figure of 
imagination. The decision to extend the discussion into the early modern period is also part of 
an attempt to suggest that Renaissance theories of imagination are not as divorced from their 
medieval counterparts as they might seem.  
The term “imagination” first appears as the Greek phantasia in Plato’s middle 
dialogues.6 Plato’s writings on imagination are, however, sparse. Neoplatonic philosophy 
developed Plato’s theories of imagination much more fully, along with the influence of 
Aristotelian writings on the faculty. For Neoplatonists, as for Aristotle, the imagination acts as 
an intermediary between sense and reason. For Plotinus, the imagination has a memorial 
function, “harbouring the presentment of an object that has disappeared.” Thus the imagination 
is also “a seat of memory.”7 Like Plato, the Neoplatonists distrust the sensible, material world 
and thus demote the imagination as a potential propagator of falsehood.8  
While Neoplatonic thought aligns imagination primarily with the senses, Aristotelian 
theories of cognition allow the imagination to play a direct role in understanding. Careful to 
separate his musings on the imagination from its “metaphorical” senses, Aristotle argues that 
imagination must be sufficiently divorced from perception. Perception, according to Aristotle, 
is an activity visited upon a necessarily present object whose outcome is always based in truth. 
Imagination, on the other hand, is a mental exercise practiced upon an object that is either 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
6 Karnes, Imagination, 23-4. 
 
7 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 283.  
!
8 Karnes, Imagination, 25. 
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present or absent whose outcome may be, and often is, false.9 Aristotle’s imagination is most 
certainly not an entirely positive force. While imagination prepares sense perceptions for 
interpretation by reason and understanding, it is often false, unlike “knowledge or intellect,” 
which “are always correct.”10 Most basically, Aristotle’s imagination is the part of the brain 
that intervenes between perception and intellect, storing and recombining images once seen in 
nature but now absent. Yet Aristotle’s phantasia, like the medieval tradition that inherits it, is 
heterogeneous. Under the heading of imagination falls not only absent images but also dreams, 
puzzling sense-data, and indistinct visions. Imagination is also responsible for the spontaneous 
production of mental imagery.  
The legacy of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian theories of imagination on the medieval 
period necessarily results in a compound, complex, and strikingly heterogeneous faculty. In the 
late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Aristotelian and Arabic theories of cognition and 
imagination begin to circulate in Europe. Yet the influx of philosophical texts by Aristotle, 
Avicenna, and Averroes did not simply spell the death of hundreds of years of development of 
Neoplatonic theories of the imagination. Instead, new theories and old theories combined in 
new ways, producing complex accounts of the imagination that are difficult to label as purely 
“Aristotelian” or “Neoplatonic.” A common controversy revolved around the extent to which 
imagination participates in reasoning. Manuscript evidence bears extensive witness to this 
debate between a Neoplatonic view of the imagination as tied primarily to the senses and a 
more Aristotelian account of the imagination as taking part in the act of reasoning. Some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
 
9 Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1986), 198.  
 
10 Ibid., 199.!
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manuscripts with diagrams of the brain position the imagination in the posterior part of the first 
cell, the cell responsible for sensation and perception. Others place the imagination in the 
posterior part of the brain, closer to aestimativa, cogitativa, and ratio.11 These manuscripts, 
then, illustrate the defining heterogeneity of late medieval imaginative theory.  
In the thirteenth century, new commentaries on Aristotle began appearing with great 
frequency in Europe. These commentaries may be viewed as evidence of the varied, constantly 
shifting nature of the philosophical imagination in this late medieval period. Aquinas’ 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima posits an imagination that results from a movement of 
the senses that then places a mental image in the potential intellect.12 As Aquinas notes, 
without the imagination, there can be no formation of opinion, and therefore the imagination 
plays an essential role in the functioning of the intellect.13 The most powerful view of 
imagination was propagated by Avicenna, who lent the imagination prophetic capacity.14 
Avicenna also unusually distinguishes between imaginatio and phantasia, assigning phantasia 
a more elevated function.15 This splitting of the imagination into two parts is picked up by 
Reginald Pecock in the fifteenth century.  
In the midst of this thirteenth-century flowering of Aristotelian philosophy, distrust of 
the imagination was still rife. Indeed, Aristotle’s texts were not accepted without a struggle in 
thirteenth-century Europe. Oxford philosophers absorbed Aristotelianism swiftly, but 
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11 Edwin Clarke and Kenneth Dewhurst, An Illustrated History of Brain Function: Imaging the 
Brain from Antiquity to the Present (San Francisco: Norman Publishing, 1996), 8.  
 
12 Thomas Aquinas, A Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, trans. Robert Pasnau (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1999), 143-4. 
 
13 Ibid., 325. 
!
14 Karnes, Imagination, 6. 
 
15 Ibid., 54-5. 
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Aristotle’s natural philosophy and metaphysics were banned in Paris as early as 1210 and again 
in 1215.16 Varying receptions of Aristotle across Europe resulted in extremely diverse theories 
of imagination. As Karnes notes, “heterogeneity” is thus the defining feature of the medieval 
imagination.17 Even in the midst of this diversity, and the many different directions scholarship 
on the imagination has thus necessarily taken, one theme seems to emerge repeatedly: that the 
imagination is somehow a lowly part of the mind, important only in its relation to reason.18 
Yet, as this dissertation demonstrates, the medieval literary imagination was far from “lowly” 
or insignificant. Instead, it was a source of lively debate and discussion, subject to versatile 
representation.  
Against the backdrop of this heterogeneity and a constantly developing nexus of 
theoretical frameworks for the imaginative faculty, the allegorical figure of the imagination 
emerges. The literary imagination is always affected by this philosophical story, but it is no 
mere shadow of intellectual-historical developments in faculty psychology. This dissertation 
reveals a vibrantly varied and tensely self-conflicted literary imagination. Allegory allows for a 
richer and often deeper examination of the complexities of the nascent figure of the 
imagination than philosophy does. My argument thus often relies on the conviction that “what 
philosophy could not do, poetry might.”19 Allegory permits relational aspects of the 
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16 Marcia L. Colish, Medieval Foundation of the Western Intellectual Tradition 400-1400 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 289.  
 
17 Karnes, Imagination, 7-8.  
 
18 Ibid., 31. Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of 
Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 120. 
 
19 Theodore Silverstein, “The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernard Silvestris,” Modern Philology 46 
(1948-49), 116. 
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imagination’s identity to arise in ways that could not be expressed with quite the same nuance 
in philosophy. The richness of the deeply conflicted relationship between Imagination and 
Nature, for example, was not much commented upon in either Neoplatonic or Aristotelian 
philosophy. The personified imagination, then, poses a challenge to the simple story of the 
development of the philosophical imagination according to dominant intellectual schools.20 For 
Alan of Lille’s imagination should no more be called “Neoplatonic” than Chaucer’s can be 
titled “Ockhamist.”  
In the coming pages, imagination will be defined strictly as the psychological 
faculty that stores and recombines images, relaying information between the senses and 
the intellect. The allegorical imagination is not some mysterious creative capacity but 
becomes personified according to its place and function within the mind. The imagination 
is allegorized under a variety of names, including Genius and Archimago, throughout 
these five centuries. These various names will all be treated, sharing the common feature 
of representing the mind’s image-making capacity. These personifications also explore 
the imagination’s function in more creative realms, including altered states of 
consciousness such as dreaming. Discussion of literary works are limited mainly to texts 
in which an allegorized version of the imagination appears, with the exception of some of 
the texts discussed in the chapter on the fifteenth century as well as Chaucer’s House of 
Fame. There is good cause for focusing exclusively on texts with allegorical 
representations of imagination. These texts show special awareness of surrounding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
20 See William J. Courtenay’s passionate case against the simplicity of categorizing philosophical 
thoughts according to “schools”: William J. Courtenay, “Schools and Schools of Thought in the 
Twelfth Century,” in Mind Matters: Studies of Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual History in 
Honour of Marcia Colish, ed. Cary J. Nederman, Nancy Van Deusen, and E. Ann Matter 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 13-14. 
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philosophical and theological debates about the nature of the imagination, and these 
debates are well represented in abstractions of this mental faculty. These allegorical texts 
thus present the most appropriate loci for discussion alongside philosophical and 
theological accounts of the imagination.  
Although scholarly work on philosophical theories of medieval imagination and 
on medieval allegory abounds, no single work of scholarship to date considers primarily 
the literary development of imagination in the medieval period.  Furthermore, while there 
are several studies on medieval allegorical figures such as Nature, there are no book-
length projects on the allegorical figure of imagination in the medieval period. This 
dissertation project seeks to remedy this gap between literary practice and philosophical 
theory, considering late medieval and early modern allegorical representations of the 
imagination against the backdrop of an intellectual-historical story about the rise and fall 
of Aristotelian faculty psychology between the middle of the twelfth century and 1590.21 
I have chosen to devote special attention to the development of imagination as an 
allegorical figure in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century England in order to remedy another 
gap in scholarship on the medieval imagination, most of which stops short at around 
1400. 
The dissertation mostly focuses on late medieval representations of imagination in 
English allegorical texts but includes one chapter on twelfth-century philosophy and 
allegory in order to argue for the importance of the twelfth century to the legacy of the 
personified imagination in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England. There is also a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
21 “Faculty psychology” refers to the tradition, stemming from Aristotle’s De anima, of defining 
the functions of the various faculties of the mind and soul, including the five senses, imagination 
and memory. 
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chapter on the Roman de la Rose, another non-English text, because its influence was far-
reaching in England, as evidenced by Chaucer’s fourteenth-century English translation of 
the text. Arguing for the seminal influence of twelfth-century allegory on fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century allegorical representations of imagination subverts a more common 
argument that the late medieval English concept of imagination was based mostly on 
Aristotelian texts and commentaries that circulated in England from the thirteenth century 
onwards. A large part of the dissertation’s argument is that late medieval English texts 
represent the personified imagination as a figure of uncertain status, often caught between 
a Neoplatonic representation of imagination regular to the twelfth century and an 
Aristotelian representation of imagination disseminated after the twelfth century. Because 
twelfth-century allegories with representations of imagination such as Bernard Silvestris’ 
Cosmographia, Alan of Lille’s De planctu Naturae, and John of Hauville’s Architrenius 
enjoyed considerable popularity in late medieval England, there is good cause to start 
with this set of texts as examples of Neoplatonic conceptions of imagination that 
influenced later medieval writers. 
Rather than retell a linear intellectual history of faculty psychology that begins 
with Platonism, changes radically in the thirteenth century with the influx of Aristotelian 
texts, and ends with a repudiation of Aristotelianism in the sixteenth century, this 
dissertation accounts for a constantly shifting nexus of theories about the imagination and 
the perpetual tensions among them. Ultimately, the dissertation poses a larger question 
about periodization, asking: Could telling a history of medieval to Renaissance through 
imagination reveal a different kind of history than has traditionally been posited about the 
transition between these two periods?  
$%!
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 Classic scholarly work on the medieval and Renaissance imagination includes 
Murray Wright Bundy’s The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought; 
E. Ruth Harvey’s The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance; J.M. Cocking’s Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas; and Jacques 
Le Goff’s Medieval Imagination.22 These books are all interested in tracing chronological 
developments in philosophical, medical and theological theories of the imagination. Only 
Harvey’s book treats both the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, whereas Bundy focuses 
on the classical period and Le Goff solely on the medieval period. Harvey states from the 
beginning that her study delineates only the Aristotelian tradition, explaining that “the 
more detailed Platonic scheme of the soul’s powers which passed into the Latin West 
through Augustine does not concern us here.”23 By “inward wits,” Harvey means the 
inner senses theorized by an Aristotelian-influenced medical tradition. Her work thus 
stands at the center of a tradition of scholarship on the imagination that deals only with 
Aristotle and represses some of the major challenges to Aristotelian faculty psychology 
throughout the medieval period, an alternative history that this project will bring to light. 
 More recent work by philosophers such as Robert Pasnau has taken into account 
challenges to Aristotelianism in the later medieval period. In Theories of Cognition in the 
Later Middle Ages, Pasnau treats later Scholastics such as Peter John Olivi and William 
Ockham in order to investigate the ways in which they challenged “Aquinas’s 
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22 Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought 
(Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1927); E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits: 
Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: Warburg Institute, 
1975); J.M. Cocking, Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas (London: Routledge, 1991); 
Jacques LeGoff, Medieval Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
 
23 Harvey, The Inward Wits, 32. 
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Aristotelian-based theory of cognition.”24 Yet Pasnau, lamenting the way in which 
philosophers “tend to skip, with a few apologetic murmurs, from the fourth century B.C. 
to the seventeenth century,” covers only the period between 1250 and 1350.25 The 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are still missing in this account of the imaginative 
faculty from a philosophical perspective. 
 Most recently, Michelle Karnes has proposed a revised view of the medieval 
imagination, one that focuses not so much on suspicion of the faculty but more on its 
centrality as a devotional tool. Karnes understands imagination in the same way as I 
define it here, in its technical and philosophical sense, taking her cue from medieval 
theories of cognition. Karnes sweeps away the notion that imagination is in any way 
weak in the medieval period. She redefines the scholastic influence of imaginative theory 
on devotional writing and practice and affords the imagination a positive form of power 
as a crucial meditative instrument. Karnes’ study treats an entirely different genre of texts 
than mine does and has little to say about the literary evolution of the imaginative faculty. 
Nonetheless, we share a common conviction that imagination “enjoyed uncommon 
authority” in medieval thought, that theories of cognition were passionately debated in 
the late medieval period, and that “imagination occupied a central place within them.”26 
Karnes warns against excessively negative views of the medieval imagination.27 While I 
agree that any disproportionate claims about medieval suspicion of the imagination are 
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24 Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 2. 
!
%(!Ibid., 2. 
!
26 Karnes, Imagination, 2-3.  
!
27 Ibid., 7-8.  
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bound to falter, it would be impossible to ignore the strong fears of the imagination that 
pervade the literary, allegorical representation of the faculty. Karnes’ study still focuses 
on the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Aristotelian imagination, while I insist upon 
examining this version of the imagination in the context of the centuries preceding and 
following this blossoming of Aristotelian theoretical material.  
 Work by Jane Chance Nitzsche and James Simpson is essential to any 
consideration of the Genius figure, a type of the imagination that survives in Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene. Nitzsche’s study, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
traces the relationship between the classical and medieval Genius, keeping intact the 
“Horatian definition” of Genius as “a god of human nature, born with each man and 
living until his death.”28 Nitzsche discusses the medieval association of genius with 
“inventive powers” or “mental abilities,” but she does not address the direct equation of 
“genius” with “imagination” as a psychological faculty, an equivalence that begins in the 
twelfth century with figures such as John of Salisbury.29 Nitzsche’s account is more 
interested in the relationship between Genius and Nature than in the functioning of 
Genius as the imaginative faculty.  
Simpson’s Sciences and the Self deals extensively with later medieval iterations 
of Genius and delineates the notion of Genius as the imagination.30 Although Simpson 
posits the movement of Gower’s Genius toward the role of “the increasingly rational 
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28 Jane Chance Nitzsche, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975), 3. 
 
29 Ibid., 6. 
!
30 James Simpson, Sciences and the Self in Medieval Literature: Alan of Lille’s Anticlaudianus 
and John Gower’s Confessio amantis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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imagination,”31 a more optimistic view of Genius than this dissertation takes, he focuses 
at length on the ways in which Genius can offer deceptive and incorrect information.32 
Moreover, Simpson’s study poses a question that is equally important to this dissertation: 
“How might poetry provide original and distinctive forms of philosophical 
knowledge?”33 This question also implicitly lies at the center of this project. At many 
points in the dissertation, and especially in dealing with the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, literature will be influenced by but not directly in line with contemporary 
philosophical theories of the imagination and faculty psychology. Investigation of the gap 
between the literary and the philosophical in these cases will form part of the core of the 
original work in this project. 
Literary scholarship thus far on medieval allegorical representations of the 
imagination tends to occur within the context of analysis of the dream vision genre or of 
medieval allegory as a whole. Kathryn Lynch’s The High Medieval Dream Vision 
provides a relatively optimistic view of the process by which the dreamer moves from the 
shady depths of imagination to the enlightenment of reason.34 These dream poems nearly 
always, at least in the high medieval period, present “reason’s dialogue with the 
dreamer’s imagination” which “prepares it to receive the truths that can be abstracted 
from images.”35 In other words, these dream visions, according to Lynch, enact the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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34 Kathryn L. Lynch, The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and Literary Form 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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process of psychological progress from the specific knowledge supplied by the 
imagination to the universal knowledge supplied by reason. In the process of describing 
this psychological “progress,” Lynch has the tendency to gloss over the independent and 
sometimes troubling work the imagination performs in these dream visions.  
My dissertation intervenes in this critical dialogue in several unique ways: by 
taking into account theories of imagination on either side of the supposed flourishing of 
Aristotelianism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; by examining philosophical and 
literary texts alongside one another and not in isolation, allowing the literary texts to 
speak in contrast to and often against philosophical texts while still being influenced by 
them; and by presenting a challenge to the acceptance of a transformation narrative that 
charts the rise and fall of positive attitudes toward the imagination by suggesting the 
presence of suspicious attitudes toward the imagination before Reformation iconoclasm.  
 Chapter one establishes a struggle between Genius and Nature in Alan of Lille’s 
De Planctu Naturae (1160s), considered in the context of two contemporary poems with 
personifications of Nature and Genius, John of Hauville’s Architrenius (1180s) and 
Bernard Silvestris’ Cosmographia (1140s). In this chapter, I argue for Genius’ creative 
capacity and thus give imagination a more prominent, if threatening, place in relation to 
Nature. I show how Nature may not be the venerated and idealized figure that she seems 
to be, but is instead unable to create anything new, a role that Genius quickly subsumes. 
At the same time, the chapter establishes imagination’s association with the “image,” of 
which Neoplatonic philosophy is markedly suspicious. Suspicion of imagination in this 
case becomes key to setting up hints of imagination’s potentially dangerous power, in 
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addition to showing imagination’s creative power. The chapter establishes the relational 
quality of allegory and the way that literature, as opposed to philosophy, may enact a 
debate among allegorical figures, such as Nature and Genius. 
 Chapter two moves forward a century and builds upon chapter one’s uncertainly 
poised imagination, arguing that imagination is a transformative allegorical figure in the 
thirteenth-century Roman de la Rose (1275). This chapter also shows how imagination 
personified is a figure that questions both allegory itself and the constancy of images. In 
this text, the imagination questions itself by representing itself as a figure in flux. The 
imagination in some ways resists philosophical progress toward the Aristotelian view of 
the recombinative imagination and remains suspended in a twelfth-century Neoplatonic, 
Silvestrian model. Questions about the original creativity of imagination arise, as the 
imagination at times inserts its own commentary and new material into the presentation 
of recombined sights. Reason also emerges as a figure in competition with Nature and 
Genius, as the text fears the unnatural and pushes Nature into a more relegated, powerless 
space. Thus the Roman de la Rose is not completely divorced from Neoplatonism and 
cannot be simply a joke on De planctu Naturae. Instead the text seriously engages with 
both Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, the past and the present, and represents a key 
moment in which imagination recombines the past. 
 Chapter three segues from the purely transformative to an imagination in the 
midst of a severe and obvious personification crisis. The personification crisis was 
suggested by the instability of Genius in the Roman de la Rose but becomes manifest in 
Chaucer’s House of Fame (1379). Here there is no Genius or Imagination personified, but 
I argue instead that Chaucer’s dreamer, Geffrey, represents the personified imagination. 
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The imagination’s relationship to images is here fundamentally questioned. If 
imagination’s purely creative ability was probed in the Roman de la Rose and De planctu 
Naturae, imagination’s reasoning capacity is investigated in The House of Fame. The text 
primarily poses the question: is imagination capable of reasoning and judgment? Nature 
is now nowhere to be found, but in this text imagination is seen struggling with reason, 
Nature’s enemy in the Roman de la Rose. I show how imagination faces an ontological 
crisis and crisis of embodiment that lend themselves to the eventual breakdown of the 
personified imagination in the fifteenth century. Literature and philosophy are aligned 
here, as the imagination’s crisis in The House of Fame is well-represented in 
contemporary philosophical texts about imagination and optical theory. Yet literature 
goes one step further than philosophy in detailing the relational qualities of imagination, 
especially in relation to Reason. This text thus introduces the irrational imagination, an 
imagination subject to fear and terror. I argue that this particular development of the 
imagination, subject to irrationality, terror, and a severe ontological and personification 
crisis, can be achieved only in literature and not in philosophy. 
 In chapter four, I establish that the fifteenth-century imagination recombines 
elements of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century imaginations, rather than representing 
a break from these centuries.  I demonstrate that, in this century, the imagination faces a 
personification crisis so extensive that its personification eventually becomes impossible 
by the end of the century. The imagination is often divided within itself, and eventually 
deteriorates as a personified figure. The fifteenth-century imagination thus functions as 
an extreme continuation of the problems of personification in the fourteenth-century 
imagination. The chapter also argues for the way in which personification allegory can 
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produce a history that runs counter to philosophy. Similar to Genius in Jean de Meun’s 
thirteenth-century Roman de la Rose, the fifteenth-century literary imagination resists the 
pattern of philosophical development of the faculty. Again imagination as a literary 
figure cannot move forward but remains rooted in the past. As in chapter two, 
imagination challenges personification, its ability to remain stable, its ability to represent 
the essence of anything, and its relationship to reality and the natural world. 
 If the divisive and even self-destructive nature of the imagination came to the fore 
in fifteenth-century literature, the sixteenth-century imagination takes this divisive figure 
to the extreme. The dissertation’s final chapter argues that the sixteenth-century 
imagination, examined through Spenser’s Faerie Queene (1590), is both a culmination 
and recombination of forces at play in the literary representation of imagination in the 
preceding four centuries. The collapse and division of the imagination seen in the 
fifteenth century has now run its course, resulting in utter fragmentation. Imagination’s 
creative ability and its relationship to the body and the individual self are just as 
rigorously questioned in the sixteenth century as they were in the twelfth century. 
Imagination is again a figure rooted in the past, holding onto the devastation of the early 
modern period’s fragmentation from the medieval period. 
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Chapter 1 
Imagination as Usurpation: Genius and Nature in the Twelfth Century 
 
 In his study of the “goddess Natura” in medieval literature, George Economou 
argues that the concept of Natura as the “mater generationis, the intermediary, 
subordinate, or vicar of God in the universe” developed in conjunction with medieval 
Platonism.36 As Economou asserts, the notion of Natura as vicaria Dei advances as part 
of a twelfth-century Chartrian fascination with nature, natural science, and natural 
philosophy.37 Some scholars, such as Peter Dronke, have further suggested that the figure 
of the “goddess Natura” did not originate in the classical period but in the twelfth 
century.38 As Economou points out, the “literary career of the goddess Natura” did not 
begin until the middle of the twelfth century.39 In the development of Natura as a 
personified literary figure, the intellectual and the literary setting were intimately 
connected. The School of Chartres was the twelfth-century locus of both philosophical 
discussion of Nature and of literary production that reified her as an allegorical figure.40 
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36 George D. Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2002), 2.  
 
37 Ibid., 3. For “vicaria Dei,” see 54-5. 
 
38 Peter Dronke, “Bernard Silvestris, Natura, and Personification,” Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes 43 (1980): 16-17. 
 
39 Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature, 58.  
 
40 The notion of the “School of Chartres” has had some detractors, most notably R.W. Southern. 
See his Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), 61-85. For arguments 
against in favor of the notion of the School of Chartres, see Peter Dronke, “New Approaches to 
the School of Chartres,” Anuario de estudios medievales 6 (1969), 117-40. See also Nikolaus 
Häring, “Chartres and Paris Revisited,” in Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis, ed. J.R. 
O’Donnell (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 268-329. 
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As Winthrop Wetherbee notes, the Chartrians’ “intense interest in the World Soul” led to 
“the idea of a more or less autonomous ‘Nature,’ operative in cosmic and human life and 
ensuring moral as well as physical stability.”41 As a literary and philosophical 
development particular to the twelfth century, the emergence of the figure of Natura 
represents a wider contemporary interest in the natural world from various intellectual 
arenas, including grammatical, legal, theological, and scientific.42  
 Thus it seems safe to assume that the twelfth century represents a time of intense 
interest in everything relating to nature and the natural world. The appearance of several 
major allegories featuring the goddess Natura in this century should therefore not be 
surprising. Yet what precisely is this “Nature” of twelfth-century allegory? Is her 
personified representation a clear outgrowth of twelfth-century natural philosophy? Is 
Nature in these allegories truly a “more or less autonomous” figure in the universe, as 
Wetherbee has positioned her? In fact, Nature is a significantly more complicated figure 
then has thus far been posited and her supremacy as a universal creator is by no means 
assured. In particular, Genius, a figure for the imagination, challenges Nature’s absolute 
reign.  
 Scholarly assessments of the twelfth-century Neoplatonic interest in Nature and 
the natural world have often led to a valuation of the allegorical figure Nature as a 
supreme messenger of God, a vicaria Dei, whose rule as an emanation of the divine 
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seems sound.43 This chapter will challenge the assessment of Nature as a divine 
emanation, a supreme being with unquestioned creative ability.44  
 A reconsideration of the personified goddess Natura in twelfth-century literature 
requires an accompanying reconsideration of her priest Genius. As Wetherbee has 
argued, the allegorical figure Genius in twelfth-century texts developed coterminously 
with the emergence of Natura and depends on a similar twelfth-century investment in 
defining the World Soul.45 These two allegorical figures emerge in the same intellectual 
moment, and they should not be considered in isolation. Yet what precisely is Genius’ 
role in relation to Natura? Is he truly Natura’s subordinate? Reassessing Genius’ position 
relative to Natura requires a similar reconsideration of his powers. Is he more or less 
powerful than Natura? Does he have the capacity to act independently of her command? 
Does he show potential to disobey her? These questions held primary importance for 
twelfth-century allegorists such as Alan of Lille and Bernardus Silvestris.  
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43 See Sara Ritchey, “The Place of Nature in Twelfth-Century Spirituality,” Religion Compass 3:4 
(2009), 601, for a discussion of twelfth-century Nature as a reflection of “divine harmonies” and 
of the “human soul and its perfectability.” See also Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval 
Literature, 54-5. For an overwhelmingly positive view of twelfth-century Natura, see M.D. 
Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives 
in the Latin West, ed. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997), 38-9 for an account of the twelfth-century’s triumphant discovery of nature as a force that 
“restored sanity” in man’s “intellectual life.” For a more measured and suspicious view of 
twelfth-century Nature’s power, see Hugh White, Nature, Sex and Goodness in a Medieval 
Literary Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), especially 86-98. See also  
Maurice Gandillac, “La Nature chez Alain de Lille,” Bien Dire et Bien Aprandre 2 (1980): 113-
124. 
 
44 On Genius in general, see Winthrop Wetherbee, “The Function of Poetry in the ‘De Planctu 
Naturae’ of Alain de Lille,” Traditio 25 (1969), 112-18. See also Edgar C. Knowlton, “Genius as 
an Allegorical Figure,” Modern Language Notes 39 (1924): 89-95. See also C.S. Lewis, The 
Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 361-3. 
 
45 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century, 34. 
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 Genius is not best explained as Nature’s “other self,” a kind of equal, in De 
planctu, as Barbara Newman, among others, has argued.46 Instead, Genius behaves as the 
antidote to Nature’s failures as an image-maker, and he emerges as an able creator and 
animator when Nature fails in this capacity. He thus begins to take over a role that is 
traditionally assigned to Nature. By creating and animating images, where Nature cannot, 
Genius rises from the shadows of the seemingly superior Nature.  
 At the same time as Genius’ role as creator is championed in this text, he is also 
poised as an “image,” necessarily somewhat degraded and suspicious in the text’s 
Neoplatonic context. Genius is able to redeem the dishonored Nature not only by 
excommunicating sexually deviant men but also by resuming her work of image 
production and craftsmanship. Yet Genius’ redemption is not wholly positive, since De 
planctu Naturae is suspicious of images and image-making. Genius’ triumph at the end 
of De planctu is therefore ambiguous. He is at once able to remedy Nature’s failure as 
image-maker and animator and is at the same time a supreme craftsman of the very 
product of which the text is often leery: images. He is at once a redeemer of Nature’s 
failed creative abilities and a degraded image himself. Genius’ creation of evil beings 
with his left hand and the presence of his true alterego, Antigenius, as a figure threatening 
Nature’s divine plan, reveal the text’s anxiety about Genius’ capacity to assume Nature’s 
creative function. His revitalization of Nature’s inability to produce and animate images 
is equally figured as a threatening usurpation of her power.  
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 While asserting Genius’ assumption of Nature’s power, I will thus also reassess 
the question of how precisely Nature fails in De planctu and in the contemporary 
Architrenius. True, Nature in De planctu cannot control unnatural and inappropriate 
sexual activity. Yet a subtler, though equally distressing, element of her failure in both 
De planctu and the Architrenius is her inability to create and animate images. Her artistry 
and capability as a creator have been compromised. As Newman has observed, Alan 
“confers authority on Nature with one hand and withdraws it with the other.”47 While 
Newman locates Nature’s failings in her femininity, I would argue that her failures are, 
more importantly, in the realm of image-making. In De planctu, Genius emerges not only 
to excommunicate those who have misbehaved sexually but also to take over Nature’s 
failed image-making capacities. This text and its twelfth-century environs, then, 
demonstrate a key moment in which the role of Genius as creator and animator of images 
develops. The Architrenius takes this accusation of Nature’s creative inabilities a step 
further both by suggesting that Nature creates horrid, unnatural creatures and by exposing 
her as an empty rhetorician with no capacity to generate knowledge. De planctu demotes 
Nature in terms more subtle than this but nonetheless reveals a keen suspicion of her 
creative abilities at its core.  
 To demonstrate how unique Alan’s exploration of the relationship between 
Genius and Nature is, I will also briefly investigate the representation of Genius in the 
most significant influence on Alan’s depiction of Genius and Nature, Bernard Silvestris’ 
Cosmographia.48 A brief exploration of this text demonstrates how twelfth-century 
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allegorists dealt with the inheritance of classical versions of Genius and sheds light on the 
ways in which Alan’s version of Genius breaks from classical traditions.49  
 The idea that Nature’s role is vulnerable in these twelfth-century allegories is 
significant in the battle between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy.50 Should 
Nature be valorized in a Neoplatonic universe?51 Neoplatonic philosophy is not interested 
in the “natural” in its own right but in Nature as an emanation of the divine.52 On a basic 
level, then, Aristotelian philosophy is more concerned with the natural world than 
Neoplatonic philosophy is. Twelfth-century poems allegorizing Nature intervene directly 
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49 Nitzsche, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 43. 
 
50 For a complex history of Natura before and up to Alain, see Giorgio Santillana, The Origins of 
Scientific Thought: From Anaximander to Proclus, 600 B.C. to 300 A.D. (Chicago: University of 
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Occitan Lyric,” in The Medieval World of Nature: A Book of Essays, ed. Joyce E. Salisbury (New 
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School of Chartres,” Acta 2 (1975): 42-52. For scriptural and Neoplatonic aspects of Alan’s 
nature, see Alberto Bartola, “‘Natura’ e ‘scriptura’ in Alano di Lilla,” Doctor Seraphicus: 
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%)!
!
in the debate between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic views of the natural world. It would 
be incorrect to assume that these allegorical texts contain ideas of Nature that are either 
wholly Neoplatonic or wholly Aristotelian. The power of Nature and her role in the 
universe is questioned in these allegories in part because these authors, most of whom 
were also philosophers and theologians, wish to enact a stage on which to work out the 
concept of Nature and the natural.53 Thus the representation of Nature’s uncertain power 
in these texts depicts a philosophical as well as a literary debate. Natura is Aristotelian as 
well as Platonic, and her allegorical figuration represents a way of staging a debate 
between these two modes of philosophical thought. Furthermore, the use of allegory 
provides an arena in which the role of Nature in the universe could be contemplated not 
only absolutely but also relationally, thus producing a rich set of possibilities for 
exploring the relationship between Nature and Genius. Establishing Genius’ independent 
power as well as his potential for suspicious and dangerous behavior serves as an 
important preamble to Genius’ development throughout the late medieval period, 
especially in Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose, a text heavily influenced by De 
planctu.54 
 Genius’ attempts to usurp Nature’s power represent an essential quality of the 
personified imagination: its power struggle with well-established allegorical figures such 
as Nature. At the same time, suspicion of Genius as a maker of unnatural and wayward 
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Bernardo Silvestre e Alano di Lilla,” Medioevo Romanzo 24 (2000): 161-188. 
 
54 For Alan’s influence on Jean de Meun, see Daniel Poiron, “Alain de Lille et Jean de Meun,” 
Bien Dire et Bien Aprandre 2 (1980): 135-51. See also Sylvia Huot, “Bodily Peril: Sexuality and 
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images maintains Imagination in a liminal space, in the process of establishing his 
allegorical presence and identity.   
 
Nature Disgraced: Alan of Lille’s De planctu Naturae  
 As George Economou argues, Alan of Lille “did more than any other author to 
establish and fix the characterization of the goddess Natura.”55 The influence of 
Bernardus Silvestris’ Cosmographia on Alan’s depiction of Natura is certainly palpable. 
Yet Economou likely alludes to the fact that the influential image of Nature as a tragic 
figure of epic proportions is the original work of Alan of Lille. Alan’s Nature, although 
described at much greater length than Bernard’s, is also much more markedly limited in 
her powers.56 Aside from the Cosmographia, Plato’s Timaeus can be discerned in the 
background of Alan’s text, and Boethius’ De consolatione Philosophiae provides the 
most prominent literary influence on Alan’s prosimetric form. Little is know about Alan 
of Lille, and the date of De planctu Naturae is difficult to establish. Reference to De 
planctu in Peter of Poitiers’ Sententiae, written between 1168 and 1176 and possibly 
before 1170, suggests that De planctu may have been written before 1170.57 R. Boussaut 
dates De planctu to some time between 1179 and 1182.58 James Sheridan, wishing to 
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56 Newman, God and the Goddesses, 71. 
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separate the De planctu from the Anticlaudianus by more years than Boussaut, tentatively 
dates the work to 1160-1165.59  
 The poem begins with the poet lamenting the state of the world when he is 
interrupted by the appearance of the majestic figure of Nature. Nature’s stature, beauty 
and garments are then described at length. Nature, filled with grief, recounts the 
disobedience of Venus, assigned to her as a delegate to aid her with worldly creation. 
Venus, married to Hymenaeus, became bored and had an affair with Antigenius, 
producing the offspring Jocus. Nature then details some of the vices, providing the poet 
with means to avoid them. Hymenaeus appears along with the virtues Chastity, 
Generosity, Temperance and Humility. Finally, Nature summons Genius to 
excommunicate sinners from her realm. The poet then awakes abruptly from his 
“ecstasy.”  
 Alan’s text makes clear that Nature has been disgraced by man’s disobedience. 
Yet Alan’s description of Nature, even as a disgraced figure, displays considerable 
insecurity about the extent of her inherent power. The dreamer’s first reaction to Nature’s 
appearance is one of awe, in an allegorical intervention that clearly owes much to the 
Philosophy’s dramatic entrance in the sixth-century De consolatione Philosophiae.60 One 
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60 Philosophy in this text appears as a commanding figure, full of splendor, with shining eyes and 
great height: Boethius, Consolatio Philosophiae, ed. James J. O’Donnell (Bryn Mawr: Thomas 
Library, Bryn Mawr College, 1990), Book I, Prose I: “Haec dum me cum tacitus ipse reputarem 
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nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis ambiguae. 2 Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese 
hominum mensuram cohibebat,nunc uero pulsare caelum summi uerticis cacumine uidebatur; 
quae cum altius caput extulisset ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum 
frustrabatur intuitum.” Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Joel C. Relihan (Indianoplis:  
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of the first details we hear about Nature relates to the light reflecting from her hair: 
“Cuius crinis, non mendicata luce sed propria scintillans, non similitudinarie radiorum 
representans effigiem sed eorum claritate natiua naturam preueniens, in stellare corpus 
caput effigiabat puelle…”61 Alan insistently elucidates that the light reflecting from 
Nature’s hair is not borrowed light (“non mendicata luce”) but light emanating from 
Nature herself (“sed propria scintillans”). “Propria” is a particularly forceful word, 
meaning not simply “hers” but “particular” to her or “not common with others.”62 We are 
to imagine that Nature’s hair shines with light that she owns or even produces herself. In 
a Neoplatonic universe, this insistence on Nature’s “unborrowed light” establishes her as 
an original form rather than as a degraded copy or image.  
 Alan emphasizes Nature’s status as “original form” further in the next phrase: 
“non similitudinarie radiorum representans effigiem sed eorum claritate natiua naturam 
preueniens.” In this neatly expressed ascending tricolon, Alan communicates with more 
and more vigor the brilliance of Nature’s emphatically inherent and unborrowed light. 
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Hackett Publishing Co., 2001), 2:“Her countenance demanded absolute reverence: Her eyes 
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Yet even within this avowal of Nature’s inherent light, language associated with images 
and similitudes emerges. The words Alan uses to describe Nature’s self-producing light 
are mostly terms applied to images and representations. The emphasis on Nature’s self-
producing light is an attempt to show that Nature is no representation or emanation of any 
other source. Yet Nature is immediately shown to be representing (“representans”) 
something else. Furthermore, Alan’s use of figura etymologica to play on the root of the 
word “effigiem” further accentuates the text’s reliance on imagistic language. “Effigiem,” 
most basically meaning “image” or “effigy,” derives from artistic production and craft 
and is associated with mere copies of original forms. The opposition established between 
the idea of the “native” or original (“natiua”) and the copied or non-native (“mendicata”) 
seems to collapse here. Alan undermines his own insistence on Nature as “original form” 
as distinct from “imagistic copy” by using terms associated with describing images to 
refer to Nature. The use of this ekphrastic language establishes Nature herself as an 
image. While Alan clearly attempts to demonstrate that Nature is not a representation of 
some other being, his language consistently reveals the impossibility of leaving images 
and representations behind.  
 Concerns about representation become yet more prominent in the description of 
the gems on Nature’s crown depicting the Zodiac. Alan describes the three Zodiacal 
stones on Nature’s crown:  
In anteriori namque ipsius diadematis parte tres preciosi lapides 
audaci sue radiationis superbia reliquis nouem anthonomasice 
prefulgebant. Lapis primus lumine noctem, frigus incendio pati 
iubebat exilium. In quo, ut faceta picture loquebatur mendacia, 
leonis effigiata fulminabat effigies. Lapis secundus, a priori non 
secundus in lumine, in prefate partis audaciori loco prefulgurans, 
quasi ex quadam indignatione reliquos lapides deorsum aspicere 
uidebatur. In quo, prout ueritatis simia pictura docebat, sub 
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imitatoria confictione progrediendo retrogradus, incedendo recedens, 
cancer post se uidebatur. Lapis tercius oppositi lapidis splendorem 
pauperculum habundantibus sue claritatis recompensabat diuitiis.63  
 
The descriptions of images here are clearly Platonic in their insistence on the levels of 
remove that occur in viewing a crafted object. The images that shine inside the stones on 
Nature’s crown are merely images of images. For example, the image of the lion in the 
first stone is not only an image of an image (“leonis effigiata…effigies”) but an image of 
an image contained within a stone. The removal of the image from any expression of the 
act of seeing is emphasized by the construction of the sentence, beginning “In quo” and 
proceeding to another subordinate clause (“ut faceta picture loquebantur mendacia”) 
before arriving at a description of the image itself (“leonis effigiata fulminabat effigies”). 
The image itself is so shrouded by the hypotactic construction of the sentence that by the 
time it is described, we are not entirely sure what we are seeing. Furthermore, Alan 
depicts the work of images in terms related to speech (“loquebantur”) rather than sight, 
suggesting that vision has been excluded from this discussion entirely.  
 The description of the second stone is most obviously disdainful of images. The 
image within the stone merely imitates truth (“prout ueritatis simia pictura docebat”). The 
sentence defers the description of the crab image itself until the last clause. Between the 
beginning of the sentence “In quo” and the final clause naming the image (“cancer post 
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63 Häring, II.55-64. Sheridan, 77-9: “In the front part of this diadem three precious stones glowed 
in front of the other nine, shining with a pride and daring that are reflected in their names. By its 
light the first stone imposed the sentence of exile on night and by its warmth on Winter. For in it, 
as the pleasantly deceptive picture showed, the image of an image of a lion flashed forth. The 
second stone, but not second to the first in light, glowing forth from a bolder position in the 
above-mentioned section, seemed to look down on the rest of the stones with a certain attitude of 
disdain. In it as the picture, aping truth, showed, a crab seems to be following himself when, in 
feigned imitation, he goes backward as he goes forward and forward as he goes backward. The 
third stone, by the overflowing riches of its brightness, made up for the impoverished splendour 
of the stone on the opposite side.” 
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se uidebatur”) are two clauses in a row to remind us that the image is a mere imitation. 
The crab crawls backward and forward only in “feigned imitation” (“sub imitatoria 
confictione”). His movement is highly unnatural, moving forwards while going 
backwards and backwards while going forwards (“progrediendo retrogradus, incedendo 
recedens”). Like the description of the first stone, the depiction of the crab image is 
embedded in reiteration of images’ aping nature. As a result, the images become 
secondary to the text’s assertion of the feigned nature of images.   
 Yet the greatest peculiarity of this passage is that it sounds almost identical to the 
description of Nature’s hair upon her entrance in prose 1. The passage is similarly 
concerned with the origin of the light emanating from the jewels on Nature’s crown, 
establishing the relative brightnesses of the three stones (“Lapis tercius oppositi lapidis 
splendorem pauperculum habundantibus sue claritatis recompensabat diuitiis”). The 
language here, especially the words “splendorem” and “claritatis,” is reminiscent of the 
language in the passage describing Nature’s hair. This linguistic similarity draws a 
parallel between the dreamer’s first vision of Nature and this passage, except that in this 
passage Alan explicitly expresses suspicion of images. This parallel suggests that we may 
now look back to Nature’s arrival with skepticism. Is her appearance as triumphal as we 
once thought or should we question her majesty? Should we be wary of the assertion that 
her hair shines with “unborrowed” light? Alan seems to linger in both these passages on 
the question of the source of Nature’s majesty. The source of Nature’s power is crucial 
because it stimulates further questions about the independence of her authority. Is Nature 
independently powerful or does she rely on God? Can her power be usurped by other 
figures, such as Venus and Imagination?  
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 After describing the images on Nature’s garments with a combination of 
skepticism and celebration, Alan delineates a strange detail of Nature’s failure: her 
inability to create lasting images. Nature’s physical appearance is steeped in images, as 
her garments detail all of creation. Yet Nature proves unable to formulate images herself:  
Hec uestium ornamenta quamuis sue plenis splenditatis flammarent 
ardoribus, eorundem tamen splendor sub puellaris decoris sidere 
paciebatur eclipsim. In latericiis uero tabulis arundinei stili ministerio 
uirgo uarias rerum picturaliter suscitabat imagines. Pictura tamen, 
subiacenti materie familiariter non coherens, uelociter euanescendo 
moriens, nulla imaginum post se relinquebat uestigia. Quas cum sepe 
suscitando puella crebro uiuere faciebat, tamen in scripture proposito 
imagines perseuerare non poterant.64   
 
The beginning of this passage continues Alan’s insistence on Nature’s inherent splendor, 
as he details how her own “splendor” eclipses the splendor (“plenis splendidatis”) of the 
images on Nature’s garments (“uestium ornamenta”). He strengthens the opposition 
between Nature’s inherent luminosity and the splendor of her garments by the use of the 
adversative “quamuis.” Yet behind this continued assertion of Nature’s independent 
splendor lie mistrust of her power and admittance of her failure. The images 
(“ornamenta”) appearing on Nature’s garments may be full of splendor (“plenis 
splenditatis”), but the pictures she creates cannot come into full existence. Everything 
Nature draws is quickly erased (“non coherens”). The use of the term “moriens” in 
reference to the disappearance of Nature’s images emphasizes her inability to bring 
anything permanent to life. Alan tries to redeem Nature’s animating and image-making 
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64 Häring, IV.1-8. Sheridan, 108: “Although the ornaments of these garments are on fire with the 
full glow of their splendour, their brilliance suffered eclipse by comparison with the star-like 
beauty of the maiden. With the aid of a reed-pen, the maiden called up various images by drawing 
on slate tablets. The picture, however, did not cling closely to the under-lying material but, 
quickly fading and disappearing, left no trace of the impression behind. Although the maiden, by 
repeatedly calling these up, gave them a continuity of existence, yet the images in her projected 
picture failed to endure.” 
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capacities by suggesting that her repeated calling up of new images gives the images a 
sort of life (“Quas cum sepe suscitando puella crebro uiuere faciebat”). Yet even within 
the same sentence, turning on a “tamen,” he must recognize that she cannot produce 
lasting animated images (“imagines perseuerare non poterant”). Thus the images Nature 
creates are not only fleeting but are also condemned to death (“moriens”). Nature, a 
supposed universal life force, not only cannot produce lasting images but also cannot 
bring them to life. This inability to produce animated images is not only a large part of 
Nature’s failure in this text but is also a skill that Genius is shown to possess at the end of 
the text. 
 
“Stepmotherly Cruelty”: Nature in John of Hauville’s Architrenius 
 John of Hauville’s Architrenius, a text contemporary with De planctu, 
demonstrates an equally ambivalent attitude toward the power of Nature. Yet whereas in 
De planctu, Nature blames Venus for corrupting mankind, in the Architrenius Nature is 
explicitly responsible for the wayward behavior of mankind. Nature in the Architrenius 
produces unnatural creations and monstrosities and is thus, in a sense, markedly 
unnatural. Despite this immediate difference between John’s Nature and Alan’s Nature, 
Nature in the Architrenius has an essential shortcoming in common with Nature in De 
planctu: she cannot produce lasting images. In this text, then, Nature again displays a 
form of helplessness as a creator; she must cede her image-making capacities to a better 
artisan and imager.  
 The Architrenius (“Arch-Weeper”) is a late twelfth-century narrative poem in 
4361 lines of Latin hexameter. The poem was dedicated to Walter of Coutances, the 
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Archbishop of Rouen, in 1184 by its author John of Hauville, a Norman grammarian 
possibly from the village of Hauville near Rouen where he was likely teaching by 1184.65 
There is evidence that John of Hauville knew Alan of Lille’s work, and the Architrenius 
was itself popular and influential throughout the medieval period, especially in the 
fifteenth century.66 The poem details the allegorical journey of Architrenius, a young man 
who is shocked to find that all of his thoughts and impulses tend toward vice. He embarks 
on a journey to find Nature, whom he blames for his brutish impulses, and meets Venus, 
Avarice, Presumption, Gluttony and Ambition along the way. He finally confronts Nature 
who answers his accusation and offers him Moderation as a bride.  
 This text represents an especially clear example of the simultaneous 
disparagement and veneration of Nature also seen in De planctu. Nature is depicted as a 
thoroughly ambiguous and equivocal character, even once Architrenius is supposedly 
reconciled with her at the text’s end. Within the passage introducing Nature lurks a 
powerful suggestion of her destructiveness. The passage begins by proclaiming Nature’s 
supreme power:  
Non habet arte manus, nec summa potencia certo 
Fine coartatur: astrorum flammeat orbes, 
Igne rotat celos, discursibus aera rumpit, 
Mollit aque speram, telluris pondera durat, 
Flore coronat humum, gemmas inviscerat undis, 
Phebificans auras, stellas intexit Olimpo. 
Natura est quodcumque vides, incudibus illa 
Fabricat omniparis, quidvis operaria nutu 
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65 Johannes de Hauvilla, Architrenius, ed. Winthrop Wetherbee (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), x. All quotations and translations of this text will be taken from this 
edition. 
 
66 Johannes de Hauvilla,!Architrenius, xxx-xxxii.  
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Construit, eventusque novi miracula spargit.67 
 
Nature is here described in a typical fashion as an artist and forger of new creatures. 
While Alan’s Nature fails at the particular art of creating lasting images, the Nature of the 
Architrenius is unquestionably master of all the arts (“Non habet arte manus”). Nature in 
her forge is autonomous in this text. She retires to her forge in order to create as she 
pleases (“quidvis operaria nutu/Construit”). Unlike Alan, who must revisit the question of 
whether Nature’s light is her own or borrowed, John of Hauville seems confident in 
portraying Nature as independent master of her creative art. She constructs (“construit”) 
according to her own will (“nutu”). She is even portrayed as a form of all-encompassing 
figure (“quodcumque vides”).  
 Yet even within this affirmation of Nature’s independent power lurks a troubling 
expression of her unnatural capabilities: 
Ipsa potest rerum solitos avertere cursus, 
Enormesque serit monstrorum prodiga formas, 
Gignendique stilum variat, partuque timendo 
Lineat anomalos larvosa puerpera vultus.68 
 
In the midst of describing Nature’s power, the passage details her monstrous fertility. Part 
of Nature’s celebrated power includes her ability to alter the course of the natural (“potest 
rerum solitos avertere cursus”) in order to produce monstrous giants (“monstrorum 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
67 Ibid., I.234-242: “There is no art that her hand has not mastered, and her supreme power knows 
no limit. She kindles the starry orbs, makes the heavens revolve by her vital heat, stirs the air with 
conflicting movements, makes the watery region fluid and hardens the bulk of the earth. She 
decks the land with flowers, plants precious gems in the deep, imbues the air with Phoebus’ light 
and adorns the firmament with stars. Whatever you behold is Nature; she labors at her all-creating 
forge, creates at will whatever she pleases, and spreads abroad a miraculous array of new 
products.” 
 
68 Ibid., I.243-247: “She has power to alter the normal course of events, and prodigally litters the 
world with huge and monstrous forms. The style of her conceptions is ever changing, and the 
fearful labor of her fantastic fertility gives shape to abnormal creatures.” 
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prodiga formas”). The fearful quality of this creation is obvious in the formulation 
“partuque timendo,” a construction that not only binds her creation inextricably to fear 
but also makes fear the instrument by which she creates these monstrous forms. Nature 
suddenly seems a paradoxically divided figure, herself capable of producing unnatural 
creations. This passage is followed by a long description of various examples of Nature’s 
“unnatural” inventions, including many sexually perverse mythical figures. In the 
Architrenius, as in De planctu, we find a figure of Nature demoted and disgraced by 
unnatural sexual activity, but here, Nature is herself responsible for producing this 
unnaturalness and depravity.  
 Nature is portrayed in the Architrenius as at once gloriously all-powerful and 
surprisingly cruel. She is described as “cuncta potentis,” and her first appearance to 
Architrenius mimics her appearance to the dreamer in De planctu. Architrenius is 
stupefied by her, even feeling some stirrings of desire: “Miratur solito magis 
Architrenius, ardet.” Even more remarkably similar to the introduction of Nature in De 
planctu, Nature in the Architrenius is awe-inspiring primarily because of her splendor: 
Sideris ardescens mulier spectatur et igni 
Lacius educto rutilum procul explicat orbem. 
Ingeminatque loci radios; nam Vere marito 
Pregnativa parit rosulas et lilia Tellus, 
Splendoresque serit alios fecudula florum 
Flora, perhennantis iubar effusive diei. 
Non hiemis fecem queritur tersissima veris 
Area, nec recipit Zephirus consorcia brume. 
Hec mulier vultu roseo phebescit, ephebis 
Defecata genis, senior matura, virentis 
Servat adhuc laurum faciei, temporis evo 
Non minor, ut Pilios longe precesserit annos.69  
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69 Ibid., VIII.290-301: “…a woman glowing like a star appears before him. Her brilliance, 
flashing forth on every side and casting a circle of radiance far abroad, lends a twofold splendor 
to the place, for Earth, made pregnant by the bridegroom Spring, brings forth rosebuds and lilies,  
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Nature’s gleaming appearance is repeatedly emphasized in this passage. She glows like 
the stars (“sideris ardescens”) with a radiance that penetrates all places (“loci radios”). 
The repetition of “splendor” from Alan’s text draws a parallel between the description of 
Nature here and her appearance in De planctu. John further underlines Nature’s splendor 
in the description of her face, glowing like Phoebus (“vultu roseo phebescit”). The terms 
“pregnativa,” “ingeminatque,” “serit,” and “fecundula” all draw repeated attention to 
Nature’s ability to create and procreate. Yet even this mention of Nature’s fertility bears a 
negative undertone, since we have already learned about Nature’s capacity to produce 
unnatural creatures. Even within this description of Nature as a brilliant creator arises the 
notion of her “unnatural” danger. Her role as a powerful creator is almost immediately 
undermined just as soon as it is introduced.   
 As in De planctu, Nature’s abilities as imager and artisan are shown to be lacking 
in the Architrenius. To begin with, Nature is not the artist of her own woven robes in the 
Architrenius, as Philosophia is in De consolatione Philosophiae: 
Divitis ingenio picture gaudet et auri 
Gloria vasorum rutilo pallore choruscat, 
Nec precii nec laudis egens. miratur in illis 
Artificis Natura manum seseque minorem 
Agnovisse pudet; nam gracia surgit in auro 
Plenior et quevis facies ornacior exiit.70  
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while Flora, modestly prolific spreads abroad the splendors of other blooms, her bounty like that 
of an endless spring day. The immaculate face of this Spring is not troubled by the dregs of 
winter, nor must Zephyrus endure the company of frost. This woman, 
Phoebuslike in the rosy glow of her face, has the unblemished cheek of youth, though ripe in 
years.” 
 
70 Ibid., IV.301-306: “A glorious array of drinking vessels rejoices in the skill of their sumptuous 
decoration, and gleams with the ruddy pallor of gold, unsurpassed in costliness and quality. 
Nature herself wonders at the artisan’s handiwork, and is ashamed to realize herself inferior, for a 
richer beauty than hers resides in gold, and whatever shape it assumes appears more elegant.” 
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Nature here recognizes (“agnovisse”) her inferior artisanship (“Artificis Natura manus 
seseque minorem”) and is even ashamed to admit it (“pudet”). It seems to be no 
coincidence that the term “ingenio” appears in the context of Nature’s rival artisan, as 
Genius is the figure who usurps Nature’s creative ability in De planctu. As in De planctu, 
no matter how splendid the description of Nature, her creative capacity is ultimately 
deemed inadequate.  
 Architrenius’ complaint to Nature revolves around two supposed faults on her 
part: her failure to provide him with any knowledge and her cruelty. Architrenius begins 
by suggesting that he is too overwhelmed by wonder to understand what Nature explains, 
yet this “overwhelming” is soon translated into a kind of frustration with Nature’s 
reliance on rhetoric. Architrenius draws a distinction between “wonder” and 
“knowledge” in Nature’s words, proclaiming that “Mirari faciunt magis hec quam scire.” 
Productive knowledge (“Scire”) is precisely what Nature’s words cannot produce. After 
yet another long speech by Nature, Architrenius becomes still more exasperated, 
exclaiming: “Quam procul eloquii fluvius decurret et aures/ Influet exundans,” ait 
Architrenius “utre/ Iam duplici pleno? satis est hausisse referto/ Vase, nec auricule pelagi 
capit alveus undam.”71 Architrenius at first assumes that his inability to gain knowledge 
from Nature’s words derives from his wonder at her appearance. Yet in this passage, just 
before he embarks on a long harangue of Nature’s cruelty and unnaturalness, suggests his 
understanding that her rhetorical eloquence communicates no actual information. The 
“eloquii fluvius” is certainly a reference to Nature’s rhetoric. Nature’s speech, like her 
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71 “How much longer,” says Architrenius, “will this river of eloquence run on, filling my ears to 
overflowing though the sack has already been filled twice over? Enough has been poured out 
when the jar is full; the little vessel of my ear cannot contain an ocean.”  
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images in De planctu, is ultimately fleeting precisely because it overflows the capacities 
of the human listener’s ears. The suggestion that Architrenius’ ears are already filled to 
their capacity and that Nature’s acts are somehow unnecessarily repetitive (“Iam duplici 
pleno”) especially enfeebles her authority. In this criticism, Nature is not merely 
unhelpful but also powerless. Just as Nature’s images in De planctu die upon her creation 
of them, her words in the Architrenius have no lasting form and produce no permanent 
knowledge. Nature is, perhaps ironically, remarkably unproductive.  
  Architrenius goes on to accuse Nature of a form of cruelty unnatural for a 
motherly figure: 
Compaterisne tuam scelerum, Natura, flagellis 
Affligi sobolem? que sic in pignora pacem 
Maternam turbavit hiemps? odiumne noverce 
Matris amor didicit? o dulces ubera numquam 
Exhibitura favos! heu pignora semper amarum 
Gustatura cibum! pietas materna rigorem 
Induit et scopulis Prognes induruit Ino. 
Sed quid ego dubito, luctusne refundere culpam 
In matrem liceat? matrem vexare querelis 
Exhorret pietas. prohibet reverencia matris, 
Imperat ira loqui; rabies in turpia solvit 
Ora, pudorque ligat. sed iam declino pudoris 
Imperium, maiorque michi dominator Erinis. 
Torrenti—fateor—ire non impero: de te, 
Pace tua, Natura, queror. tibi supplicat omnis 
Maiestatis apex et nobis semper avarum 
Obliquas oculum, nulla dulcedine clausas 
Scis reserasse manus. homo preda doloribus evum 
Tristibus immergit, nec amicis utitur annis, 
Nec fruitur letis, nec verna vescitur aura… 
Tolle, parens, odium! tandem mansuesce, novercam 
Exue, blanda fave! morum bona singula mater 
Possidet, et nato nec libra nec uncia servit.72  
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72 Johannes de Hauvilla, Architrenius, IX.178-210: “And can you, Nature, allow your offspring to 
be tormented by the scourge of wrong? What winter storm has so aroused your motherly 
gentleness against your charges? Has a mother’s love learned a stepmother’s hatred? Alas that 
your breasts will no longer impart their honeyed sweetness! Alas that your charges must  
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As Architrenius emphasizes Nature’s abandonment of her offspring, he repeats words for 
“mater” in almost every line in different grammatical formulations, from the accusative 
adjective “maternam” in line 180 to the genitive noun in line 181 to the nominative 
adjective in line 183. The use of the rhetorical device traductio to repeat different 
grammatical formulations of the word “mater” in lines 185-187 is an especially clear 
example of Architrenius’ obsessive reformulation of the word: “luctusne refundere 
culpam/ In matrem liceat? matrem vexare querelis/ Exhorret pietas. prohibet reverencia 
matris.” Three different grammatical uses of the word “mater” appear in these three lines 
alone, from the impersonal accusative “matrem” to the accusative “matrem” to the 
genitive “matris.” The repetition of the word “mater” indicates Architrenius’ disbelief at 
Nature’s cruelty toward her own offspring. Yet the consistent grammatical reformulation 
of the word may reveal a certain way in which Hauville’s text actively reformulates the 
idea of Nature. The text seems to pose the question: “Should Nature be deemed the 
supreme mater generationis?” By the end of this passage, Architrenius has substituted 
the term “stepmother” for “mother” twice, effectively depriving Nature of her role as 
fertile producer. The transformation of Nature from “mother” to “stepmother” resonates 
with earlier suggestions in the text of Nature’s inability to produce the best-crafted art 
and images, revealing her failure as creator.  
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henceforth taste only bitter food! Motherly compassion has cloaked itself in severity, and Ino has 
grown as hard as unyielding Procne. But what am I to do? I doubt whether it be right to place the 
blame for my suffering on my mother: filial devotion shrinks from assailing a mother with 
complaints. But what reverence for a mother forbids, wrath commands me to declare. Anger 
gives rein to foul speech, tough modesty resist it. I must now reject the rule of modesty, for the 
Fury who dominates me is too strong. I must admit that I cannot stem the tide of my wrath. By 
your leave, O Nature, my complaint is of you. Withdraw your hatred, O Parent, grow mild at last, 
put off stepmotherly cruelty and be gentle and kind. A mother’s nature should possess every good 
quality, and not deal with her child in terms of pounds and pennies.” 
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 Both the Architrenius and De planctu specify the ways in which Nature cannot be 
considered an independent creator and maker. While the attack on Nature may be far 
more explicit in the Architrenius than in De planctu, the accusation that Nature is not 
actually as productive as she should be is emphasized in both texts. In the Architrenius, 
Nature’s role as benevolent creator has been compromised by unnatural behavior and 
creation on the one hand and by a lack of artistic skill on the other. In the De planctu, the 
blame of unnatural creation falls upon Venus rather than on Nature, yet the accusation 
that Nature has become somehow deficient as an artist, imager and animator is very 
apparent. The Architrenius may simply represent a later development in twelfth-century 
views on Nature, in which Nature begins to take on more responsibility for the unnatural 
behavior of man. Whether or not this is truly the case, a comparison of these two texts 
reveals a startling lack of faith among twelfth-century authors in the ability of Nature to 
maintain her role as cosmic artificer.  
 
The Classical Genius: Bernard Silvestris’ Cosmographia 
 If Nature is shown to be weak, unnatural and unable to create independently in 
these twelfth-century allegories, Genius emerges not as her subordinate but as the figure 
who can perform the tasks at which Nature fails. Especially in De planctu, Genius’ 
ability to create images compensates for Nature’s failures as creator. In this way, Genius 
is not simply Nature’s other half but emerges as her superior. He can perform the actions 
that Nature cannot and thus his role as imager and animator, a capacity that Imagination 
takes on in full force in the later medieval period, begins to solidify. The end of De 
planctu offers us a preview of the eventual disappearance of Nature as Genius’ priest in 
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Gower’s Confessio Amantis. Before discussing Alan’s innovations in the representation 
of the character of Genius, I will first examine his twelfth-century influence’s iteration of 
this same character. Bernardus Silvestris’ Genius in the Cosmographia serves as an 
important bridge between the classical and medieval forms of this personified figure. By 
way of examining Bernardus’ Genius, it is possible to observe how Alan’s Genius 
represents a departure from a more traditionally classical representation of Genius as a 
figure for reproduction and generation. Alan’s text instead moves in the direction of the 
medieval iteration of Genius as imager and imagination. Alan’s Genius also emerges as a 
much more equivocal figure than Bernardus’ Genius.  
 The Cosmographia, a prosimetric work in two parts, was dedicated to Thierry of 
Chartres and completed before 1147 when it was read before Pope Eugene III.73 The text 
ultimately depends on a Platonic view of the universe deriving directly from Plato’s 
Timaeus and enjoyed great popularity throughout the medieval period, surviving in about 
50 manuscripts. The work begins with “Megacosmus,” describing the creation of the 
physical universe. The text opens with Natura’s complaint to Noys that the world is 
unordered. Noys responds by asserting her own role as daughter of God, begetting the 
World Soul (Endelechia) and marrying Endelechia to Mundus. This marriage leads to the 
creation of the nine orders of angels, the stars, and the planets. The cosmic cycle is 
established under the jurisdiction of Natura. The second part of the text, “Microcosmus,” 
details the creation of man. Natura travels through the universe, meeting Genius, Urania, 
and Physis who aid in the creation of man. Noys assigns specific roles to Natura, Urania, 
and Physis. Urania provides a soul for man derived from Endelechia, Physis provides 
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73 Bernardus Silvestris, The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris, trans. Winthrop Wetherbee 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 20.!!
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man with a body, and Natura unites the soul and the body. Thus the creation of both the 
universe and man is complete.  
 For Winthrop Wetherbee, the Genius of the Cosmographia, responsible for 
assigning forms to human souls, encapsulates Nature’s journey in general. Genius, as the 
representation of the “union of form with matter,” sits at the edge of the universe in order 
to “define the limits of Nature’s ascent toward the origins of being.”74 In Wetherbee’s 
view, Genius becomes a kind of intermediary between Nature, representing “form,” and 
Urania, representing “celestial ratio.” He performs the “archetypal act” of bringing these 
two elements of form and ratio together.75 Genius thus behaves as a mediator on behalf 
of Nature, a role typical of the imagination in general, and paves the way for a concept of 
Genius as Nature’s priest and messenger.  
 As Jane Chance Nitzsche notes, Bernardus’ Genius is an eloquent combination of 
different forms of classical Genius. Nitzsche suggests that the Genius Nature meets at the 
edge of the universe may not quite be a unified figure but a combination of various 
“genii” that collectively comprise a gamut of classical subtypes of Genius. These include 
the “astrological genius,” the Genius of generation; the “daemonic genius,” a kind of 
intermediary usually between this world and the underworld; and the “genius loci,” the 
“begetting Genius of marriage.”76 Wetherbee’s notion of Genius as an intermediary 
between Nature’s “formal impulses” and Urania’s ratio complements Nitzsche’s 
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74 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century, 92-3.  
 
75 Ibid., 174-5.  
 
76 Nitzsche, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 67.  
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“daemonic genius.”77 As Nitzsche observes, Genius is also cast in the role of 
Pantomorph, the celestial scribe, in the text. Pantomorph fashions creatures by copying 
from the heavens and imitating the Creator (or “Opifex”). While Pantomorph writes, 
Nature, with the help of her sisters Urania and Physis, forms creatures as a creator in her 
forge.78 The roles of Nature and Genius in this account seem to be clearly separated, 
except for one important overlap. Nature copies from the mirror Urania receives from 
Noys depicting the ideal forms of all things just as Pantomorph (a figure for Genius) 
writes down the form of all creatures by copying from the forms in heaven. Thus, as 
Nitzsche suggests, the “Artifex Natura” is herself a copy of “the scribe and artist 
Genius.”79 We can already see how the roles of Nature and Genius are not entirely clearly 
delineated in the Cosmographia, and the question of who does what and who is 
subordinate to whom comes to the fore even more in De planctu. The source of the 
problem of defining the roles of Genius and Nature is the variation in classical 
formulations of Genius. Defining Genius, and his role in relation to Nature, is particularly 
difficult in light of the innumerable roles he plays in a variety of different classical texts. 
The “conglomeration” that is Genius in the Cosmographia makes Alan’s task of defining 
him in De planctu yet more complicated, especially as Alan forges a rather original and 
unprecedented depiction of Natura in his text.  
 Genius’ main role in the Cosmographia is that of cosmic generator. “Genius” is 
used to specify a spirit that is joined to man’s body in the early stages of conception: 
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77 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century, 174-5; Nitzsche, The Genius Figure 
in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 67.  
 
78 Nitzsche, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 73-4. 
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Ea igitur spirituum distinctio que in aere mansitat, sed sereno, 
tranquillans mentes contrahunt, quia cohabitant in tranquillo. Ex 
istorum quoque numero secundus est Genius, qui, de nascendi 
principiis homini copulatus, vitanda illi discrimina vel mentis 
presagio, vel soporis ymagine, vel prodigioso rerum spectaculo 
configurat. Horum quidem non adeo sincera, non usquequaque 
simplex est divinitas, verum corpore—sed ethereo—circumplexa. Ex 
etheris namque serenitate et liquore aeris defecatam opifex puritatem 
excepit, unde divinas extrinsecus animas materiis, ut ita dixerim, 
simplicibus illigavit. Cum corpore igitur velud incorporeos, 
subtilores inferis, set superis grossiores, inbecilla non sufficit 
humanitas intueri.80 
 
Genius is here defined as a life force, since he joins man’s body from the first stages of 
conception (“de nascendi principiis homini copulatus”). The words “nascendi” and 
“copulatus” in particular evoke the sense of procreative activity and of birth itself. This is 
thus the classical genius identified by Nitzsche as the cosmic force associated with 
generation.81 Yet Bernardus does not leave the definition of Genius at that. Genius is also 
responsible for formulating dreams and signs that help guide human beings. Within a 
single sentence, Bernardus has thus combined two different forms of classical genius and 
fused them into one new Genius figure: the procreative, generative genius and genius as 
producer of dreams and images.  
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80 Bernardus Silvestris, Cosmographia, ed. Peter Dronke (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 135. All 
further quotations of this text will be taken from this edition. Bernardus Silvestris, The 
Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris, trans. Winthrop Wetherbee (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 107-8. All further translations of this text will be taken from this edition: 
“The class of spirits who dwell in the atmosphere, but in serenity, maintain calm of mind, as they 
live in calm. Second in rank to these is the genius which is joined to man from the first stages of 
his conception, and shows him, by forebodings of mind, dreams, or portentous displays of 
external signs, the dangers to be avoided. The divinity of these beings is not wholly simple or 
pure, for it is enclosed in a body, albeit an ethereal one. For the creator drew forth the distilled 
essence of ethereal calm and ethereal fluidity, and adapted divine souls to a material which was, 
so to speak, unmixed. Since their bodies are virtually incorporeal, and subtler than those of lower 
creatures, though coarser than those of higher powers, the feeble perception of man is unable to 
apprehend them.” 
 
81 Nitzsche, The Genius Figure in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 49-50.  
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 Interestingly, Genius is not simply responsible for producing images and dreams 
in the mind of man but has a specifically prophetic or discriminatory function. A trio of 
ablatives reveals Genius’ tools for showing man what dangers to avoid: “vel mentis 
presagio, vel soporis ymagine, vel prodigioso rerum spectaculo.” Genius’ production of 
images in the mind is thus not his only function in this text. The creation of images in 
sleep, portentous signs, and forebodings in the mind are all means to an end. Genius’ 
more essential role is to use these images to show human beings what dangers to avoid. 
This is a quite positive view of Genius’ role and displays faith in the utility of his 
imagistic inventions. In a similar fashion, Genius is figured as a form of personal 
guardian in this text. Bernardus describes how each man will be assigned a “genius” to 
watch over him: “Cum igitur homo, condictante quidem Providencia, novum figmentum, 
nova fuerit creatura, de clementissimo et secundario spirituum ordine deligendus est 
Genius, in eius custodiam deputatus. Cuius tam ingenita, tam refixa est benignitas, ut, ex 
odio malicie displicentis, pollute fugiat conversantem.”82 Genius is designated as a form 
of “custodiam,” described as fully benign (“benignitas”). It makes sense that Genius’ role 
as imager is also one of personal guidance for the mind of man. The images Genius 
creates are also meant as benign guidance, forming part of his task as custodian.  
 
Imager and Priest: Genius in De planctu Naturae 
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82 Bernardus Silvestris, Cosmographia, 135. Wetherbee, 107: “Accordingly, when the new 
design, the new creation of man has taken place, a ‘genius’ will be assigned to watch over him, 
drawn from this most merciful and serviceable race of spiritual powers, whose benevolence is so 
deep-seated, and unalterable, that they shun, out of a hatred of evil, any contact with the vile or 
displeasing.” 
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 Bernardus’ rather positive and personal depiction of Genius constitutes a major 
source of influence for Alan of Lille’s Genius in De planctu. The “conglomerative” 
nature of Bernardus’ Genius, derived from several different forms of classical genius, 
also strongly informs Alan’s version of Genius. Yet Alan’s text is more interested in 
exploring the relationship between Nature and Genius than Bernardus’ text is. Genius is a 
cosmic force, rather than a personal guardian, in Alan’s text. His prerogative as Nature’s 
priest is to function as her subordinate and take action against mankind on her behalf. Yet 
the extent of Genius’ subordination to Nature and thus the exact nature of his relationship 
to her are repeatedly probed in De planctu.   
 Nature’s official process of summoning Genius constitutes the first mention of the 
figure in this text. Genius must be summoned in writing: “Tunc illa cedulam papiream 
huius epistolaris carminis inscriptione arundinis interuentu signauit.”83 The performance 
of this summoning by inscription (“inscriptione”) suggests a formal ritual, as indicated by 
the terms “signauit” and “epistolaris.” Nature writes a formal letter to Genius, inscribed 
with her signature. Alan emphasizes the formality and ceremony surrounding the 
relationship between Nature and Genius by detailing this mode of summoning, replete 
with official language. This letter-writing is only the first sign of Alan’s deep interest in 
delineating (and complicating) the relationship between Nature and Genius. Nature’s 
letter to Genius reads like a long, rhetorical plea:  
Natura, dei gracia mundane ciuitatis uicaria procuratrix, Genio, sibi alteri, 
salute eique per omnia serenantis fortune blandicias amicari. Quoniam similia 
cum dissimilum aspernatione similum sociali habitudine gratulantur, in te 
uelut in speculo Nature resultante similitudine tecum in tuo profectu 
proficiens aut in tuo defectu equa lance deficiens. Quare circularis debet esse 
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83Häring, XVI.184-186. Sheridan, 207: “Then Nature, with the aid of a reed-pen, inscribed on a 
sheet of paper an official formula of the following kind.” 
',!
!
dilectio, ut tu, talione dilectionis respondens, nostram fortunam facias esse 
communem. Patrati sceleris euidentia, clamoris gerenis imaginem, humani 
generis naufragium tibi habundanter eloquitur. Vides enim qualiter homines 
originalis nature honestatem bestialibus illecebris inhonestant, humanitatis 
priuilegialem exuentes naturam, in bestias morum degeneratione transmigrant, 
Veneris in consequentia affectus proprios consequentes, gulositatis uorticibus 
naufragantes, cupiditatis uaporibus estuantes, alis superbie ficticiis euolantes, 
inuidie morsibus indulgentes, adulationis ypocrisi alios deaurantes. Hiis 
uiciorum morbis nullus medicinalibus instat remediis. Hunc scelerum 
torrentem nullus obice defensionis castigat.84 
 
The beginning of this letter constitutes the formula for letter-writing in Latin. The 
addressor, Nature, appears in the nominative (“Natura”) addressing the addressee Genius 
in the dative (“Genio, sibi alteri”), sending greeting (“salute”) as per the customary 
language of the opening of Latin letters. The letter is itself a highly rhetorical form of 
expression, bringing Alan’s Natura closer to the Natura in the Architrenius, who speaks 
fountains of rhetorical eloquence.85 It is intriguing that Natura should need to address 
Genius with such formality. There is something ceremonial and official about their 
relationship, and the fact that Nature needs to summon Genius using a rhetorically 
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84 Häring, XVI.187-204. Sheridan, 206-7: “Nature, by the grace of God, vicar-governess of the 
city of earth: to Genius, her other self, greetings and wishes that in all things he may be 
befriended by the delights of fair fortune. Since like, with disdain for unlike, rejoices in the bond 
of relationship with like, finding myself your alter ego by the likeness of Nature that is reflected 
in you as in a mirror, I am bound to you in a knot of heartfelt love, both succeeding in your 
success and in like manner failing in your failure. Love, then, should be a circle so that you, 
responding with a return of love, should make our fortunes interchangeable. The evidence of 
crime committed, evidence that all but shouts aloud, tells you at length of the shipwreck of the 
human race. For you see how men dishonor the dignity of their original nature by succumbing to 
bestial allurements, and abandoning a nature with the privilege of humanity, cross over to join the 
beasts by degeneration in their morals, as they follow their own inclinations in the pursuit of 
Venus, suffer shipwreck in whirlpools of gluttony, burn with the hot vapour of greed, fly on the 
counterfeit wings of pride, give themselves over to the bites of envy, gild others with the 
hypocrisy of flattery. No one brings medicinal remedies to bear on these diseases of vice.” 
 
85 For Alan’s use of rhetoric, see Alain Michel, “Rhétorique, Poétique et Nature chez Alain de 
Lille,” Bien Dire et Bien Aprandre 2 (1980): 113-124. 
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eloquent letter may suggest that she is his subordinate.86 At the same time, Nature’s act of 
summoning Genius to aid her and her identification of herself as “vicar-governess” and 
“vicaria Dei” suggests that she is second in command only to God and that Genius must 
be her subordinate. Already, the relationship between the two figures, and particularly the 
question of who is subordinate to whom, is examined.87  
 In a typical definition of the relationship between Nature and Genius, Genius is 
identified by Nature as her other self (“sibi alteri”). The role of Genius as Nature’s 
“likeness” is emphasized in the second sentence of Nature’s letter by the figura 
etymologica on the root “simile”: “Quoniam similia cum dissimilum aspernatione 
similum sociali habitudine gratulantur, in te uelut in speculo Nature resultante 
similitudine tecum in tuo profectu proficiens aut in tuo defectu equa lance deficiens.” 
Some form of “simile” occurs four times in different grammatical formulations in this 
single sentence: first as a nominative (“similia”), then as an accusative antonym 
“dissimilum,” then as an accusative (“similum”), and finally as an ablative 
(“similitudine”). The use of this word certainly reinforces Nature’s insistence on Genius 
as her other half or her “likeness.” Yet the constantly changing nature of the word itself 
suggests a subtle way in which Genius as Nature’s “likeness” may not be an assured and 
constant concept. Furthermore, the presence of “dissimilum” in the litany of “similum’s” 
subtly indicates a way in which the text may be working against itself and showing that 
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86 See Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter, eds., Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts 
and Literary Theory, AD 300-1475 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).!
 
87 This is in contradistinction to many scholars who claim that Genius is obviously Nature’s 
subordinate. See H. David Brumble, “The Role of Genius in the De Planctue Naturae of Alanus 
de Insulis,” Classica et Mediaevalia Revue Danoise de Philologie et D’Histoire 31 (1970), 306: 
“Clearly Genius is some kind of underling, or aspect, of Nature…” See also R.H. Green, “Alan of 
Lille’s De Planctu Naturae,” Speculum 31 (1956), 672.  
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Nature and Genius may not best be characterized as twins or likenesses, even as Nature 
herself tries to assert this relationship. This primary assertion of the relationship between 
Genius and Nature as “twins” is immediately undermined, however subtly, almost as 
soon as it is introduced.  
 To complicate matters even further, Nature’s definition of Genius as both her 
other self and as her likeness or mirror image indicate two different types of relationship 
and suggests that the exact nature of the relationship between these two figures has not 
been resolved. Scholars such as Winthrop Wetherbee and Jane Chance Nitzsche have 
taken Nature’s reference to Genius as “sibi alteri” to mean that he is certainly considered 
her twin in this text.88 Yet the exact equation of Nature and Genius should not be 
assumed so easily. Nature first calls Genius her “sibi alteri,” intimating that they are of 
the same substance and virtually identical. Yet Nature then devolves into a series of 
images of mirrors and likenesses that suggest divergence from an exact equation between 
her and Genius. Wetherbee contends that Nature’s view of Genius as “velut in speculo” 
indicates that Genius represents an exemplary form of Nature, a “higher reflection of 
herself.”89 Yet evidence for this view in Nature’s letter itself or in the text in general is 
scarce. Instead, Genius reflects Nature as an image or likeness, similar to the kinds of 
images or likenesses he himself creates, but he cannot, in this view, be an exact copy of 
Nature. As a mere reflection or likeness, he is, at least from a Neoplatonic perspective, a 
degraded version of an original. Earlier descriptions of the images on Nature’s own 
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garment demonstrate that the text is apprehensive about the integrity of images and 
likenesses. The formulation of Genius as Nature’s “likeness,” the real import of the word 
“similitudine,” encompasses a view of Genius as an inferior copy of the “original” 
Nature. The repetition of “in te” and “in tuo” reinforces the mirror image and the idea 
that Nature can see herself in Genius as if in a mirror. Yet the idea that they are exact 
twins, that he is her exact other self, or that he can be equated with her does not recur 
after Nature’s initial address to him as “sibi alteri.” Is Genius a degraded, subordinate 
version of Nature? Is he similar to her but not as powerful? Are they exact copies of each 
other occupying the same cosmic role? Alan complicates rather than resolves the answers 
to these questions.  
 Genius’ entrance is quite different from Natura’s arrival in Prose 1. He is neither 
the awe-inspiring nor tragic figure that Nature is. He is instead described as an old man 
who has been strangely unaffected by age:  
Cuius statura mediocritatis canone modificata decenter nec diminutionis 
querebatur afferesim nec de superfluitatis prothesi tristabatur, cuius caput 
pruinosis caniciei crinibus inuestitum, hiemalis senii gerebat signacula. 
Facies tamen iuuenili expolita planitie nulla fuerat senectutis exaratione 
sulcata. Vestes uero, opere sequente materiam, huius uel illius nescientes 
inopiam, uidebantur nunc inflammari purpura, nunc serenari iacinto, nunc 
colore succendi coccineo, nunc bisso expressius candidari.90 
 
While Nature is clearly an imposing, majestic figure, Genius has a kind of mediocre or 
middling stature (“stature mediocritatis”). Mention of Genius’ hair is reminiscent of the 
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90 Häring, XVIII.59-66. Sheridan, 215: “His height, kept within fitting limits by the rule of the 
mean, neither had a complaint to make about shortening by contraction nor was he saddened by 
superfluous elongation. His head, covered with hair hoar-frosted by greyness, bore minor signs of 
winter-like old age. However, his face, smooth with the regularity of youth, had not been 
furrowed by the plough of age. His garments, with workmanship suiting material, suffered from 
no defect in the former or the latter and seemed now to be aflame with purple, now to have the 
brightness of the hyacinth, now to be afire with scarlet, now to have the clear white of linen.”  
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text’s earlier focus on the magnificent gleam of Nature’s hair. Yet Genius’ hair, far from 
producing its own divine light, is simply described as dressed in grey and displaying the 
signs of old age (“cuius caput pruinosis caniciei crinibus inuestitum, hiemalis senii 
gerebat signacula”). Again reminiscent of the introduction of Nature at the beginning of 
the text, Genius’ garments are described but again in language that falls short of the 
majesty due to Nature. The images on Genius’ garments are described as well-suited to 
their material (“opere sequente materiam”). All that can be said of their workmanship is 
that it is not defective (“huius uel illius nescientes inopiam”). In fact, the primary feature 
of Genius’ description seems to be this insistence on his mediocrity, his well-suitedness, 
and his appropriateness. Having evoked the dramatic description of Nature by focusing 
on Genius’ stature, hair and garments, Alan shies away from a depiction of Genius that 
would resemble Nature’s majesty. He is instead unremarkable: of middling height and 
“appropriately” dressed.  
 From this underwhelming description, we would not expect Genius to have the 
kind of power Alan reveals him to have. Yet Genius soon emerges as a triumphant 
imager where Nature has previously failed at this very task. In particular, Genius has the 
ability to breathe life into inanimate images:  
Ille uero calamum papiree fragilitatis germanum numquam a sue 
inscriptionis ministerio feriantem, manu gerebat in dextera: in sinistra uero 
morticini pellem nouacule demorsione pilorum cesarie denudatam, in qua 
stili obsequentis subsidio imagines rerum ab umbra picture ad ueritatem 
sue essentie transmigrantes, uita sui generis munerabat. Quibus delectionis 
morte sopitis, noue natiuitatis ortu alias reuocabat in uitam. Illic Helena, 
suo decore semi-dea, enfasi sue pulcritudinis mediante, ‘pulcrutido’ 
poterat nuncupari. Illic in Turno fulmen audatie, uigor regnabat in 
Hercule. Illic in Capaneo gigantea ascendebat proceritas, in Vlixe uulpina 
uigebat calliditas. Illic Cato pudice sobrietatis nectare debriabatur aureo, 
Plato ingenii splendore rutilabat sidereo. Illic stellata cauda Tulliani 
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pauonis ridebat. Illic Aristotiles sententias enigmaticarum locutionum 
latibulis inuoluebat.91  
 
In this passage, Genius is exposed as a craftsman of images and as a scribal figure. He 
hovers over his papyrus with a pen in his right hand. Yet Genius does not simply create 
images with his pen on papyrus; he animates them. As a usual, continuous gesture 
narrated in the imperfect, Genius bestows life upon his images as a kind of generous gift. 
While the images on Nature’s garments and inscribed on the diadems of her crown are 
derided for their pale imitative nature, Genius has the capacity to bring mere images out 
of the untrustworthy shadow (“ab umbra picture”) of Neoplatonic suspicion into the light 
of true existence (“ad veritatem sue essentie”). The opposition formed here between the 
copied picture (“picture”) and the essence (“essentie”) of true creation suggests that 
Genius has the capacity to create original objects rather than suspicious images or copies. 
This capability gives Genius, who was only moments ago degraded as a mere likeness of 
Nature, a nearly God-like status.  
 Of course, Alan has in part taken this ability of Genius’ directly from Bernard’s 
Cosmographia, in which Genius, in keeping with classical tradition, is a life-giving force 
who inscribes images of creatures in a book. Yet there is greater significance to Alan’s 
emphasis on Genius’ life-giving animating ability than simply its existence in the 
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91 Häring, XVIII.68-80. Sheridan, 215-16: “In his right hand he held a pen, close kin of the fragile 
papyrus, which never rested from its task of enfacement. In his left hand he held the pelt of a dead 
animal, shorn of its fur of hair by the razor’s bite. On this, with the help of the obedient pen, he 
endowed with the life of their species images of things that kept changing from the shadowy 
outline of a picture to the realism of their actual being. As these were laid to rest in the 
annihilation of death, he called others to life in a new birth and beginning. There Helen, a demi-
goddess in beauty, by reason of her impressive beauty, be styled ‘The Beauty.’ There the 
thunderbolt of impetuosity held sway in Turnus, strength in Hercules. There a giant’s stature rose 
high in Capaneus, the cleverness of the fox was active in Ulysses. There Cato was intoxicated 
with the golden nectar of modest sobriety; Plato glowed wit the shining star of genius. There 
Cicero’s peacock with its bestarred tail exulted. There Aristotle ensconces his ideas in the coverts 
of enigmatic expressions.” 
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Cosmographia. The description of Genius’ ability to animate the images functions as a 
specific and pointed correction of Nature’s inability to perform the same action earlier in 
the text. In Prose 2, Nature inscribes pictures on slate tablets that immediately disappear: 
“Pictura tamen, subiacenti materie familiariter non coherens, uelociter euanescendo 
moriens, nulla imaginum post se relinquebat uestigia.” While Genius is heralded for his 
ability to bring images to life, with the term “uita” repeated twice in the description of his 
image-making and animating activities, Nature can do nothing but create images that die 
as they come to life. Her images leave no traces (“uestigia”). In fact, it is never even said 
that Nature brings images to life but only that the images she composes immediately die 
(“uelociter…moriens”). This inability to create anything is a devastating failure for 
Nature in this text, as she is supposedly God’s agent of creation, his vicaria Dei, who 
should have the capacity to create and animate. The Natura of the Architrenius 
experiences a similar failure when she discovers herself an inferior artisan and creator of 
images in Book Four and feels deep shame at her lack of creative ability. It seems 
particularly significant that Nature’s failure becomes Genius’ triumph in De planctu. As 
Nature has been stripped of her power, Genius has usurped the precise abilities that 
Nature has lost.  
 This usurpation of Nature’s power by Genius cannot be an entirely comfortable or 
positive outcome. Although Genius is attributed God-like power in his ability to 
transform mere images into original, “honest” creations that bespeak a Neoplatonic 
veneration of “essence” over imagistic copy, he is still initially depicted as a degraded 
image himself. Furthermore, Genius creates with both his right and left hands. Everything 
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Genius creates with his right hand becomes a positive force in the universe, such as the 
“semi-dea” Helen. Yet everything Genius creates with his left hand turns out to be evil:  
Post huius inscriptionis sollempnitatem dextere manui, continue 
depictionis defatigate laboribus, sinistra manus, tanquam sorori fesse 
subueniens, picturandi officium usurpabat, manu dextera pugillaris 
latione potita. Que ab orthographie semita falsigraphie claudicatione 
recedens, rerum figuras immo figurarum laruas umbratiles, semiplena 
picturatione creabat. Illic Thersites, turpitudinis pannositate uestitus, 
pericioris fabrice solerciam postulabat. Illic Paris incestuose Cipridis 
frangebatur mollicie. Illic Sinon sinuose locutionis latebris armabatur. 
Illic Ennii uersus, a sententiarum uenustate ieiuni, artem metricam effreni 
transgrediebantur licentia. Illic Pacuuius, nesciens narrationis modificare 
curriculum, in retrograda serie sui tractatus inicium locabat.92  
 
Genius’ left hand adopts the task of creation when his right hand becomes tired. The use 
of the term “continue” suggests that there exists a regular trade-off between the work of 
Genius’ right hand and the work of his left hand. Even so, the “sinistra manus” does not 
just take over from a willingly tired right hand but “usurpabat” the work of the right 
hand. Considering that the left hand continues to produce Thersites, Paris, and Sinon, 
traitors and inciters of unnatural violence, it is not surprising that there may be something 
sinister about the way in which the left hand assumes the role of the right hand. While the 
right hand has made imagistic imitations into essential beings, the left hand operates once 
again in the realm of shadowy images. The movement from the production of the right 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
92 Häring, XVIII.81-91. Sheridan, 216-17: “After this solemn process of enfacement, his left 
hand, as if were helping a weary sister, came to the aid of his rights which had grown tired from 
the toil of continuous painting and the left took over the work of portrayal while the right took 
possession of the tablets and held them. The left hand, limpingly withdrawing from the field of 
orthography to pseudography, produced in a half-completed picture outlines of things or rather 
the shadowy ghosts of outlines. There Thersites, dressed in his disgraceful rags, impeached the 
expertness of one more skilled in strategy. There Paris was being broken down by the wantonness 
of the lewd Cyprian. There Sinon was arming himself with subterfuges for a sinuous speech. 
There the verses of Ennius, destitute of elegance of idea, crossed the bounds of metrical practice 
in unrestrained license. There Pacuvius, unskilled in arranging the sequence of his narrative, 
places the beginning of his discourse at a stage that points backwards.” 
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hand to that of the left hand is described as a movement from orthography (“ab 
orthographie”) to forgery (“falsigraphie”). At first Alan suggests that the left hand creates 
images of things (“rerum figuras”) but then corrects this with the dramatic turn of phrase 
“immo” to reveal instead that what the left hand fashions are mere shadowy ghosts of 
figures (“figurarum laruas umbratiles”). The use of both “laruas” and “umbratiles” 
emphasizes the extent of the remove of these images from real essential beings of the sort 
the right hand produces. The construction of the entire phrase with “rerum figuras” 
interrupted by “immo figurarum laruas umbratiles” further highlights the importance of 
asserting that the figures created by the left hand are not simply images of things but, at 
an even further remove from reality, shadowy ghost-like outlines of images of things.  
 Thus even as Genius usurps the creative capacity of Nature and breathes life into 
images, the positive creative ability of his right hand is also usurped by the negative 
creative ability of his left hand. Genius is himself a divided figure who can create both 
true essences and shadowy false images. He is at once elevated and demoted in the text’s 
Neoplatonic scheme. Genius’ “false” creations raise the question of whether there may be 
more of a connection between Genius and Antigenius than is usually posited. According 
to Nature’s complaint, Venus, bored with the conjugal bed she shares with Hymeneus, 
has an affair with Antigenius that leads to the damnable and unnatural behavior of 
mankind and the offspring Jocus: 
Venus, hiis furiis aculeata letalibus, in suum coniugem Hymeneum, thori 
castitatem peste adulterationis incestans, cum Antigenio cepit 
concubinarie fornicari suique adulterii suggestionibus irretita letiferis 
liberale opus in mechanicum, regulare in anomalum, ciuile in rusticum 
inciuiliter inmutauit meumque disciplinare inficiata preceptum, malleos ab 
incudum exheredans consortio adulterinis dampnauit incudibus. Ipse etiam 
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incudes natiue suorum malleorum deplorantes absentiam lacrimabiliter 
uidebantur deposcere.93  
 
This passage delineates the process of the turn from Venus’ natural sexual behavior to 
perversion. As Venus moves from her conjugal bed with Hymeneus to her adulterous bed 
with Antigenius, she also moves from “liberale opus” to “mechanicum,” from “regulare” 
to “anomalum,” and from “ciuile” to “rusticum inciuiliter.” This dwelling on Venus’ 
transformation from upright, noble and natural sexual behavior to mechanical, anomalous 
and uncivil rustic behavior is later echoed in the movement from the noble creations of 
Genius’ right hand to the degraded production of his left hand. Just as Antigenius usurps 
the role of Hymeneus, Genius’ left hand usurps the work of the right hand. The results, 
unnatural behaviors and unnatural offspring or creations, are similar. This parallel 
construction of usurpation begs the question of whether Antigenius is really the opposite 
of Genius or whether he is instead an essential part of Genius, the part characterized by 
the work of Genius’ left hand. “Usurpation,” represented by the term “usurpabat” in the 
description of the relationship between Genius’ left hand and his right hand, should 
perhaps be seen as the central concept in Alan’s De planctu. The text can be seen as serial 
usurpations: that of Hymenaeus’ marriage bed by Antigenius, that of the creative role of 
Nature by Genius, and that of the creative work of Genius’ right hand by his left hand. 
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All of these usurpations, including that of Nature’s creative role by Genius, are treated 
with suspicion and anxiety in the text.  
 If Antigenius may represent the work of Genius’ left hand, then the recreation of 
Genius as Venus’, rather than Nature’s, priest in John Gower’s fourteenth-century 
Confessio Amantis begins to make more sense. Perhaps the seeds for a Genius who is not 
Nature’s subordinate are already present in Alan’s text, both in the figure of Antigenius 
and in the suggestion that Genius himself may be more disobedient than he seems. Alan’s 
text implies on some level that Antigenius is actually an essential part of Genius and that 
his dissent from Nature is therefore somewhat ingrained or inevitable. The development 
of Genius as a figure increasingly associated with Venus rather than Nature and as a 
decreasingly “natural” force in the universe should thus be seen as a continuous 
phenomenon that emerges in the twelfth century rather than as an innovation of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The threat of Genius’ “unnatural” behavior is 
therefore a surprisingly continuous one, beginning perhaps as a latent threat in Alan of 
Lille’s twelfth-century text and becoming manifest by the fourteenth century.   
 In this twelfth-century material, philosophy and literature are bound tightly 
together, since many of the authors of these literary texts are also philosophers and the 
literary texts themselves in some ways straddle the line between literature and 
philosophy. What cannot quite be captured in purely philosophical texts, however, is the 
nuance of the complex relationship between Nature and Genius that Alan depicts. The 
literary form of allegory allows for a certain kind of experimentation with the relationship 
among important figures in philosophical thought, such as Nature and Genius. The subtle 
dance that Genius engages in, aiding but also carefully usurping Nature’s place in the 
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cosmos, relies upon the presence of a narrative, allegorical story and the careful 
manipulation of literary language. This particular feature, and the introduction of the 
notion of the literary imagination as a perpetually transforming character, always 
redefining its role in relation to other allegorical figures, could not be expressed in non-
narrative philosophical prose in the same way.  
 Genius continues to emerge from the shadows of Nature’s influence and 
dominance in Jean de Meun’s thirteenth-century Roman de la rose. In this text, Genius 
attempts anew to assert his dominance over Nature. Yet as we shall see, the allegorical 
role Genius endeavors to establish for himself is in no way secure. Genius remains 
changeable and ambiguous, always on the edge of different transformative possibilities, 
and always altering and reasserting his allegorical position.  
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Chapter 2 
Protean Genius: Jean de Meun’s Transformative Imagination and the Image Crisis in the Roman 
de la Rose 
 
 If Alan of Lille left us with a Genius poised between benevolent and unnatural 
creativity, Jean de Meun’s portion of the Roman de la rose picks up with a Genius whose 
very essence is transformation. Scholars have long been troubled by the figure of Genius 
in Jean de Meun’s portion of the Roman de la rose.94 Frustratingly sly, Genius may at 
first seem merely facetious, perhaps a figure for the writer Jean de Meun himself. Many 
critics have chosen to view Genius as a figure for a fiercely ironic opposition to the 
Neoplatonic Genius of Alan of Lille’s twelfth-century De planctu Naturae.95 Yet this 
view has consistently figured Genius as a purely antithetical character without pondering 
what Genius may represent in Jean’s text. The result is an artificial sense of rupture in the 
development of the allegorical Genius (or Imagination) figure in the later medieval 
period. If critical consensus posits that Jean’s Genius is merely a reaction against Alan of 
Lille’s then there can be no discussion of the complex ways in which Jean de Meun’s 
Genius traces a critical moment in the philosophical development of the imaginative 
faculty.  
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 The development of Nature and Genius in the Roman de la Rose is in some 
essential ways a continuation of their portrayal in De planctu. Nature has been more 
definitively relegated to Genius’ control, being banished to her forge at the start of his 
speech.96 The shift from Genius as Nature’s priest to Genius as Nature’s confessor also 
indicates a change in the power dynamic between these two figures: in this text, Genius is 
more explicitly Nature’s superior. Yet Nature’s role is usurped by Reason more than by 
Genius in this text, a figure who is explicitly said to be outside the realm of Nature’s 
creation. The text expresses general anxiety about the place of the “natural” in the 
universe. Nature herself becomes increasingly confined to her forge, becoming a 
conscientious smith rather than a powerful cosmic force in the universe. As in De 
planctu, Nature’s dominion over artistic creation is also anxiously questioned in this text. 
In the Roman, Nature’s role, like her confinement to her forge, has become more limited, 
and the components of her traditional role as cosmic creator have been parceled out 
among other allegorical figures, including Art, Reason and Genius.  
 Yet Genius does not simply “usurp” Nature’s creative role in the universe in the 
Roman. The relationship between the two figures is not merely a question of power in the 
Roman the way it seems to be in De planctu. Instead, Genius, even while confining 
Nature to her forge, emerges as an uncertain figure, constantly caught in a process of 
transformation. While Nature becomes less powerful, Genius also undergoes a significant 
transformation in the process of his own sermon. Over the course of his sermon, Genius 
transforms from the classical and Silvestrian generative force to the later medieval 
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“recombinative imagination.”97 By detailing the process of this transformation, the 
Roman projects an image of Genius as an “in-process” figure whose identity is in flux.  
 As he is suspended in this process of change, Genius becomes somewhat of an 
untrustworthy figure. Genius’ rewriting of the spring of Narcissus episode from the first 
part of the Roman suggests that he does not only recombine images previously seen but 
he also alters them significantly. The extent to which we can trust what we see has 
already been frustrated by Nature’s discourse on optics, and Genius furthers this concern 
by demonstrating how imagination’s recombined images can be just as distorted as the 
figure of the bent stick in the water. This chapter will argue that in his constant 
transformation, Genius in the Roman encapsulates unease about images in the text as a 
whole. He is not only a recombination of the images seen earlier in the dream, but he also 
functions as a recombination of the text’s obsessive assessments and reassessments of the 
capacities of images and especially the text’s apprehension about the ability of images to 
convey truth rather than distortion.  
 Genius’ transformation from generative priest to recombinative imagination 
occurs over the course of the portion of his sermon in which he re-narrates the lover’s 
encounter with the Garden and the Fountain of Narcissus. This portion of the speech not 
only demonstrates Genius as a figure in flux but also witnesses Genius attempting to 
figure out how much interpretative work the recombinative imagination should perform. 
The narration of the Fountain scene reveals that the very concept of the “recombinative 
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imagination” is similarly in flux in Jean de Meun’s intellectual milieu. While claiming to 
summarize the previously viewed scene, Genius simultaneously inserts a large amount of 
commentary and then repeatedly reverts to a supposed mere summary. This examination 
of the work of the imagination by a figure representing it is unusual and troubles both the 
reliability of the function of the imagination and the supposedly stable and clearly 
identified nature of an allegorical figure. Perhaps more than any other allegorical figure 
in the text, Genius consistently upsets the idea of the allegorical figure as an assured and 
constant representation of a concept.  
 If Alan of Lille’s text can be seen as a series of usurpations, the Roman should be 
seen as a series of transformations. At every turn, the text is confronted by the 
inconsistencies of nature and anxious about the ease with which anything can be 
transformed. Even the poem’s compositional process is transformative. The text may be 
seen as a holistic approach to love that is interrupted and resumed by another author. This 
“poetics of inconsistency” must in some way trouble the poem’s presentation as 
personification allegory. Allegorical figures should be static and unmoved, but this 
cannot be the case in a text that is permeated by perpetual transformation. The result is a 
series of allegorical figures who are caught somewhere between the static and the 
protean. This pattern reaches its culmination in the ultimate figure of transformation, 
Genius. If Nature teaches us to be wary of sight through her discourse on optics, Genius 
exhorts the reader to be wary of “recombinative” sight, of the work of the imagination, 
and of the supposedly inert nature of images. Genius becomes an encapsulation of the 
text’s crisis about both the deceptive possibilities of vision and the transformative power 
of images.  
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 If Genius usurps Nature’s creative capacities in De planctu, in the Roman, he 
assumes her inclination toward transformation and takes it to an even more profound 
level. Nature reveals that her cosmic role may be unstable, delineating her constantly 
shifting relationship to Art and Reason and the distribution of the characteristics usually 
associated with her across a range of other allegorical figures. Yet the series of 
transformation continues at the end of her confession, when Genius relegates her to a 
space of confinement and repetition and reveals himself to be the real figure of 
transformation in the text. For Sarah Kay, Nature’s speech represents a crux in the text 
upon which Jean’s simultaneous engagement with and abandonment of Boethius 
converges.98 Yet I would argue that Genius in fact brings the text’s crux to its fruition. It 
might be said that Genius extracts Nature’s transformative capacities and makes them his 
own in a movement that fashions him as the engin of the text’s image crisis. I will first 
detail Nature’s processes of transformation, then demonstrate how Genius extracts and 
usurps them in a speech that also asks some frightening questions about the operation of 
the recombinative imagination. Finally I argue that Genius’ self-fashioning as a 
transformative figure in the process of change captures the text’s pervasive concern with 
the mutability of images.  
 
Thirteenth-Century Philosophy: Jean de Meun’s Intellectual Milieu 
 Before examining the attitudes toward Nature and Imagination in the Roman de la 
Rose directly, it is essential to account for the philosophical climate in which both 
Guillaume de Lorris and especially Jean de Meun wrote. In doing so, we find Jean de 
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Meun’s suspended, transformative Genius to be interestingly in line with concurrent 
developments in faculty psychology. Importantly, theories of imagination begin to move 
toward Aristotelian faculty psychology, away from notions of Augustinian illumination 
and devaluing of the senses. At the same time, philosophy in Jean’s surroundings, 
including faculty psychology, is surprisingly heterogeneous, poised between 
Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism. Aristotelian ideas are not absorbed easily but instead 
present a set of ideas that are constantly in flux across this period as philosophers attempt 
to solve the problem of incorporating Aristotelianism into dominant Augustinian and 
Neoplatonic world-views. Jean’s uncertain Genius, often suspended between cosmic 
generative force and recombinative imagination, thus reflects a larger philosophical 
conundrum about how to manage the overwhelming flood of Aristotelian and Arabic 
philosophical texts.  
 Thirteenth-century Paris was the seat of scholasticism, vastly demonstrating the 
influence of new translations of both Arabic and Greek philosophical sources. 
Particularly important for theories of imagination were Latin translations of Avicenna’s 
De anima and Aristotle’s De anima. The influx of new Aristotelian-influenced 
philosophical materials into Paris in the thirteenth century was a result of several twelfth-
century translation movements. In the twelfth century, Toledo was a center for translation 
from the Arabic of Aristotelian texts and related works by Arabic writers.99 There were 
also translations in Italy directly from Greek Aristotelian texts, most significantly those 
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by James of Venice between 1130 and 1150.100 In the thirteenth century, scholars in 
Sicily and Toledo, among other places, undertook further translation, including Michael 
Scot, Hermann the German, William of Luna, a translator of Averroes, and William of 
Moerbeke. Moerbeke translated almost the entire Aristotelian corpus between 1260 and 
1286. Moerbeke’s texts eventually became the standard for Latin translations of Aristotle 
in the medieval period.101  
 Aristotle’s texts were not absorbed into the thirteenth-century French 
philosophical milieu seamlessly, however. In 1210 in Paris, the scientific works of 
Aristotle were banned.102 The ban on Aristotle’s natural philosophy was repeated in 1215 
in the statutes for Paris University.103 The injunctions were repeated once again in 1231, 
indicating that they must not have been strictly followed.104 Aristotelian thought did 
provoke fear and uneasiness in the minds of thirteenth-century religious leaders. As Luca 
Bianchi has argued, these injunctions were instituted in part to protect sacred science 
against the infiltration of pagan science and in part inspired by Pope Innocent III in his 
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fight against potential heresies.105 In addition, because the injunctions specified 
commentaries on Aristotle, they may have included works by commentators such as 
Avicenna and Alfarabi.106 Furthermore, philosophers and theologians were themselves 
uncertain about how to incorporate Aristotelian materials into their work. As Marenbon 
has noted, philosophers in the period between 1250 and 1275 especially experimented 
with different modes of incorporating Aristotelian philosophy into their world-views.107 
This experimentation resulted in the vastly different, but all Aristotle-inspired, 
philosophies of Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant.108  
 Claims that the imagination occupies an elevated position in Aristotelian 
philosophy seem well-founded. In Neoplatonic thought, the imagination behaves as an 
intermediary between sense and reason, as is its basic function in Aristotelian philosophy. 
However, Neoplatonists exhibit distrust of the sensible world and of the senses and 
subscribe to Plato’s theory of forms.109 This attitude necessarily demotes the imagination, 
which does not contribute in a profound way to intellectual understanding. As Karnes 
observes, the “imagination’s alignment with the senses means that it functions most often 
to impede understanding” and thus “it is therefore no surprise that the tradition’s 
dominant attitude toward phantasia is negative.”110 In the scheme presented in pseudo-
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Augustine’s twelfth-century Liber de spiritu et anima, imagination presents symbols to 
reason, “hinting through its visibility at invisible truths.”111 Aristotelian imagination does 
more than transmit symbols to reason: this imagination transmits actual data subsequently 
utilized in the process of intellectual apprehension. Thus for Aristotle, and for the 
thirteenth-century scholastics influenced by him, the imagination participates directly in 
intellectual understanding. 
 Aristotle’s imagination as presented in De anima is often difficult to understand 
and incredibly diverse. This diversity leads to a lack of coherency in the presentation of 
the faculty, which left room for subsequent thinkers to disagree and vary widely in their 
reformulations of the faculty’s function. Imagination may retain images of things once 
sensed, create new mental images, produce dream images, or present images to the 
intellect.112 Because Aristotle posited that the soul cannot think without images, the 
imagination must be part of every intellectual act. Thus imagination in a certain sense 
becomes a form of understanding.   
 Yet even as Aristotelian texts made their mark on thirteenth-century philosophy, 
Neoplatonic and Augustinian distrust of the senses did not disappear. The first phase of 
translations of Aristotelian texts in the early thirteenth century tended to be amalgams of 
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic sources. Gordon Leff warns against distinguishing too 
sharply between the direct influence of Aristotle and the influence of Aristotelian texts 
transmitted in Neoplatonic garb through translated Arabic sources.113 Two stages of the 
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influx of Aristotelian texts into Western Europe, including Paris, may be observed: the 
first stage witnessed Aristotelian texts translated from the Arabic with much Neoplatonic 
influence; the second stage involved more purely Aristotelian texts freed from these 
Neoplatonic accretions, with translations taken directly from the Greek.114 The 
scholastics of the mid-thirteenth century had been trained in Augustinian and Neoplatonic 
natural philosophy. When confronted with Avicenna, they tried to apply his philosophical 
system to Augustine’s. In these theories, the agent intellect accounted for “divine 
illumination.”115 Once Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle became available, the 
situation became more complex.116 Controversies arose about whether the senses and the 
imagination provided the intellect with knowledge or whether intellectual knowledge was 
the result of some outside illumination from divine sources.117 Aquinas was especially 
concerned with easing this controversy, but Aristotle and his De anima came increasingly 
under attack after the Thomist solution.118  
 Greco-Arabic and Greco-Latin accounts of psychology and the imagination 
differed in some essential ways. Significantly, Aristotle did not believe in divinely 
inspired dreams and denied the notion that a strong imagination could result in prophetic 
visions.119 Avicenna, on the other hand, promulgated the notion that an extremely 
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powerful imagination could produce prophecy.120 There was also disagreement about the 
number of internal senses. Avicenna maintains five internal senses, while Averroes and 
Aquinas recognize only four (common sense, imagination, cogitative faculty, and 
memory).121  
 Theories of imagination confronted further serious changes with the introduction 
of Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. Avicenna’s Liber de anima seu 
sextus de naturalibus, translated into Latin at Toledo in the second half of the twelfth 
century, divides the imagination into two parts, a lower retentive imagination, which 
simply stores images, and a higher compositive imagination, which combines images and 
presents them to the intellect.122 This splitting of the imagination was picked up by some 
thirteenth-century scholastics, including Albertus Magnus, but most thirteenth-century 
scholars conflated the two.123 Averroes’ treatment of the imagination is much more 
extensive than Avicenna’s. Averroes eliminates Avicenna’s estimative power and 
expands the imagination to include this function. The estimative power, introduced into 
the Latin West via Avicenna, constitutes judgment capability. For example, a sheep’s 
perception of a wolf does not in and of itself indicate fear to the sheep. This is instead the 
prerogative of the estimative faculty, which allows the sheep to judge that the perceived 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
120 Ibid. 
 
 
121 Ibid.,309. 
 
122 Karnes, Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the Middle Ages, 41-2. 
!
$%&!Ibid. 
!
*%!
!
wolf is in fact a threat.124 For Averroes, this judging capability is part of the 
imagination’s functioning, effectively elevating the imagination from a more sensory 
position to a position of judgment and even reason.125  
 Thirteenth-century scholastics such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas 
struggled with the extent to which imagination participates in reason and judgment. 
These thinkers were caught in the middle of an extensive debate about the imagination, as 
it varied among dominant Arabic and Greek thinkers. At the same time, these thirteenth-
century scholastics remained profoundly influenced by Neoplatonic and Augustinian 
thought on the imagination and did not necessarily abandon these views in the presence 
of new materials. Thus Jean de Meun encounters a philosophical imagination that is itself 
in flux, often caught between Neoplatonic and Aristotelian formulations. His depiction of 
Genius is a serious engagement with and dramatization of this uncertain imagination. Just 
as many scholastics grappled with Avicenna’s dual imagination and Averroes’ 
“estimative” imagination, so Jean de Meun presents a Genius unsure of whether to simply 
re-present images or to interpret them, reason about them, and judge them.  
 
The Transformation of Nature: Nature, Reason and Art 
 As George Economou and Alan Gunn, among others, have pointed out, a full 
assessment of Jean de Meun’s Genius cannot be made unless his Nature is also 
understood.126 This is certainly the case in De planctu Naturae and remains essential in 
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the Roman, since Genius’ characteristics become ever more prominent as a result of 
comparison with Nature. Jean de Meun’s Nature demands comparison with her 
predecessor, Alan of Lille’s Natura, in part because Jean’s text displays Alan’s profound 
influence, including occasional direct translations of passages from De planctu. Sarah 
Kay suggests some essential ways in which Jean’s description of Nature reveals his 
primarily Aristotelian, rather than Neoplatonic, stance. His employment of an extended 
ineffability topos in his description of Nature constitutes an admission of the 
“deficiencies of art” that belies Jean’s “disagreement with the neo-platonist Alan of Lille, 
and mocks both the poetic efforts of the first author of the Rose and his own.”127  
 Hugh White focuses on what may be the most striking feature of Nature’s 
behavior in the Roman, her confession, as the real essence of Jean’s departure from Alan, 
noting that because “we are invited to think in terms of a Nature having done something 
wrong” as a result of her confessing, “Nature’s dignity is undercut.” Alan’s Natura, on 
the other hand, is a figure of “dignity, power, and moral authority.128 Nature’s association 
with the sins of mankind through her confession consequently associates her with the 
“animal” and “sub-rational” forces in the universe. In White’s view, Nature is a less 
elevated figure in Jean de Meun’s universe, but the fact that she is fitted with “Alanian 
trappings” suggests a direct challenge to Neoplatonic conceptions of the universe in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
discussion, see especially Alan M.F. Gunn, The Mirror of Love: A Reinterpretation of ‘The 
Romance of the Rose’ (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech Press, 1952), 270-21, who sees the two 
figures together as the apex of the text’s so-called “love-truth motif.” See also Hugh White,  
Nature, Sex, and Goodness, 124. 
 
 
127 Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 76. 
 
128 White, Nature, Sex, and Goodness, 122. 
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which a supreme Natura is the immediate executor of God’s will.129 In a sense, then, 
Nature’s role has in this text been usurped by Reason, a newly intervening figure who 
will gain in importance in the later medieval period. If Nature’s creative role was 
primarily usurped by Genius in De planctu, it could be argued that Reason is the Genius 
of the Roman, subtly yet powerfully adopting Nature’s jurisdiction. 
 In Guillaume’s portion of the poem, Reason is described as a figure who could 
not be created by Nature.130 She enters the scene from above, as distinct from Nature’s 
entry from below, tucked away in her forge. Her appearance is overwhelming, and her 
description closely matches the majestic and otherworldly entry of Natura in Alan of 
Lille’s De planctu: 
En ce point ai grant piece esté, 
Tant que einssi me vit maté 
La dame de la haute garde, 
Qui de sa tor aval esgarde. 
Resons fu la dame apelee. 
Lors est de sa tor avalee, 
Si est tot droit a moi venue. 
El ne fu joesne ne chanue, 
Ne fu trop haute, ne trop basse, 
Ne fu trop graille ne trop grasse, 
Li œil qui en son chief estoient, 
Com .ij. estoiles reluissoient, 
Si ot ou chief une corone, 
Si resembloit haute persone. 
A son semblant et son vis 
Pert qu’el fu faite em paradis 
Car nature ne seüst pas 
Oevre fere de tel compas. 
Sachez, se la letre ne ment, 
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129 Ibid., 127-8. 
 
 
130 For an excellent summary of Reason’s special place in this text, see Armand Strubel, La Rose, 
Renart et le Graal: La littérature allégorique en France au XIIIe siècle (Geneva: Editions 
Slatkine, 1989), 206. 
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Que dieus la fist demoinement 
A sa semblance et s’image 
Et li dona tel avantage, 
Qu’el ait pooir et seignorie 
De garder home de folie, 
Por coi il soit tieus qu’il la croie. 
Ainssi con je me demantoie, 
Atant ez vos resons commance.131  
 
The association of Raison’s eyes with stars (“ij estoiles”) is reminiscent of the description 
of Philosophia’s eyes in De consolatione Philosophiae.132 Yet mention of the crown on 
Raison’s head (“Si ot ou chief une corone,/ Si resembloit haute persone”) seems to invite 
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131 Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la rose, ed. Armand Strubel (Paris: Le 
Livre de Poche, 1992), ll. 2969-2995. All further quotations of this text will be taken from this 
edition:!.My heart was close to breaking at the thought of the rose that I must now leave behind. I 
was a long time in this state, until the lady from her high vantage-point in the tower looked down 
and saw me thus downcast. The lady’s name was Reason, and, descending from her tower, she 
came directly to me. She was neither young nor old, neither too tall nor too short, neither too thin 
nor too fat. The eyes in her head shone like two stars and she wore a crown upon her head; she 
looked like a person of importance. It was apparent from her form and her face that she was made 
in paradise, for Nature could not have fashioned anything so perfectly proportioned. Know that if 
the books do not lie, she was made in the firmament by God in his own image and likeness, and 
that he gave her such virtue that she has power and authority to keep a man from folly, provided 
that he be such as to trust in her.” The Romance of the Rose, trans. Frances Horgan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 46. All further translations of this text will be taken from this 
edition. 
!
132 Philosophy in this text appears as a commanding figure, full of splendor, with shining eyes and 
great height: Boethius, Consolatio Philosophiae, Book I, Prose I: “Haec dum me cum tacitus ipse 
reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili officio signarem astitisse mihi supra uerticem uisa  
est mulier reuerendi admodum uultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum ualentiam 
perspicacibus, colore uiuido atque inexhausti uigoris, quamuis ita aeui plena foret ut nullo modo 
nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis ambiguae. 2 Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese 
hominum mensuram cohibebat,nunc uero pulsare caelum summi uerticis cacumine uidebatur; 
quae cum altius caput extulisset ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum 
frustrabatur intuitum.” Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, 2:“Her countenance demanded 
absolute reverence: Her eyes glowed like fire, penetrating far beyond the common capability of 
mortals; her color was intense, her strength inexhaustible, even though she was so full of eternity 
that it was impossible to believe that she was of my own generation; and her height was hard to 
fix. For at one time she would keep herself within common mortal limits, but at another she 
would seem to strike at the heavens with the crown of the top of her head—and whenever she 
stuck her head up still higher she would pierce heaven itself and disappoint the vision of those 
mortals who tried to contemplate her.”  
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comparison with Alan’s long description of Nature’s crown in the beginning of De 
planctu. Alan spends several pages detailing the “tres preciosi lapides” that 
“prefulgebant” on Nature’s crown depicting the Zodiac. Unlike Philosophia, whose 
height and appearance shift radically at each moment, Raison’s appearance is in fact 
average and relatively stable. In her “averageness,” her middling height and weight, and 
her seemly and constant proportions, she is strikingly similar to Alan’s Genius. Raison is 
neither young nor old (“ne fu joine ne chenue”), neither too tall nor too short (“ne fu trop 
haute, ne trop basse”) and neither too fat nor too thin (“ne fu trop graille, ne trop grasse”). 
These lines do not exactly describe what Raison is as much as what she is not, but they 
do succeed in suggesting that there is something “mediocre” about her, recalling Genius’ 
“statura mediocratis” in Alan’s text.  
 Yet Raison’s identification with Alan’s Natura is particularly peculiar given 
Guillaume’s insistence on her transcendence of the realm of the “natural.” Nature’s 
appearance, her “semblant” and her “vis,” makes clear that she was fashioned in paradise  
(“fu faite em paradis”), precisely because Nature could not have fashioned such a 
creature (“Car nature ne seüst pas/ Oevre fere de tel compas”). This statement is strong: 
not only did Nature not make this creature but Nature cannot fashion anything of such 
proportions (“tel compas”). The use of the word “tel” (“such”) suggests a failure on 
Nature’s part to create an entire class of creatures. Guillaume continues to relate that 
Raison was created by God himself directly in his own image (“a sa semblance et 
s’image”). God gives her (“li dona”) authority (“pooir et seignorie”) to keep man from 
folly (“de garder home de folie”). The word “seignorie” endows Raison with nobility and 
fashions her as a lord with dominion over a jurisdiction. Her direct contact with God, not 
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only created in his image but given authority directly by him, renders Raison a 
replacement for the vicaria Dei identity that Nature occupied in De planctu. The idea that 
Raison directly replaces Nature in this text is emphasized by aspects of her description 
that are reminiscent of Alan’s description of Natura. Guillaume’s expression that Raison 
could not have been created by Nature, that she is somewhat unnatural, is unsettling. The 
text seems to suggest that as Nature’s dominion becomes less significant, the figures who 
overtake her role are decreasingly natural, allowing unnaturalness to reign free in the 
cosmos.  
 Jean adopts Guillaume’s suggestion of Raison’s usurpation of Nature by placing 
words spoken by Natura in De planctu into Raison’s mouth. In a tirade against the God of 
Love, Raison describes the torment of amorous passion to the dreamer: 
Amours ce est pais hayneuse, 
Amours est hayne amoureuse 
C’est loiautez la desloiaus, 
Ce est desloiautez loiaus, 
C’est paours toute asseüree, 
C’est esperance desesperee. 
C’est raisons toute forsenable 
C’est forsenerie raisnable, 
C’est douz periz a soi noier 
Grief fais legier a palmoier…133 
 
Jean continues with a near exact translation of Meter 1 of De planctu until Raison arrives 
at the very end of her speech and seamlessly departs from Natura’s words in De planctu:  
Touz li mondes va cele voie 
C’est li dieus qui touz les desvoie 
Se ne sont cil de male voie 
Que genius escommenie, 
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133 Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 4290-4299: “Love is hostile peace and loving hatred, 
disloyal loyalty and loyal disloyalty; it is confident fear and desperate hope, demented reason and 
reasonable madness. It is the sweet danger of drowning and a heavy burden that is easy to handle” 
(The Romance of the Rose, ed. Horgan, 65).  
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Pour ce qu’il font tort a nature. 
Et pour ce, se je n’ai d’aus cure, 
Ne vueill je pas que les gens aiment 
De cele amour dont il se claiment 
En la fin, las, chaitif, dolant 
Tant vait lor amours affolant.134 
 
In this passage, Raison explicitly expresses her distance from Nature. Genius has 
excommunicated those who have done wrong by Nature (“font tort a nature”). Raison 
qualifies that all the world can see the consequences of this kind of bad behavior (“malle 
vie”). Yet at this point Raison departs from Nature. She declares that she does not in fact 
have much concern for those of bad nature (“de male voie”) who have been 
excommunicated by Genius (“et pour ce, se je n’ai d’aus cure”). Raison continues to 
express her lack of interest in the fact of the sexual disobedience of man against Nature 
and her sole concern with alleviating the suffering of those in love (“Ne vueill je pas que 
les gens aiment/De cele amour dont il se claiment”). Raison is not necessarily concerned 
with mankind’s lack of moral rectitude; she simply does not want to hear the lover 
complain and be sorrowful (“chaitif et dolant”). Raison successfully usurps Natura’s 
words and then declares herself uninterested in the problems that occupy Natura in De 
planctu. She has both replaced Natura and rendered her position invisible. As with 
Guillaume’s primary description of Raison, this speech suggests the rise of something 
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134Ibid., ll. 4338-4347: “No one has been found who is so highly born, so wise, of such proven 
strength or courage, or so virtuous in other respects that Love has not conquered him. The whole 
world treads that path, for he is the god who leads everyone astray except those excommunicated 
by Genius because their evil ways are an offence against Nature. I am not concerned with these, 
however, but I do not want people to love in such a way, to be so maddened by Love that in the 
end they admit themselves to be unhappy and sorrowful wretches. But if you really want to avoid 
being hurt by Love and to be cured of this madness, you cannot drink a better draught than the 
thought of fleeing from him. This is the only way you can be happy: if you follow him, he will 
follow you, and if you flee him he will flee away” (The Romance of the Rose, ed. Horgan, 66). !
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unnatural, outside of Natura’s jurisdiction, in Nature’s place. As John Fleming notes, the 
iconographic attributes of the sublime Natura are given over to Lady Reason in the 
Roman.135 Yet it is striking that Natura should be transformed into Reason, whose role in 
this text is explicitly supernatural.136   
 Nature in Jean’s text is, above all, a diligent worker. Confined to her forge, she 
works as quickly as possible against the pressure of the death of her creatures. A long 
passage about the beauty of her creations and Art’s impotence in relation has convinced 
several scholars, including Sarah Kay, that “Art kneels before Nature” in the Roman.137 A 
closer look at the passage in which Jean supposedly declares Nature’s supremacy over 
Art and the sequence that follows it should, however, cast some doubt on this position. 
After detailing how Nature slaves away in her forge in the fight against Death and 
Corruption, Jean praises Nature’s creations above the pale imitations of Art: 
Dont ars faisoit ses examploires 
Qui ne fait pas forms si voires, 
Mais par mout ententive cure, 
A genoulz est devant nature 
Si prie et requiert et demande 
Comme mendicant et truande, 
Povre de science et de force 
Qui de sivre la mout s’esforce 
Que nature li vueille aprendre, 
Comment ele puisse comprendre 
Par son enging en ses figures 
Proprement toutes creatures. 
Si garde comment nature oevre 
Car mout voudroit faire autele oevre 
Et la contrefait comme singes. 
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135 John Fleming, The Roman de la Rose: A Study in Allegory and Iconography (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), 195-6. 
 
136 John V. Fleming, Reason and the Lover (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 29.!!
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137 Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 75-6. 
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Mais tant est ses sens nuz et linges 
Qu’el ne puet faire choses vives…138  
 
Art seems to fail in precisely the same way that Natura fails in De planctu: she cannot 
create anything living. Just as Alan describes the diadems on Natura’s crown in De 
planctu as aping nature, Jean assumes a fairly standard Neoplatonic attitude and reveals 
that Art can do no better than “contrefait comme singes” the work of Nature. Jean repeats 
Art’s failure to animate anything in the passage immediately following, revealing that Art 
could portray anything beautifully (“bien pourtraictes bien figurées”) but that she could 
never render them alive: “Ne les fera par eulx aller/ Vivre mourir sentir parler.” She thus 
fails at Nature’s dual task of vivifying and simultaneously fending off death. 
 Significantly, both Art’s weakness and Nature’s strength are described in terms of 
some form of natural mental composition of these two figures. Art cannot create like 
Nature because she is “povre de science et de force,” with “science” referring not merely 
to her lack of experiential knowledge but to a lack of a mental capacity for intellect that 
Nature has.139 Yet this line also suggests that Nature’s craftsmanship is based on a 
physical ability and emphasizes Nature’s work in the forge as mechanical. More 
importantly, Nature carries out her work by the use of her “engin” (“par son engin”); 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
 
 
138 Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 16021-16038: “Art took these for her models, but her 
forms are not so true. With most attentive care she kneels before Nature, like a poor beggar who 
lacks both knowledge and strength but who strives hard to follow her. She begs and prays and 
implores Nature to teach her how to use her skill so that her figures may properly encompass 
every creature, and she watches how Nature works, for she would very much like to do the same 
work herself. Like an ape, she mimics Nature, but her understanding is so weak and bare that she 
cannot make living things, however natural they seem” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 
247-8).  
 
139 “Science” means an exact knowledge of a certain subject (“connaissance exacte d’un certain 
ordre de choses”). Frédéric Godefroy, Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue française (Paris: F. 
Vieweg, 1881-1902), s.v. science. 
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Art’s lack of this mental capacity requires her to beg Nature for help. The use of the word 
“engin” is significant because it links Nature to Genius by suggesting that part of her 
success arises from the mental abilities that the allegorized Genius encompasses, skills 
associated with the imagination.140 So far it seems as though Art is definitively inferior to 
Nature in this scenario, and that, at least in a Neoplatonic universe, Nature has been 
upheld as a supreme creator and Art as a mere ape.  
 Yet two features in the description of Nature in Jean’s text following this 
comparison with Art suggest that perhaps Nature does not quite reign supreme over Art. 
Jean’s subsequent inability to describe Nature suggests that her role is not secure, and, as 
a result, her absolute ascendancy over Art cannot be established. Furthermore, Jean 
reverts to an appeal to the “artistic” in his (failed) attempt to describe Nature: 
Bien la vous vousisse descrire 
Mais mi sens n’i porroit souffire. 
Mi sens? K’ai je dist? C’est du mains! 
Non feroit voir nus sens humains 
Ne par voiz vives ne par notes, 
Et fust Platons ou Aristotes, 
Algus, Ouclides, Tholomees, 
Qui tant orent granz rennomees 
D’avoir esté bon escrivain. 
Leur enging seroient si vain 
S’il osoient la chose enprendre, 
Qu’il ne la porroient entendre, 
Ne Pymalion entaillier; 
En vain s’i porroit travaillier 
Parasius, voire Apelles 
Que mout bon paintre apel, les  
Biautez de li jamais descrire 
Ne porroit, tant eüst a vivre; 
Ne Myro ne Policletus 
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140 “Engin” most basically means native wit or mental ability (“habilité”) but may also mean 
“craft” (“artifice”). It also has a sense of fraud or deceit embedded in it, as evidenced by the 
definitions “fraude,” “ruse” and “tromperie.” Godefroy, Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue 
française, s.v. engin. 
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Jamais ne savroient cest us… 
Tant est de grant biauté nature. 
Zeusys? Non pas, mais tuit li mestre 
Que nature fist onques nestre, 
Car or soit que bien entendissent 
Sa biauté toute et tuit vousissent 
A tel portraiture muser, 
Ainz porroient lor mains user 
Que sit res grant biauté portraire.141 
 
Sarah Kay points out that the corresponding moment in Alan’s De planctu results in an 
extensive description of Natura that lasts for several books. The “ineffability topos” Jean 
instead employs here is, in Kay’s view, a comic exaggeration, “humorously underlining 
the inadequacy of language for description.”142 In this way, Jean divorces himself from 
his Neoplatonic predecessor and declares his thirteenth-century Aristotelian influence.143  
 Yet viewing this passage simply as humorous may obscure its other meanings. 
While it is true that Jean significantly departs from his predecessor Alan by harping on 
the impossibility of describing Nature, this passage also, and perhaps more significantly, 
demonstrates the impossibility of expunging Art from the realm of Nature. Here, Jean not 
only displays a sense of humor but he also expresses anxiety about the place of Art in his 
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141 Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 16169-16188; ll. 16206-16214: “I would gladly have 
described her to you, but my wit is not equal to the task. My wit, do I say? Not only mine! No 
man’s wit could depict her, whether in speech or writing, were he Plato or Aristotle, Algus, 
Euclid, or Ptolemy, who now enjoy the reputation of having been good writers: their powers 
would be too weak, and if they dared undertake the task, they would not be equal to it. Pygmalion 
could not carve her, Parrhasius would strive in vain, and even Apelles, whom I call a very good 
painter, could never describe her beauties, however long he lived. Nor would Miro or Polycletus 
ever be successful…But Nature’s beauty is so great that Zeuxis could never have succeeded, for 
all his skill in executing and colouring his portrait. Zeuxis? No, nor all the masters that Nature 
ever bore. For even if they had grasped the extent of her beauty and wanted to waste their time 
trying to portray it, their hands would have worn out before they had managed to depict such very 
great loveliness. Only God could do it” (The Romance of the Rose, trans Horgan, 250). 
 
142 Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 75-6. 
 
143 Ibid.!
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own text. He cannot simply discount it in a Neoplatonic insistence on its mere imitative 
quality. As Kay points out, Jean has perhaps moved away from a Neoplatonic world 
view, and the result is that he is not quite sure how to deal with the problem of Art, 
especially as it relates to Nature.  
 In this passage, Jean does not only point to the inability to use language to 
describe Nature but the inability for art to depict Nature. He begins with a list of writers 
who could not describe Nature, including Plato, Aristotle, Euclid and Ptolemy, and 
suggests that it is precisely their “engins,” the word from which “Genius” derives, that 
renders them unable to depict Nature in writing. Jean experiences, perhaps anxiously, a 
similar failure of his own genius. He includes an underhanded comment on Genius’ 
“failure” in service of Nature, a failure that will be elaborated upon below. Yet more 
importantly, this emphasis on failure in writing immediately diverts to an exploration of 
the visual-artistic failures in the depiction of Nature. Without any transition, Jean 
continues to muse about the inability of artists and sculptors such as Pygmalion, Miro and 
Polycletus to portray Nature and ends with a long excursus on Zeuxis’ frustrations in this 
very task. Jean begins the passage with what feels like the form of praeteritio so often 
utilized by Guillaume in describing the Garden of Pleasure. Yet Jean does fail to describe 
Nature here. Playing on his predecessor Guillaume, Jean’s non-description of Nature 
reveals the real problem: that it is impossible to keep Art out of the text. Art has 
supposedly just been revealed to be undeniably inferior to Nature and yet she is suddenly 
necessary to complete a description of Nature herself. Nature in this passage becomes 
strangely dependent on Art. Reliance on the visual of the sort that Guillaume employs by 
+'!
!
describing everything by sight cannot be expunged even in the case of an allegorical 
figure who speaks at length about the unreliability of vision.  
 In fact, where Natura in Alan of Lille’s De planctu is defined almost immediately 
as God’s vice-regent or vicaria Dei, Jean’s Nature rehearses a series of possible titles for 
herself before finally arriving at one definitively: 
Cil Dieus meïsmes, par sa grace, 
Quant il ot par ses devises 
Ses autres creatures mises, 
Tant m’ennora, tant me tint chiere 
Qu’il m’en establi chamberiere, 
Servir m’i laisse et laissera 
Tant com sa volenté sera: 
Nul autre droit je n’i reclame; 
Ainz le merci, quant il tant m’aime 
Que si tres povre damoisele, 
En si grant maison et si bele, 
Il, si granz sires, tant me prise. 
Pour chamberiere? Certes, voire, 
Pour conestable ou pour vicaire 
Dont je ne fusse mie digne 
Fors par sa volenté bénigne.144 
 
While Alan’s Natura is quite confidently proclaimed vicaria Dei soon after her entry into 
the text, Jean’s Nature much less dramatically narrates the process of being named 
“chamberiere” and then suddenly changes this title twice within one line. She claims to 
have been overwhelmingly honored (“tant me honnora”) by being established (“etablit”) 
as “chamberiere.” Nature is so enamored of the title that she repeats it eight lines later 
after a dramatic escalation that masterfully defers the word amidst a proliferation of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
144Le Roman de la rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 16772-16788: “When he had settled his other creatures 
according to his plan, this same God in his grace showed me such honour and love that he made 
me chamberlain of all; he allows and will allow me no other right here, but thank him, great lord  
that he is, for loving and valuing me enough to take so poor a maiden as chamberlain in so grand 
and fair a house. As chamberlain? Truly, as constable indeed, and vicar, titles of which I could 
never have been worthy except through his benign will” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. 
Horgan, 259).  
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word “tant.” Yet for all Nature flaunts her title, when the word “chamberiere” is finally 
repeated at line 16785, the validity of the title is comically undermined by an uncertainty 
of nomenclature in the next line in which Nature reveals that God named her his 
“conestable” or “vicaire.” While the additions of “conestable” and “vicaire” are in a basic 
sense meant to elevate Nature’s status in relation to God, they have the accompanying 
effect of revealing a problem with Nature’s story. She insists with precision on having 
been honored with the title of “chamberiere,” and by adding two new titles to this 
“honor,” it becomes a more likely possibility that Nature’s role in relation to God is 
actually undefined. If Alan’s Natura was certainly and triumphantly vicaria Dei, Jean’s 
Nature is only “vicaire” as an afterthought to an already suspect title of “chamberiere.” 
Jean’s Nature is not only indescribable but may have no name at all. 
 If Art pales in comparison to Nature in a Neoplatonic context, and Jean is 
somewhere between a Neoplatonic and Aristotelian view of Nature, then Nature’s 
evaluation of Plato’s dismissal of her serves as an important clue into the status of Nature 
in this text. Nature, as part of her confession, laments not only man’s disobedience but 
also, and perhaps more extensively, her own lack of grace. In the passage above, she 
reveals that her “honorable” title bestowed directly by God is in fact not as confident as it 
might seem. In a long discussion of Platonic views of Nature, she complains about her 
disreputable position in Plato’s corpus. Her assessment of Plato reveals that he has 
relegated her to a status of insignificance in comparison with God, that her creative 
abilities are unimportant and, especially distressingly, that she cannot render anything 
eternal. 
Connois je bien que vraiement 
Celui ne li donné je mie: 
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La ne s’estent pas ma baillie 
Ne fui pas sage ne poissant 
De faire rien si connoissant. 
Onques ne fis riens pardurable: 
Quanque je faz est corrompable. 
Platon meïsmes le tesmoingne 
Quant il parle de ma besoingne 
Et des dieus qui de mort n’ont garde. 
Leur createurs, ce dist, les garde 
Et soustient pardurablement 
Par son vouloir tant seulement; 
Et se cil vouloirs nes tenist 
Trestouz morir les couvenist. 
Mi fait, ce dist, sont tuit soluble, 
Tant ai pooir povre et obnuble 
Au regart de la grant poissance  
Du Dieu qui voit en sa presence  
La trible temporalité  
Souz .i. moment d’eternité…145 
 
Nature admits her inability to give understanding to man and particularly shows her lack 
of power (“ne fui pas sage ne poissant”). She is not the prime actor in man’s ability to be 
“connoissant,” a word associated with the powers of the intellect, and as we have already 
seen, this is probably most accurately the province of Reason. When we first encounter 
Nature, she is hard at work in her forge in order to fend off death. Her inability to create 
anything permanent, as expressed in this passage, is actually a moment of similarity 
between her and the Natura of De planctu, who also fails to create anything that is not 
immediately erased. It is essential not to make too much of the demotion of Nature in this 
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145 Ibid., ll. 19060-19080: “Undoubtedly, as I know very well, it was not I, in truth, who gave him 
his understanding. That is outside my province, and I had neither the wisdom nor the power to 
make anything so intelligent. I have never made anything eternal, and whatever I make is 
corruptible. Plato himself bears witness to that when he speaks of my work and of the gods, who 
have no need to fear death. It is their creator, he says, whose will alone protects and maintains 
them throughout eternity, and if that will did not sustain them, they would perforce all die. All my 
works are perishable, he says, for my power is poor and obscure before the great power of the  
God who perceives the three aspects of time as present to him in a moment of eternity” (The 
Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 294).  
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passage in comparison to Alan’s Natura, who is supposedly more securely able to create 
lasting creatures.146 In fact, Alan’s Natura is explicitly unable to do this and her role as 
vicaria Dei is therefore in crisis, much like Jean’s Nature.  
 What is most significantly different about Jean’s Nature is not that she is demoted 
from her ability to create something lasting but that she analyzes her own disfavor from a 
Neoplatonic viewpoint. While Alan only hints at Natura’s inability to animate anything 
as part of the description of her, in Jean’s text Nature articulates the realities of her 
failures herself. This self-consciousness makes sense in light of Nature’s unusual act of 
confession, an action that forces her to assume a part in man’s increasing neglect of 
natural behavior. While in Alan’s text, Natura’s blame is always, at least explicitly, 
outward on figures such as Venus and mankind in general, Jean de Meun develops a far 
more inwardly focused version of Nature who has internalized the criticism suggested 
about her in the background of twelfth-century texts such as De planctu Naturae and 
Architrenius.  
 Jean’s Nature is certainly different from Alan’s Natura but not perhaps in the way 
we might expect based on some of the existing scholarship on the topic. It cannot simply 
be the case that Alan’s Natura is wholly “Neoplatonic” while Jean’s Nature is 
“Aristotelian,” and that the difference between them can be explained by appealing to a 
historical influx in Aristotelian texts in the Latin west by the time Jean writes his 
continuation of the Roman in the thirteenth century. In many ways, Jean’s Nature is 
caught squarely between a Neoplatonic and Aristotelian view of the natural, and Jean’s 
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146 Several scholars emphasize difference while obscuring certain similarities between Alan’s 
Nature and Jean’s Nature. See, for example, Lucie Polak, “Plato, Nature and Jean de Meun,” 
Annual proceedings of the Graduate Centre for Medieval Studies in the University of Reading 3 
(1977), 81-2; Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 75-6; White, Nature, Sex, and Goodness, 124-31. 
++!
!
description of her captures the essence of a figure in flux. Nature’s relationship to God, as 
“chamberiere,” “vicaire,” or some other title, is undecided and constantly transforming in 
the course of Nature’s speech. Her role has been partially reassigned to Reason, at least 
insofar as Reason reiterates words that were once spoken by Nature in Alan’s text. 
Perhaps most importantly, Nature has not been proved to be superior to Art, and concerns 
about visual representation are by no means outside of Nature’s (and Jean’s) purview. 
Sarah Kay is perhaps a bit too quick to dismiss Jean’s description of Art bowing before 
Nature as evidence for his lack of concern with the question of visual representation that 
seems to haunt both Alan of Lille and Guillaume de Lorris. I have already shown how 
Art’s subservience to Nature is immediately questioned by Jean’s explicit anxiety about 
how to describe Nature and especially by his long explanation of the impossibility of 
depicting Nature pictorially. Far from ridiculing Alan and Guillaume for their anxieties 
about artistic representation, the problems of visual representation, of vision, and of the 
art of images are absolutely central to Jean’s portion of the Roman and especially to the 
depiction of two intertwined allegorical figures: Nature and Genius. 
 In this concern with visual representation and images, Genius and Nature become 
inextricably connected in Jean’s Rose in a way that differs fundamentally from the 
“usurping” qualities of Alan’s Genius. The two figures share a central preoccupation with 
artistic representation and vision. Nature includes a summary of scientific work on optics 
and the necessity of being skeptical of vision in her speech, and Genius builds upon this 
suspicion in his reinterpretation of Guillaume’s fountain of Narcissus scene. Genius’ 
sermon represents the crux of the entire text’s obsession with visuality and images, 
Guillaume’s portion included. While the relationship between Genius and Nature is as 
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complicated and uncertain in Jean’s text as it is in Alan’s, the nature of the complication 
is significantly divergent in the Rose. Here, Genius enfolds an already transforming 
figure, Nature, into his own identity, summarizing her words and escalating her concerns 
about vision. The confessor takes on the voice and concern of the confessee. Nature’s 
own fluidity is subsequently encompassed in Genius’ amorphous, ever-transformative 
identity in Jean’s Rose.  
 
Genius as Transformation 
 The relationship between Natura and Genius in De planctu Naturae can certainly 
be seen in terms of a power struggle. In Jean’s Rose, though, “power struggle” and the 
possibility of usurpation of authority is not the best way of viewing the relationship 
between these two figures, which might be far more dynamic and fluid than it is in Alan’s 
text. The confessor-confessee relationship is certainly formal, but the interaction between 
Nature and Genius does not stand on the same ceremony as the formal rhetorical 
language with which Natura summons Genius in De planctu. In fact, as both Kay and 
White observe, Genius begins his sermon by “invoking the ‘authority of Nature,’” but the 
content of his “pronouncements” more accurately serve Venus and Amor.147 As Eberle 
notes, the changes Jean makes to Alan’s figure of Natura are “paralleled” in the changes 
he makes to Genius.148 In a sense, Genius is much more Nature’s “other self” in the 
Roman than he is in De planctu. In the Roman, Genius expands upon Nature’s 
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147 Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 88-9; see also White, Nature, Sex, and Goodness, 130-1. 
 
148 Eberle, “The Lover’s Glass,” 285. 
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transformative capacities rather than simply attempting to usurp her capacity as creator. 
This suggests a certain kinship between the two figures.  
 At the end of Nature’s confession, she gives instructions to Genius that at first 
resemble her interaction with him in Alan’s De planctu:  
Alez, amis, au dieu d’amours 
Porter mes plains et mes clamours, 
Non pas pour ce que droit m’en face, 
Mais qu’il se confort et solace 
Quant il orra ceste nouvele 
Qui mout li devra estre bele  
Et a noz anemis grevaine… 
Pardon qui bien soit souffisanz 
Leur donnez, non pas de .x. anz 
--Nel priseroient .i. denier –  
Mais a tous jors pardon plenier 
De trestout quanque fait avront, 
Quant bien confesser se savront. 
Et quant en l’ost serez venuz 
Ou vous serez mout chier tenuz, 
Puis que saluer les savroiz, 
Publiez leur en audience 
Cest pardon et ceste sentence, 
Que je vueill que ci soit escrite.’ 
Lors escrit cil, et cele dite, 
Puis la seele et la li baille 
Et lie prie que tost s’en aille, 
Mais qu’ele soit ainçois assoste 
De ce que son penser li oste.149 
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149 Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 19373-19379 & 19397-19414: “Go, my friend, to the 
God of Love, and take with you my complaints and protests. I do not want him to make me any 
reparation, but to take comfort and solace from this news, which should be very welcome to him 
and calamitous for our enemies… Give them a pardon that will be amply sufficient: not just for 
ten years, for that would not be worth twopence to them, but a perpetual, plenary pardon for 
everything they have done, when they make a good confession. When you reach the host, where 
you will be warmly welcomed, and when you have greeted them on my behalf as you know how 
to do, then announce to them in a loud voice this pardon and decree that I would like you to write 
down here.’ Then he wrote at her dictation, and she sealed it and gave it to him, begging him to 
go quickly but first to absolve her from anything that might have slipped her mind” (The 
Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 298-9). 
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This focus on the written form of Nature’s instructions, with Genius taking dictation, is 
reminiscent both of Nature’s composition of a letter to invoke Genius in De planctu and 
of the primary identification of Genius as a writer upon his entry in Alan’s text. Jean 
pauses over Genius’ writerly identity here by the quick succession of “escrite” and 
“escrit” both as part of Nature’s commandment that Genius write down her words and his 
fulfillment of this order. The focus on the process of Genius’ writing continues in the 
next line with the detail of Nature sealing the dictation (“puis la seele”), a detail also 
noted in De planctu. The description of every exchange between Nature and Genius in 
this passage, including Nature’s handing the sealed dictation to Genius (“la li baille”) 
serves not only to emphasize Genius’ function as Nature’s scribe but also to force a pause 
in the text to reflect on the relationship between these two figures a moment before it 
transforms significantly.  
 Yet Jean’s version of the Genius-Nature relationship calls upon Alan’s model 
only to dismiss it promptly. Although Nature has just used a series of imperatives to 
guide Genius, in the next moment, Genius fully assumes his role as confessor and gains 
the ability to command Nature: 
Si tost comme ot esté confesse 
Dame nature la deesse, 
Si com la lois veult et li us, 
Li vaillanz prestres genius 
Tantost l’assoust et li donne 
Penitance avenant et bonne 
Selonc la grandeur du forffait 
Qu’il pensoit qu’ele eüst forffait. 
Enjoinst li qu’ele demorast 
Dedenz sa forge et laborast 
Si com ainz laborer soloit 
Quant de noient ne se doloit, 
Et son servise ades feïst  
Tant k’autre conseill i meïst  
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Li rois qui tout puet adrecier 
Et tout faire et tout despecier.150 
 
Genius, who moments ago took dictation on the orders of Nature, now adopts an 
imperative tone with the indirect command “enjoinst li qu’ele demorast,” suddenly 
borrowing Nature’s imperatives for his own speech. The specific injunction that Nature 
remain in her forge is significant in its clear attempt to circumscribe Nature spatially. The 
use of the word “demorast” conveys a sense of inactivity and staid languishing. The 
initial placement of the word “dedenz” highlights Nature’s conscription to an “inside” 
space that is somehow constricted. Genius conscribes Nature to this circumscribed space 
just before Jean tells us that Genius has the capacity to fly. After Genius changes his 
clothing, he “prent eles pour tost voler.”151 Genius’ extraordinary mobility is emphasized 
here by the (rather unnecessary) qualification that he takes to his wings (“eles”) in order 
to fly away (“voler”), and fly away quickly (“tost”) at that. The focus on Genius’ 
mobility is striking in light of both the previous passage, in which Genius consigns 
Nature to her forge, and in the context of what comes immediately after. Just after Genius 
flies off, we are made privy to Nature’s endless laboring in her forge. In a moment of 
stark contrast to Genius’ powerful movement, Nature is shown to be unable to move at 
all: “Lors remest nature en sa forge,/ Prent ses martiaus et fiert et forge/ Trestout ausi 
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150 Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 19415-19430: “As soon as the goddess, Lady Nature, had 
made her confession as was lawful and customary, then Genius, her worthy priest, gave her 
absolution and imposed on her a good and fitting penance, appropriate to the seriousness of the  
 
fault he thought she had committed. He enjoined her to remain in her forge and toil as she used to 
when she had no cause for grief, and to continue in the performance of her duties until the king 
who has the power to set all things right, to create and destroy everything, should offer some 
other remedy” (The Romance of the Rose, ed. Horgan, 299). 
 
151 Ibid., l. 19442: “Then, taking to his wings, he flew swiftly away” (The Romance of the Rose, 
ed. Horgan, 299).  
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comme devant.”152 The passages are linked by the use of the term “lors,” which 
encourages reading continuously from the point of Genius’ winged departure to this 
scene of Nature toiling in the forge. As in Genius’ instructions to Nature to return to her 
forge, this description of Nature’s work there reiterates her spatial and temporal 
confinement. She remains (“remest”) in the forge, unable to leave this single space, and 
to compound matters further, her work appears highly repetitive, as she “trestout ausi 
comme devant.” The use of both “ausi” and “devant” only further highlights Nature’s 
inability to move both outside of the forge itself and, less literally, to a different form of 
work.  
 Genius thus begins to emerge as the primary figure of transformation in the 
Nature-and-Genius portion of Jean’s text. Genius does in a sense usurp Nature’s identity 
by repeating some of her words at the beginning of his sermon. What is significant about 
Genius’ “usurpation” of Nature in Jean’s text is that it involves limiting Nature’s role to a 
singular, unchanging set of actions in her forge while Genius becomes the ever-changing 
figure that Nature seemed to be earlier in the text. The “usurpation” may be characterized 
as a transformation in and of itself. Thus Genius’ long list of transformative activities 
begins with his transformation of his relationship to Nature by consigning her to her forge 
and then re-articulating her words in a new context. The relationship between Genius and 
Nature thus takes on a new form of fluidity.  
 Perhaps more significant than Genius’ transformation of his relationship with 
Nature is his own establishment as a transformative figure. Over the course of his 
sermon, Genius demonstrates that he is suspended somewhere between an identity of 
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152 Ibid., ll. 19442-19444: “Nature remained in her forge, wielding her hammers, smiting and 
forging just as before…” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 300). 
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“generative” Genius and “recombinative” imagination.  This kind of transformation-in-
process is an uncomfortable concept to assign to an allegorical figure who should 
represent a stable identity. In the process of his transformation, Genius draws upon 
anxieties in both Guillaume’s and Jean’s portions of the text about the transformative 
capacity of objects that should not be able to transform, most notably images. Genius also 
enfolds Nature’s concerns about the deceptiveness of vision into his sermon, and, in the 
process of establishing himself as the recombinative imagination, casts doubt on his own 
ability to represent visual stimuli accurately. 
 Several scholars, such as Jane Chance Nitzsche, Rosemund Tuve, Charles 
Dahlberg, and John Fleming, have noted Genius’ double role in Jean’s text.153 Yet these 
analyses tend to focus on Genius as god of generation and as priest and, with the 
exception of Nitzsche’s work, these scholarly accounts use Genius’ double role as proof 
of Jean’s ironic intentions. According to these scholars, Jean must be making fun of the 
tradition of Genius portrayed in twelfth-century allegories such as Bernardus Silvestris’ 
Cosmographia and Alan of Lille’s De planctu Naturae. Nitzsche refutes these claims by 
arguing that Jean in fact carefully intertwines the two roles of Genius as “generation god 
and priest” and that the marriage of these two traditional identities for Genius into one 
figure is a normal function of allegory and need not be interpreted ironically.154 Nitzsche 
is correct to question the confidence with which many scholars have called Jean’s Genius 
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153 See Nitzsche, The Genius Figure, 116-17. Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery: Some 
Mediaeval Books and their Posterity (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 327. The Romance 
of the Rose by Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, trans. Charles Dahlberg (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 5, 9-10, 13, 19.  
 
154 Nitzsche, The Genius Figure, 116-17. 
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“ironic” to explain away his dual role. Yet her explanation of Genius’ two roles relies 
upon identifying him as god of generation and as priest. Nowhere do any of these 
scholarly accounts discuss Genius’ retelling of the lover’s encounter with the fountain of 
Narcissus.155 This omission has the accompanying effect of overlooking Genius’ 
evolving role as the recombinative imagination in Jean’s text.  
 Genius’ transformative nature is highlighted by his frequent change of clothing 
and by his winged mobility. In his first description, Genius appears dressed as Nature’s 
priest. After absolving Nature, Genius changes into secular clothing for his flight to earth:  
Et je m’en vois endementiers, 
Fait genius, plus que le cours, 
Pour faire as fins amanz secours, 
Mais que desaffublez me soie 
De ceste chasuble de soie, 
De ceste aube et de cest rochet. 
Et vest sa robe seculiere 
Qui mains enconbreuse li ere 
Si com s’il alast queroler…156 
 
Jean takes special care to show Genius in the process of changing his garb. Since Genius 
himself says that he will “desaffublez” (“undress”), the addition of “et vest sa robe 
seculiere” is unnecessary. Genius delineates each article of clothing he will take off 
(“desaffublez”), including his ‘aube,” “rochet,” and “chasuble de soie.” The use of 
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155 Many scholars seem more interested in the relationship among fiction, nature, and the 
fountain. See for example David F. Hult, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Readership and Authority in 
the First Roman de la Rose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 287. See also John 
V. Fleming, “The Garden of the Roman de la Rose: Vision of Landscape or Landscape of 
Vision?” in Medieval Gardens, ed. Elizabeth B. MacDougall (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks 
Colloquium Series in the History of Landscape Architecture 9, 1986), 222. 
 
156 Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 19432-19441: “And in the meantime,’ said Genius, ‘I 
will make all haste to bring aid to true lovers, but first I must take off this silk chasuble, alb, and 
surplice. He hung them all on a hook and put on his secular clothes, which were less cumbersome 
for him, as if he were going to dance” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 299). 
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“ceste” before the listing of each article of clothing brings the reader closer to observing 
Genius taking off each article. Then we are told about the process of his putting on his 
new clothing. The whole narration of Genius’ changing of his clothes suspends the 
allegorical figure in a moment of transformation. Jean prolongs the moment by having 
Genius point out each article he is doffing and then adding the comment that Genius will 
then don secular clothing. The addition of the fact that Genius will be less encumbered by 
his new garb and that he could even dance (“si com s’il alast queroler”) only emphasizes 
the unpredictability of Genius’ actions as a protean figure. Genius, who only moments 
ago was officially absolving Nature of her sins, is now ready to fly off with ease and so 
light in dress that he could dance. The transformation is indeed profound. 
 Soon thereafter, Genius changes his attire once again in preparation for his 
sermon. This time, he is re-dressed by Venus, thereby combining a change in his attire 
with a change in his identity as priest and messenger of Nature to priest and messenger of 
Venus.  
Tantost li dieus d’amours afuble 
A genius une chasuble; 
Anel li baille et croce et mistre 
Plus clere que cristal ne vistre: 
N’i quierent autre parement, 
Tant ont grant entalentement 
D’oïr cele sentence lire.  
Venus, qui ne cessoit de rire 
Ne se pooit tenir coie 
Tant par estoit jolive, et gaie, 
Pour plus enforcier l’anateme 
Quant il avra fini son theme, 
Li met al poing .i. ardant cirge 
Qui n’estoit pas de cire virge.157 
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157 Ibid., ll. 19481-19494: “Then the God of Love arrayed Genius in a chasuble and handed him a 
ring, crosier, and mitre, clearer than glass or crystal. They sought no other ornament, for they 
greatly longed to hear him read the sentence. Venus laughed continually and could not keep quiet 
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The repetition of the verb “affubler” in this passage recalls the previous passage, 
moments earlier, in which Genius changes into his secular clothing from his priestly garb. 
The mention of specific items of clothing or attire in this passage has a similar effect to 
their mention in the previous passage, drawing the reader’s attention to the process of 
Genius’ transformation and his suspension in a transformative state in between. The 
process of change is meticulously completed with the detail that Venus and Genius “n’i 
quierent autre parement.” The use of the word “parement,” close to our word “apparel,” 
draws attention to the intricate process by which Genius must be appareled and re-
appareled with each action he performs. The idea that Venus must cease seeking pieces 
of “apparel” for Genius before he can intone his sermon suggests that his identity 
transformation cannot be complete until he has completed his change of attire. Venus’ 
laughter (“ne cessoit de rire”) adds a level of performative pleasure to Genius’ 
transformation and prolongs the process of his change by forcing the reader to pause over 
it. 
 Genius’ primary identification as a figure in transition is significant for two 
reasons: first, because it manifests itself in his sermon as a microcosm of a larger shift in 
concepts of ingenium or imaginatio from a generative force to a recombinative force that 
re-presents images in the mind; second, because it serves as a crux for the text’s concern 
with the transformative capacities of objects that should be stable, including images. In 
this latter point, Genius serves as the text’s “recombinative imagination” by performing a 
summary of its internal anxieties about images. Of course, the ability of an ever-changing 
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in her joy and gaiety; in order to lend added force to his anathema, when he had finished his 
speech, she put into his hands a lighted candle, which was not made of virgin wax” (The 
Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 300). 
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figure to provide accurate recombination of previously observed sights in nature is a 
major concern in this portion of the text and has the effect of reiterating Nature’s anxiety 
about the reliability of vision.  
 Genius begins his sermons by invoking the authority of Nature and seemingly 
revealing himself to be the god of generation. This Genius, who encourages fertility and 
allows for the human race to be renewed, is mostly inherited from classical models of the 
figure, as Jane Chance Nitzsche has documented, and is famously transmitted by Bernard 
Silvestris’ Cosmographia.158 Yet even in portraying this sub-type of the genius figure, 
Jean’s Genius is caught between two slightly different identities. On the one hand, he 
conveys Nature’s message, acting as her priest. On the other, he has just confined Nature 
to her forge and been re-costumed by Venus who seems to have silently reclaimed him as 
her messenger. Even in Genius’ assumption of the identity of “god of generation,” Jean’s 
text still equivocates about who exactly Genius is, to whom he is subordinate, and whose 
message he conveys. 
 Kevin Brownlee has argued that Genius rewrites parts of Guillaume de Lorris’s 
text. According to Brownlee’s argument, Genius reformulates Guillaume de Lorris’ 
Garden as a beau parc and in the process formulates himself as the new writer of the text 
by repeatedly referring to his speech as “écriture.”159 Yet Genius’ “rewriting” of 
Guillaume’s Garden of Pleasure may more accurately delineate the process of 
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158 Nitzsche, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 115-16. 
 
159 Kevin Brownlee, “Jean de Meun and the Limits of Romance: Genius as Rewriter of Guillaume 
de Lorris,” in Romance: Generic Transformation from Chretien de Troyes to Cervantes, ed. 
Kevin Brownlee and Marina Scordilis Brownlee (Hanover: Published for Dartmouth College by 
University Press of New England, 1985), 127. 
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recombination. Sarah Kay has noted that Genius as related to the Latin ingenium can 
mean “imagination” and that Jean de Meun “acknowledges this etymological connection” 
by having Genius speak about the “devices of the imagination” in his description of 
Jupiter.160 Kay comments that Jean de Meun’s Genius may further be a figure for the 
imagination. I would suggest that Genius only steps into this role as Imagination when he 
recounts the dreamer’s encounter with the Fountain of Narcissus. Here, Genius becomes 
Imagination in the more firmly Aristotelian sense of relying on the senses to recombine 
and re-present sights once seen in nature. Kay identifies a hierarchy in which Jean’s 
Genius represents a “higher” allegory “in which images construct transcendent truths” 
and argues that Genius’ recapitulation of Guillaume’s Garden and Fountain reveals his 
attempt to “relegate” Guillaume’s text to “the ‘lower’ kind of imagination, in which 
images relate to physical experience.”161 Yet Genius does not emerge as a “higher” 
version of imagination, nor does he simply “rewrite” Guillaume’s text. He transforms in 
the process of speaking his sermon and enfolds within his speech and his transformative 
identity anxieties about the transformative capacity of images and artistic creations in 
both Guillaume’s and Jean’s portions of the text. The reiteration of the Garden represents 
a moment in which Genius mutates from priest of generation to recombinative 
imagination. The fact that the reader witnesses this transformation renders Genius an 
uncomfortably unstable figure, commensurate with his frequent attire changes and 
constant flight.  
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160 Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 89-90. 
 
161 Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 90 
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 Genius’ reiteration of Guillaume’s garden scene pretends to be a straightforward 
summary but in fact constantly makes apparent the fact that it is a reinterpretation. 
Genius begins his reiteration of the lover’s vision of the “beau parc” by claiming certain 
obvious and immediately apparent characteristics of the Garden’s features:  
Car qui dedenz ce parc seroit, 
A seür jurer oseroit, 
Ou meïst sanz plus l’oeill leanz, 
Que li jardins seroit neanz 
Au regart de ceste closture 
Qui n’est pas faite en quarreüre, 
Ainz est si ronde et si soutille 
C’onques ne fu berill ne bille 
De forme si bien arondie.162 
 
Genius’ comments here are based upon the common experience of any person (“qui”), a 
strange point of alienation from the dreamer, whose actual experience he supposedly 
summarizes. Even stranger is the repeated use of the subjunctive and conditional in this 
passage (“seroit” “oseroit”) as though Genius is not describing a real sense experience 
that actually occurred but merely a hypothetical situation in which someone would judge 
the sights of the Garden in this particular way if he were to enter it. Already, Genius’ 
relationship to the particularities of the sights of the dreamer are in question, and he 
offers an interpretation of the Garden in general rather than a reiteration of the scene as 
viewed by the dreamer.  
 Genius then begins his proper summary of the dreamer’s view of the Garden and 
Fountain first by posing the question: “Que voulez vous que je vous die?”163 Horgan 
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162 Le Roman de la rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 20293-20301: “Anyone who entered the park, or simply 
cast his eyes inside it, would dare swear with certainty that the garden was nothing in comparison 
with this enclosure, which is not square in form but round, and so skilfully shaped that no beryl or 
ball was ever so perfectly rounded” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 312). 
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translates this line as “What should I tell you?” but it more precisely means “What would 
you like me to tell you?” At this point, Genius reveals that his subject matter cannot be a 
mere regurgitation of the sights Amant saw in the Garden. Furthermore, by asking this 
question, Genius pauses in a moment of formulating his summary of the sights of the 
Garden, a speech that allows him to assume the identity of the recombinative 
imagination. Once again, Genius appears in a moment of transformative process. Finally, 
Genius arrives at his topic, a summary of Amant’s vision of the Garden: “Parlons de 
choses qu’il vit lores/Et par dedenz et par defores,/Et par bries moz nous en passon,/Pour 
ce que trop ne nous lasson!”164 
 Significantly, the constant shift between first-person and third-person pronouns 
throughout this portion of the speech indicates a transformative moment in which Genius 
is still the priest speaking his sermon of generation and yet transitions into a role of 
service to the dreamer’s senses as a messenger inside his psyche. The constant shift 
between direct reporting and commentary also demonstrates wavering on Genius’ part 
about the extent of the imagination’s interpretative role. A concise example of both of 
these phenomena occurs in Genius’ description of the Fountain of Narcissus as first seen 
by the dreamer: 
Ele sourt, ce dist il, a granz ondes 
Par .ij. dois creuses et parfondes: 
Mais el n’a mie, bien le sai, 
Ses dois ne ses eaues de sai; 
N’est nule chose qu’ele tiengne 
Qui trestout d’autrui ne viengne. 
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163 Ibid., l. 20302: “What should I tell you?” (The Romance of the Rose, ed. Horgan, 312). 
 
 
164 Ibid., ll. 20303-20306: “Let us talk of the things he saw there, inside and out, but let us speak 
of them briefly, so that we do not grow too weary” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 
312-13).  
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Puis si redist que c’est sanz fins 
Qu’ele est plus clere k’argenz fins. 
Vez de quels trufles il vous plaide! 
Ainz et voir si trouble et si laide 
Que chascuns qui sa teste i boute 
Pour soi mirer, il n’i voit goute. 
Tuit s’i forsennent et s’angoissent 
Pour ce que point ne s’i connoissent.  
Au fonz, ce dist, a cristaus doubles  
Que li solaus, qui n’est pas troubles, 
Fait luire quant ses rais i giete, 
Si clers que cil qui les aguiete 
Voit touz jours la moitié des choses 
Qui sont en cel jardin encloses, 
Et puet le remenant veoir 
S’il se veult d’autre part seoir, 
Tant sont cler, tant sont vertueus. 
Certes, ainz sont trouble et nueus!  
Pour coi ne font il demonstrance, 
Quant li solaus ses rais i lance, 
De toutes les choses ensamble?165 
 
In the first part of this passage, Genius inserts asides that draw attention to the fact that 
the main actor in this scene is the dreamer and that Genius is simply reiterating, 
correcting and summarizing what the dreamer has already seen. In the first line 
especially, the tag “ce dist il” interrupts Genius’ reporting about the gushing of the 
fountain so that the reader must pause over the recognition of the dreamer’s primary role 
in this sight. Yet Genius does not allow the description to continue for long without 
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$)(!Ibid., ll. 20429-20455: “It gushes out, he tells us, in great waves through two deeply hollowed 
channels, but I know very well that neither the channels nor the water originate there: everything 
that it has comes to it from somewhere else. He goes on to say that it is infinitely brighter than 
pure silver. See what tales he is telling you! In fact, it is so ugly and muddy that anyone who 
hangs his head over in order to look at himself will be unable to see a thing. Everyone goes wild 
with anguish because he cannot recognize himself. At the bottom, he says, are two crystals of  
such power and radiance that when the rays of the unclouded sun fall upon them, they shine so 
brightly that anyone looking at them can always see half the things that are enclosed in the 
garden, and can see the remainder by stationing himself on the other side. But it is certain that 
they are cloudy and murky. Why, when the sun’s rays fall upon them, do they not reveal at 
once?” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 314-15).!
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inserting his own voice, sometimes in the jarring form of altering the syntax from 
declarative to exclamatory or interrogative and sometimes in the equally abrupt shift to a 
first-person pronoun. Genius again describes the dreamer’s supposed evaluation of the 
stones at the bottom of the fountain as “plus clere k’argenz” with a verbal tag reminding 
the reader of the third-person presence here “puis se redist.” Yet immediately after this, 
Genius’ own voice bursts into the passage with the exclamatory “vez de quels trufles il 
vous plaide!” The use of the exclamatory voice as well as the direct appeal to “vous,” 
Genius’ audience, brings Genius back to a manner of speaking that occupies the first part 
of his sermon in which he directly exhorts his listeners to generative behavior. As Genius 
assumes the role of the recombinative imagination, his identity as generative priest, 
directly ordering his listeners to perform certain actions, continues to rise to the surface.  
 Genius signals his return to reporting the sights the dreamer has seen in the 
fountain with another version of the third-person tag, “ce dist”: “Au fonz, ce dist, a 
cristaus doubles.” As in the first line of this passage, the “ce dist” interrupts Genius’ 
summary of what the dreamer actually saw, emphasizing the fact that the dreamer, 
another being, is the agent who in fact witnessed these phenomena. Genius makes a 
number of declarative statements about the brightness of the crystals, concluding that the 
crystals are so bright and pure (“tant sont cler, tant sont vertueus”) that one can see the 
other half of the garden by peering at them. As with the passage discussed above, the ease 
of these declarative statements is abruptly interrupted by yet another exclamation closely 
followed by a question: “Certes, ainz sont trouble et nueus!/ Pour coi ne font il 
demonstrance,/ Quant li solaus ses rais i lance,/ De toutes les choses ensamble?” The 
word “certes” imposes a pause on the reading of this passage, and the juxtaposition of the 
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exclamation and question here removes the reader from the dreamer’s description and 
recalls Genius’ presence. “Certes” also signals Genius’ role as commentator. This 
particular set of exclamation and question defines itself as a form of paratext beside the 
primary description of the scene seen by the lover. 
 Thus Genius equivocates about his role in the retelling of the Fountain scene, 
simultaneously inhabiting the functions of summarizer and commentator. By the end of 
this passage, Genius begins to speak as though he is the dreamer, fashioning himself the 
sole agent in the sight of the fountain and substituting first-person conjugations of “dire” 
for the previous third-person tag “ce dist.” He enjoins his audience to pay attention to his 
(perhaps superior) description of the fountain: 
Or levez un pou les oreilles, 
Si m’en orrez dire merveilles. 
Cele fontaine que j’ai dite, 
Qui tan test bele et tant profite 
Et garist, tant sont savorees, 
Toutes bestes enlangorees, 
Rent touz jors par .iij. dois soutives 
Eaues douces, cleres et vives.166 
 
As at the beginning of his reiteration of the dreamer’s view of the fountain and in the 
various interjections discussed above, Genius here appeals directly to his audience by 
using the imperative “levez.” The word “or” followed by an injunction to listen normally 
signals the beginning of a speech, revealing a way in which Genius here starts afresh, this 
time using his own voice rather than reporting what the dreamer has supposedly seen. He 
refashions the dreamer’s experience as his own by substituting “j’ai dite” for “ce dist,” 
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166 Ibid., ll. 20467-20474: “Now prick up your ears, and you will hear me tell of wondrous things. 
The spring of which I have told you is extremely beautiful, and the water, sweet, clear, lively, and 
so delicious that it has great power to heal sick beasts, wells up continually through three skilfully 
constructed channels” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 315). 
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effectively removing consideration of the dreamer’s primary experience of the fountain 
from view. Earlier iterations of the third person have now been erased in favor of 
repetition of the first person with “m’en orrez dire merveilles” and “que j’ai dite.” 
 Kevin Brownlee has noted that Genius here “rewrites” and even corrects 
Guillaume’s text in a turn of events that perhaps figures Jean de Meun’s anxiety about the 
existence of his predecessor’s writing.167 It is certainly true that Genius necessarily 
rewrites the scene of the dreamer’s encounter with Narcissus’ fountain and that this must 
represent Jean’s act of rewriting or writing over Guillaume’s portion of the Roman. Yet 
Genius’ actions here may be more equivocal than absolute rewriting. When he reverts to 
the first person and directly addresses his audience, Genius also reverts to his role as 
generation god and priest. These moments are intertwined with recapitulation of what the 
lover saw in the fountain, and they witness, with their accompanying insistence upon the 
presence of the third-person “il” with repetitions of “ce dist,” Genius assuming the 
function of the recombinative imagination. Genius’ entire recapitulation of the dreamer’s 
view of the Fountain of Narcissus thus also encompasses the process of Genius’ 
transformation from god and priest of generation to recombinative imagination. Along 
the way, troubling questions about the imagination arise, including whether the 
imagination can wholly alter a sight once seen in the process of recalling and 
recombining it, and whether imagination can offer commentary on visual stimuli in a way 
that similarly alters the experience of the senses.  
 
Genius and the Image Crisis  
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167 Brownlee, “Jean de Meun and the Limits of Romance,” 120-1. 
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 Genius as grand summarizer and recombinative imagination does more than 
reiterate the dreamer’s vision of the Fountain of Narcissus.  His transformative nature 
serves as its own kind of summary of the entire text’s anxieties about transformation. 
Genius recombines the anxieties of both Guillaume’s and Jean’s portions of the text and 
represents not only the dreamer’s imagination but also the text’s imagination. Genius is, 
then, the true engin of the text. Genius thus encapsulates the text’s own “image crisis.” 
In Guillaume’s portion of the text, images that should be stable are described as 
though they have transformative capacities. The descriptions of painted images, 
conversely, posit past lives, processes of becoming and continuous existence in all verbal 
tenses and moods, immediately producing not one but multiple images of these figures. 
The descriptions of Vieillesse and Tristesse are particularly instructive on this point. The 
dreamer relates how “la pesance et li anuiz” which Tristesse “ soffroit de jor et de nuiz,/ 
L’avoient faite mout jaunir/ Et maigre et pale devenir.”168 The notion that Tristesse 
carries around the weight of “anuiz” both day and night suggests her continuous 
existence. Similarly, the positing of a process of “devenir,” of becoming rather than being 
“maigre et pale,” renders necessary a concept of Tristesse as mobile within and 
progressing through time. The pluperfect in the description of Tristesse constructs a 
complexly layered history for this image, as the dreamer relates that “trop avoit son cuer 
corrocie”169 and that “En maint leu l’avoit dessiree / Com cele qui mout iere iriee”170 and 
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168 Le Roman de la rose, ed. Strubel, ll. 299-302: “…the sadness and distress and troubled 
thoughts which she suffered night and day had made her turn quite yellow, thin, and pale” (The 
Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 7).  
 
169 Ibid., l. 311, my emphasis: “her heart was exceedingly sad and her grief deep and intense” 
(The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 7). 
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how “Qu’ele n’avoit pas este lante / D’esgratiner toute sa chiere.”171 These pluperfects 
are embedded in imperfects and perfects, insinuating that Tristesse, although seemingly 
an immobile image, has a continuous, temporally layered past that has delivered her to 
this moment.  
 The description of Vieillesse likewise reveals the continuous existence of painted 
images across tenses and moods. In describing her appearance, the dreamer’s language is 
steeped in a description of what she once looked like: “Mout ere ja ses vis fletriz/ Qui fu 
jadis soef et pleins.”172 The word “jadis” refers to an imagination of her former 
appearance. Vieillesse is also infused with conditional and subjunctive force: “S’ele 
morist ne grant pechiez/ Car touz ses cors estoit sechiez/ De vieillece et anientiz.”173 As 
the dreamer contemplates Vieillesse in a counterfactual situation – “s’ele morist ne grant 
pechiez” (“if she were to die, it would not be a shame”) – her existence now crosses into 
the realm of imaginary projection. The effect of these multiple temporal existences for 
both Vieillesse and Tristesse, to take only two examples, is to replace staid, discontinuous 
fragmentation with multiplicity, continuity and mutability. As Stephen Nichols observes, 
Guillaume’s ekphrasis “serves as a metacommentary showing the reader-viewer how to 
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170 Ibid., ll. 317-318, my emphasis: “…no one, however hard-hearted, could have seen her 
without feeling great pity for her, for she struck and tore at herself and beat her hands together” 
(The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 7).  
 
 
171 Ibid., ll. 314-315, my emphasis: “She had not been slow to scratch her own face” (The 
Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 7).  
 
172 Ibid., ll. 352-353: “Her face, once soft and smooth, was now quite withered and covered in 
wrinkles” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 7). 
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173 Ibid., ll. 349-351: “If she had died, her death would not have been important or wrong, for her 
whole body was dried up and ruined by age” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 7). 
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enter the allegorical world of the narrative.”174 Such textual pausing over commentary 
that both draws the reader into the text and results in contemplation specifically of 
transformation is reminiscent of the effect of the portion of Genius’ sermon in which he 
reiterates the events surrounding the dreamer’s view of the Fountain of Narcissus.  
The Narcissus episode itself, which Genius recapitulates, is in its original 
formulation a reflection on transformation, mutability and the ability of images to 
multiply and change ceaselessly. This episode has been interpreted as an instance of 
bodily and psychic fragmentation and especially as an icon of stasis. As Thomas Hill has 
argued, Narcissus, “fixed” in his gazing position, encodes no ability for “change or 
growth.”175 Jean-Charles Huchet, offering a Lacanian analysis, suggests that “the fact that 
the image is fractured serves as a reminder of the lack which is inherent in symbolic 
representation.”176 Yet, although mirror reflections threaten to fragment the self, 
fragmentation here gives way to a process of generating other, endlessly proliferating 
images. Appropriately, then, the dreamer does not see himself right away when he looks 
into Narcissus’ fountain, even though he does begin from a notion of the fountain as 
reflecting a fragmented self-image. The dreamer relates how he perceives “ou mireor” a 
rose-hedge “entre mil choses,” referencing the innumerable, proliferating sights the 
mirror offers him.177 Even more unusual, though, are the “.ij. pierres de cristal,” which he 
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174 Stephen G. Nichols, “Ekphrasis, Iconoclasm, and Desire,” in Rethinking the Romance of the 
Rose: Text, Image, Reception, ed. Kevin Brownlee and Sylvia Huot (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 150. 
 
175 Thomas D. Hill, “Narcissus, Pygmalion, and the Castration of Saturn: Two Mythographical 
Themes in the Roman de la Rose,” Studies in Philology 71 (1984), 413. 
 
176 Quoted in Kay, The Romance of the Rose, 82. 
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sees “ou fonz de la fontaine.”178 The crystals themselves comprise an unstable image, as 
the dreamer describes their mutability according to the light the sun sheds on them: “Lors 
perent colors plus de .c./ Ou cristal qui par le soleil / Devient jaunes, ynde, vermeil.”179 
The concept of “devient,” becoming, with its recourse to transformation, invokes most 
readily the mutability of the very mirror itself and its own “multiplicity,” collecting and 
reflecting “plus de cent” colors. 
The dreamer goes on to liken the work of the crystals to a mirror, relating that just 
as 
 …li mireors mostre 
Les choses qui sont a l’ancontre 
Et i veoit on sanz coverture 
Et la color et la figure, 
Trestout ausi vos di de voir…180 
 
So “le cristal” offers: 
A ceaus qui dedanz l’eaue musent 
Car touz jorz quel que part qu’il soient, 
L’une moitie dou vergier voient 
Et s’il se tornent maintenant, 
Puent veoir le remenant.181 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 Le Roman de la rose, ed. Strubel, l. 1612.  
 
178 Ibid., ll. 1534-1535. 
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179 Ibid., ll. 1543-1545: “…more than a hundred colours appear in the crystal, which turns blue 
and yellow and red in the sunlight” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 24). 
 
180 Ibid., ll. 1552-1557: “…things placed in front of a mirror are reflected in it, and their 
appearance and colour are seen quite plainly” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 24-5).!!
!
181 Ibid., ll. 1559-1563: “…the crystal truly disclose[s] the whole of the garden to him who gazes 
into the water. For whichever side he is on, he can always see half of the garden, and by turning 
he is at once able to see the remainder” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 25). 
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The mirror is revelatory, bringing images out of the “couverture” of unseeing. However, 
this cannot be a moment of “enclosed” reflected vision because the “mirror” referenced 
here is already within another mirror (the fountain itself), suggesting proliferating layers 
of mirror images in the first place. Furthermore, the crystals do not produce a reflection 
of the gazer back to himself but create several images of the garden and reflect a 
multiplying wealth of images, as they “mostroient / .C. mile choses qui paroient.”182 
Looking into the fountain, about to confront what should be a self-fragmenting image, the 
dreamer instead sees these highly mutable reflective crystals, which also generate a 
multiplicity of images (“mile choses”). This episode suggests that fragmentation may 
generate imagistic proliferation – a primary act of imagistic fragmentation in the form of 
mirror-gazing, which separates the subject into constituent parts, immediately becomes 
an instance of a multiplicity of perpetually transforming images.  
 As is the case in the Pygmalion episode, the realization of the deceptive qualities 
of vision and the capacity of images to transform continuously produces an important and 
sudden change in affect. The viewer suddenly shifts from feelings of wonder and marvel 
to feelings of sheer terror. The dreamer interrupts his own narrative to exclaim his dismay 
at having been deceived by the images in the fountain: 
Mes de fort eure me miré: 
Las, tant en ai puis soupiré! 
Cil mireors m’a deceü: 
Se j’eusse avant queneü 
Quel la force ere et sa vertu, 
Ne m’i fusse ja embatu, 
Car maintenant es laz chaï 
Qui maint home a pris et traï.183 
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182 Ibid., ll. 1602-1603.  
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The use of the word “mes” suggests an affective turn from enchantment and marvel to 
terror and fear. The exclamatory outburst beginning with the lamenting “las” forces a 
hesitation in the text after which the dreamer forces us to pause over his affective 
experience. The particular mention of the “force” and “vertu” of the crystal’s mirror 
reveals a concern over the power of images or image-making devices such as mirrors in 
general. This momentary lamentation bespeaks a pervasive concern in the Roman about 
the power of transforming images and explicitly connects this power to an affective 
response of fear and despair, signaled by the dreamer’s interjection of his plaintive “las.”  
 In Jean’s portion of the Roman, the Pygmalion episode offers a strikingly similar 
musing on the transformative capacities of images, a point of consistency between the 
two portions of the text. Pygmalion is almost a Genius figure in his entanglement with 
Nature and Venus and his despair over to whom to be most loyal. His despairing about 
his relationship to Nature and to Venus recalls the way in which Genius repeatedly 
transfers allegiances between Nature and Venus. As Pygmalion creates his image, he 
laments being at odds with Nature: 
Ez vous qu’il ne s’en donne garde, 
K’amours en ses roisiaus le lace 
Si fort qu’il ne set que il face. 
A soi meïsmes s’en conplaint, 
Mais ne pot estanchier son plaint: 
‘Las, que faz je, dist il, dor gié 
Maint ymage ai fait et forgié 
C’on ne savoit prisier leur pris, 
N’ainc d’euls amer ne fui seurpris!... 
Que puis je faire en cest article? 
Par foi, s’une roynne amasse, 
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183 Ibid., ll. 1604-1611: “But it was an evil hour when I looked at my reflection. Alas, how often I 
have since sighed about it! The mirror deceived me, and if I had known in advance what force 
and power it had, I would never have approached it, for at once I feel into the trap that has 
captured and betrayed many men” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 25). 
$$%!
!
Merci toutevois esperasse 
Pour ce que c’est chose possible. 
Mais ceste amour est si orrible 
Qu’el ne vient mie de nature. 
Trop mauvaisement me nature: 
Nature en moi mauvais fill a; 
Quant me fist forment s’avilla.184 
 
Pygmalion’s entanglement with the God of Love is immediately apparent in this passage, 
as he becomes entrapped in her web (“lace”) with excessive strength (“si fort”). The 
entanglement with Love leads Pygmalion into despair, with a traditional lament 
beginning with the exclamatory “las,” mimicking the Latin “helas.” Intriguingly, 
Pygmalion comes to the realization that he must be in conflict with Nature, recognizing 
that this “unnatural” love could not have been perpetuated by nature herself (“ne vient 
mie de nature”) and that he has treated Nature poorly (“trop mauvaisement me nature”). 
He has transformed into a terrible child of Nature (“mauvais fill”). The battle between 
Love and Nature is reminiscent of Genius’ position, constantly shifting alliances between 
Venus and Nature. 
 If Pygmalion is a quasi-Genius figure, his statue underpins concerns about 
imagistic transformation that come to the fore in Genius’ own perpetually mutating 
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184 Ibid., ll. 20840-20870: “Love bound him so tightly in his nets that he did not know what he 
was doing. He uttered his grief to himself, but could not stifle his complaint: ‘Alas!’ he said, 
‘What am I doing? Am I asleep? I have made and forged many images whose worth was beyond 
price, and I have never been overcome with love for any of them…What can I do in this 
situation? By my faith, if I loved a queen, I could at least hope for mercy because it would be a 
possibility, but this love is so horrible that it cannot be Nature’s work. I am at odds with Nature, 
who has a bad son in me and who disgraced herself in making me. And yet I ought not to blame 
her for my insensate love; I have only myself to blame” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 
321). 
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identity. Pygmalion’s first reaction upon realizing that his statue has come to life is not 
only shock but also fear:  
Lors voit qu’ele est vive et charnue, 
Si li debaille la char nue 
Et voit les biaus crins blondoianz 
Commes ondes ensamble ondoianz, 
Et sent les os et sent les vaines 
Qui de sanc erent toutes plaines, 
Et le pouls debatre et mouvoir. 
Ne set se c’est mençonge ou voir, 
Arriers se trait, n’en set que faire 
Ne s’ose mais pres de lui traire 
Qu’il a paour d’estre enchantez. 
‘Qu’est ce, dist il, sui je tantez? 
Veille je pas? Nanil! ainz songe! 
Songe? Par foi, non faz, ainz veille! 
Dont vient donques ceste merveille? 
Est ce fantosme ou anemis 
Qui s’est en mon ymage mis?’185 
 
Although Pygmalion’s realization that his statue’s materials have transformed into live 
flesh (“vive et charnue”) seems initially to invoke an elated response, it is essential not to 
ignore the feelings of terror and skepticism that follow closely thereafter. The concern 
over the truth or falsity of his vision not only recalls Nature’s and Genius’ discourses on 
the deceptions of optics but also resonates with the first few lines of Guillaume’s portion 
of the poem in which “songe” is famously rhymed with “mençonge.” The connection 
with the early parts of Guillaume’s portion of the text is made more apparent in 
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185 Ibid., ll. 21137-21154: “He saw she was living flesh; he caressed the naked flesh, he saw the 
lovely bond locks shining and rippling together like the waves, he felt the bones and the veins all 
full of blood, and the throbbing movement of the pulse. He did not know whether it was false or 
true, and drew back, unsure of what to do. He dared not approach more closely, for he was afraid 
of being bewitched. ‘What is this?’ he said, ‘Am I being tempted? Am I awake? No, I am 
dreaming. But I have never had so realistic a dream. Dream? By my faith, I am not dreaming but 
awake. So where has this marvel come from? Is it a phantom or a demon that has possessed my 
image?’” (The Romance of the Rose, trans. Horgan, 325-6).  
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Pygmalion’s questioning of whether or not he is in fact dreaming, with the word “songe” 
repeated several times and appearing prominently at the beginning of line 21150.  
 The most significant turn in Pygmalion’s reaction to the liveliness of his statue 
appears at line 21145 when he actually retreats in fear: “arriers se trait.” The use of the 
word “arriers” provides a visual image of Pygmalion recoiling from the statue. The 
element of fear arises explicitly two lines later when it is explained that Pygmalion 
retreats because he is afraid (“a paour”) of being bewitched (“d’estre enchantez”). 
Pygmalion is specifically troubled by his lack of knowledge about the force behind this 
transformation, urgently wondering about from where this change originates: “Dont vient 
donques ceste merveille?” He finally entertains the notion that his statue has been 
possessed: “Est ce fantosme ou anemis/ Qui s’est en mon ymage mis.” The use of the 
word “fantosme” in addition to “anemis,” a more traditional sense of “demon” or “devil,” 
suggests the entry of the idea of the imagination, broadly conceived, into this scene of the 
statue’s enlivening. Although “fantosme” may most simply mean a delusion or phantom 
such as a ghost-like figure, the root of the word is also related to the work of the fantasia, 
a close companion of the imagination. The line thus has a double sense, contemplating 
both the possibility that the image itself has been invaded by a demon and also the 
possibility that Pygmalion’s fantasia or imagination has itself been infested with 
misleading phantasms. Terror associated with the imagination has its roots in thirteenth-
century Aristotelian examples of monstrosities associated with the imaginative act of 
dreaming. The dreaming imagination has the capacity to recombine images once seen in 
nature to produce terrifying monstrous hybrids. The Pygmalion episode compounds this 
inherent monstrosity of the imagination by introducing the frightening notion that the 
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desirable and the monstrous are actually closely linked. Critics have long puzzled over 
the foray into the Pygmalion story in the context of the lover’s conquest of the rose at the 
end of the Roman.186 As it stands, it appears digressive and tangential. Yet the Pygmalion 
episode reflects the text’s concerns about imagistic animation and transformation and the 
possible deceptions of sight, anxieties that Genius, whose speech directly precedes the 
Pygmalion episode, represents.  
 In her analysis of Jean’s Genius, Eberle argues that he differs from Alan’s Genius 
because rather than being the personification of “man’s innate tutelary spirit, reason,” he 
is the embodiment of man’s “inherent concupiscence.” She notes that Jean’s Genius is 
thus a “false priest,” while Alan’s is a “true one.”187 Yet such an argument simply strips 
Genius of identities he may have occupied in De planctu without properly taking into 
account the new positions he assumes in the Roman. Without deliberating on whether 
Genius is a wholly ironic figure, it is possible to detect in Jean’s Genius a transformative 
figure suspended in the process of mutating from a twelfth-century god of generation to a 
personification of the recombinative imagination. In addition to presenting himself as a 
grand summarizer (if not occasional distorter) of the sights the dreamer has seen, he 
emerges as a form of engin for the text as a whole, concisely embodying both authors’ 
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186 See Robert Pogue Harrison, “The Bare Essential: The Landscape of Il Fiore,” in Rethinking 
the Romance of the Rose: Text, Image, Reception, ed. Sylvia Huot and Kevin Brownlee 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 293. See also Lewis, The Allegory of 
Love, p. 139. For “digression” as a major principle of the Rose, see Douglas Kelly, Internal  
 
 
Difference and Meanings in the Roman de la rose (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995), 124. 
 
187 Eberle, “The Lover’s Glass,” 286. 
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concerns about images’ transformative capacities. This type of transformation, as seen 
with the Pygmalion episode, has the capacity to produce terror.  
 While thirteenth-century philosophy about the imagination was moving forward 
toward a more purely Aristotelian outlook, Jean’s Genius demonstrates a moment in 
which the literary imagination lags behind and moves only reluctantly forward. Once 
again, as in Alan’s De planctu, narrative style and literary language allow for a depiction 
of the allegorical imagination as thoroughly divided between an older concept of 
imagination as a god of generation and a more modern development of imagination as 
recombinative. The devices that Jean employs to communicate literature’s lag behind 
philosophy are themselves literary, including narrative devices such as extensive detail 
about a character’s process of changing clothing. The ability to experiment with character 
and literary description allows for a much richer exploration of imagination’s reluctance 
to change in literature, while philosophical texts are necessarily more straightforward 
about this move toward Aristotelian recombination.  
 Genius’ identification as a transformative figure both puts pressure on the idea of 
the allegorical figure as a unified, stable unit and, in an unexpected twist, helps to unify 
the two portions of the Roman by encapsulating the concern with imagistic mutation 
central to both of them. Although Genius’ sermon, especially his transfiguration of the 
lover’s initial sight of the Fountain in Guillaume’s portion of the text, is normally viewed 
as a rejection of Guillaume’s text, a form of ridicule that devalues and discredits its 
predecessor, a deeper consideration of the allegorical representation of Genius helps draw 
the two portions of the text together rather than drive them apart. If the Fountain of 
Narcissus itself embodies the concept of fragmentation, then Genius, who reiterates this 
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primary scene of fragmentation, comes to represent a form of unity. At the same time, 
Genius’ figuration as a character constantly suspended in the process of transformation 
denotes a form of instability that runs counter to the unification that this allegorical figure 
seems to perform. Yet even if Genius is caught somewhere between priest of generation 
and recombinative imagination, he does come to embody the text’s “recombinative 
imagination” by representing a succinct summary of its defining characteristic as a series 
of transformations. The image crisis represented by Jean’s Genius becomes a yet more 
prominent feature of Imagination’s identity in Chaucer’s House of Fame, as Chaucer 
questions whether imagination creates images of substance at all. A transformative and 
uncertain imagination thus evolves into one in the midst of an ontological crisis in this 
fourteenth-century text.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Embodiment Crisis and the Irrational Imagination: The Dreamer as Image and 
Imagination in The House of Fame 
 
 
Jean de Meun left us with a constantly transforming imagination that becomes a 
locus for concerns over the transformative capacities of images themselves. If Jean de 
meun’s Genius represents imagination’s uncertain allegorization, Chaucer takes this 
uncertainty one step further in The House of Fame, jettisoning imagination into the midst 
of an ontological crisis and questioning its ability to produce images.  
Debates over optical illusions in fourteenth-century England produced a series of 
serious ontological questions about the imagination. What is it and how does it function? 
What is the mechanism by which it causes us to see objects that are not really present? 
Does it create real images with weight and material presence or does it make a subjective 
judgment that is transferred to the intellect with no intermediary? Although Chaucer’s 
fourteenth-century milieu was perhaps just as saturated with optical theory as Jean de 
Meun’s thirteenth-century Paris, much of the scholarship thus far on later medieval 
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optical theory has been produced by historians of science and by intellectual historians 
rather than by literary scholars.188 Some of these studies, such as David Lindberg’s, have 
discredited much of the optical theory produced in the fourteenth century, claiming 
incorrectly that no new advances in the field of optics occurred between Roger Bacon and 
Johannes Kepler.189 These claims have made it somewhat difficult for literary scholars 
interested in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to ponder how optical theory and 
theories about vision and cognition might have related to the literary production of this 
period and to literary and non-literary theories of imagination. In scholarship on English 
literature, this phenomenon seems particularly strange, since the dream vision genre 
flourished in the fourteenth century. Most of the scholarship on this topic, however, 
centers on dream-theory rather than on vision-theory and optics.190  
 Vision-theory and optics are of immediate relevance to studies of the imagination 
in the fourteenth century, because, as optical theory and theories of vision developed in 
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France and England, the mechanism of the imagination became of urgent interest to many 
philosophers.191 A debate that arose asked the questions: do the imagination and the 
images it produces have real, material substance or are they simply “illusions”? What is 
the precise mechanism by which these illusions may be seen?192 At the same time, optical 
theory contemporary with Chaucer, and mainly deriving from Alhazen, involved a firm 
recognition that the process of seeing involves the imaginative faculty directly.193 This 
idea that the imagination is involved in initial sense perception is also reflected in The 
House of Fame.  
 This chapter will argue that questions about imagination and the images it 
produces posed by fourteenth-century optical theory are also posed by Geffrey’s body 
throughout The House of Fame. The uncertainty about the substance of Geffrey’s body 
reflects contemporary debates about the materiality of the imagination’s imagistic 
products. Geffrey’s body thus becomes a locus for debate about the imagination itself. 
Geffrey also represents imagination in his activities in relation to images throughout the 
poem, acting always as an intermediary between sense perception and understanding. 
Geffrey enacts the process of movement from perception to intellectual understanding.194 
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In a sense, then, Geffrey becomes a personification of imagination in this text. He enacts 
the processes by which imagination functions and also embodies the question about 
whether imagination’s products have weight and material substance.  
 This text witnesses imagination in the midst of a crisis of embodiment, as 
Chaucer’s philosophical milieu questioned the very substance of imagination’s imagistic 
productions. Geffrey represents both the images produced by the imagination and the 
imagination itself. He is thus a locus for consideration of a major debate about the 
materiality of images produced by the imagination. On a larger scale, the text itself can 
be seen as an exploration of the space between vision and understanding, the very realm 
of the imagination.  
 Chaucer’s knowledge of contemporary philosophy is a highly contentious issue in 
Chaucer scholarship, but there is reason to believe that he knew something about Ockham 
and also, as will be shown below, something about the optical debates of his time. 
Kathryn Lynch is particularly devoted to the idea of a “philosophical Chaucer,” 
contending that Chaucer had “direct” and “sustained” knowledge of philosophy, even if 
he does not maintain a “consistent set of positions,” and even if he approaches 
philosophy satirically and with “comic distance.”195 Furthermore, for Lynch, resistance to 
Chaucer’s philosophical side might be a bias of traditional Chaucer scholarship, which 
views fourteenth-century scholasticism as “dry” and “desiccated” and Chaucer as a 
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literary genius, a “proto-humanist” of sorts.196 Sheila Delaney identifies the impact of 
nominalist philosophy on Chaucer’s creation of The House of Fame, and Ann Astell 
suggests that Chaucer had a tier of “bookish readers with an education, income, and 
interests similar to Chaucer’s own” and that The House of Fame displays Chaucer’s 
desire to be a “philosopher-poet.”197 Suzanne Akbari has noted that the eagle’s example 
of sound waves as akin to circles emanating from a stone thrown in a pond is taken from 
John Pecham’s widely used text on optics, in which he examines the specific role of the 
intermediary in vision.198  
 There is thus a small, though growing, critical consensus that deems Chaucer 
worthy of a philosophical title, one that would indicate his sustained engagement with 
contemporary philosophical and scientific questions. Discussions about optical theory 
were, moreover, widespread in the fourteenth century, with perspectivist theories finding 
their way into sermons and preaching manuals.199 As optics and perspectivist theories 
exploded in fourteenth-century England, their consequences were significant for all 
philosophers, since optics had the ability to shed light on the nature of material reality 
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and cognition.200 A number of scholars have, furthermore, established Chaucer’s 
engagement with optics in particular in his literary work.201 
 This chapter will first explore the optical and imaginative theories of Peter Aureol 
and Adam de Wodeham, with reference to William of Ockham and William Crathorn, as 
key representatives of the debate about imagination’s material output in the fourteenth 
century. Then I will show how Geffrey’s body represents the uncertainty of the 
materiality of images produced by the imagination in The House of Fame, as well as how 
Geffrey’s actions in relation to images renders him an embodiment of the faculty. The 
embodiment of imagination presented by Geffrey not only dramatizes a troubling debate 
about the ability of imagination to create material objects but it also poses pointed 
questions about the ability of imagination to incorporate judgment and reason into its 
initial processing of images. Is imagination a true intermediary between sense perception 
and understanding? How well does it incorporate reason and understanding into its 
processing and representation of images previously seen? These questions are most 
poignantly posed in the interaction between Geffrey and the eagle, who represents reason. 
This version of the imagination “personified” is subject to irrational behavior that must 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200 Cynthia Hahn, “Visio Dei: Changes in Medieval Visuality,” in Visuality Before and Beyond 
the Renaissance: Seeing as Others Saw, ed. Robert S. Nelson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 174-5.  
 
201 See, for example, Carolyn Collette, “Seeing and Believing in the ‘Franklin’s Tale,’” The 
Chaucer Review 26 (1992): 395-410; Joseph E. Grennen, “The Calculating Reeve and his Camera 
Obscura,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 14 (1984): 245-257; Linda T. Holley, 
“Medieval Optics and the Framed Narrative in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde,” Chaucer  
 
Review: A Journal of Medieval Studies and Literary Criticism 21 (1986): 26-44; Miriam Moore, 
“Troilus’s Mirror: Vision and Desire in Troilus and Criseyde,” Medieval Perspectives 14 (1999): 
152-165; Susan Yager, “‘A Whit Thyng in Hir Ye’: Perception and Error in the Reeve’s Tale,” 
The Chaucer Review 28 (1994): 393-404. 
 
 
 
$%'!
!
be repeatedly corrected by the embodiment of reason in the form of the eagle, in a 
struggle that remains unresolved at the end of the poem. This struggle at times produces 
terror, suggesting that imagination may be subject to fear when it disobeys reason and 
that imagination tends naturally toward irrationality. If in the Roman de la Rose, Nature 
conflicted with Reason, by Chaucer’s House of Fame, it is the imagination that struggles 
to remain within the confines of reason, always tending toward the irrational. At the same 
time, the ontological crisis of the fourteenth-century imagination in some ways segues 
into its internal fragmentation in the fifteenth century.  
 
Peter Aureol’s “Esse Apparens” and Oxford Views on Imagination  
 In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a number of philosophers, including 
John Duns Scotus, Peter Olivi, and William of Ockham, theorized about an intermediary 
between vision (sense perception) and knowledge (intellect).202 This intermediary space 
is, of course, the realm of imagination.203 Many philosophers posited the possibility of a 
species in medio, a mediator between sensation and intellection, and a controversial 
conversation arose about whether this “species in medio” had real weight or not. Is the 
species something sensed in the world or is it entirely without material reality?204 
Michael Camille has argued that theorists of vision posited theories of the transmission of 
the species from the object viewed to the internal senses that seemed to result in an 
“increasing dematerialization” of the visual process. I would argue instead that the 
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question of the materiality of the internal senses, and especially of the imagination, was 
still one of great uncertainty in the fourteenth century, an uncertainty which Chaucer 
seems to relish in The House of Fame.205  
 Wondering about optical illusions, such as a stick bent in water or a mirror image, 
fourteenth-century philosophers wanted to know the mechanism by which a human being 
can see something that is not really there. This, they knew, was the realm of the 
imagination, since it is the imagination that can conjure images of objects once seen in 
nature but now physically absent, and it is the imagination that can produce new images 
out of recombinations of images once truly existing. Oxford theorists such as Adam de 
Wodeham (1298-1358) argued that optical illusions were the direct result of the workings 
of the imagination. In the process of questioning the mechanism by which it is possible to 
see something not actually there, fourteenth-century philosophers in both England and 
France debated about whether the imagination in these cases produced a real object with 
material substance, or simply endowed the intellect with a subjective image. In early 
fourteenth-century France, the philosopher Peter Aureol (1280-1322) took up this 
question, positing the existence of an “esse apparens,” an entity created by the 
imagination that affects the eye just as a real object in nature does. Aureol’s successors 
frequently react to his idea of the esse apparens as though it is a certain statement of the 
imagination’s ability to produce material images. In reality, Aureol wavers about whether 
imagination may produce material substances.  
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 William of Ockham (1288-1348) and William Crathorn (fl. 1330s), among many 
others in England, quickly disputed the idea of the esse apparens, claiming the existence 
only of a subjective image sent from the imagination to the intellect. Aureol’s theory 
came under similarly harsh criticism in fourteenth-century Oxford. One of the most 
prominent of these Oxfordians, Adam de Wodeham, argued that the imagination could 
produce no discernible material object and flatly denied the existence of the “esse 
apparens.” The debate that ensued thus came to ask one essential question: can 
imagination’s output be seen as a material object, sensed by the individual as any real 
object in nature would be?  
 Aureol’s term esse apparens was synonymous with many other terms which 
appear abundantly in his work, including an ‘intentional being’ (esse intentionale), 
‘objective being’ (obiectivum), or a being that is ‘conspicuous’ (conspicuum), ‘fictitious’ 
(ficticium), ‘seen’ (visum), ‘judged’ (iudicatum), or ‘intuited’ (intuitum).206 The esse 
apparens is best defined as a mediating figure, somewhere between the truth of the object 
as it really appears (in veritate rei) and the subject’s perception of it, fueled by the 
imagination. The example of the optical illusion created by the mirror figures 
prominently in Aureol’s positing of this term.207 First, he argues alongside Alhazen, 
whom he calls the “Perspectivist,” that mirror images “cannot be species which have 
really, or in fourteenth-century terms, subjectively (subjective) penetrated the mirror to 
become a real part of it.”208 Aureol goes on to state without doubt that the imagination 
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produces an esse apparens as part of its functioning.209 Since with imagination there is no 
“extramental” object that produces an image, a mental image as a substitute must be 
formed. This “mental image” is the esse apparens, here called “intentional being,” a term 
Aureol uses interchangeably with esse apparens. Aureol wavers on whether the esse 
apparens, the mental image produced by the imagination, has the weight and substance 
of a real object, just as he is undecided about whether optical illusions truly impress a real 
image on the eye. He leaves the question in the hands of his predecessor, Durand of St. 
Pourcain (d. 1334), a Dominican philosopher, who argued that the “esse intentionale,” 
which Aureol develops into the esse apparens, may be “contra esse reale,” or that it may 
“habet esse debile.” In other words, it may exist outside of reality or may have real 
weight and substance but weight and substance that is simply “weaker” than the weight 
and substance of a real object in nature impressed upon the eye.  
 William of Ockham, a figure most likely known to Chaucer,210 was the first to 
attack Aureol’s concept of the esse apparens. Ockham insisted that the positing of such a 
being was superfluous, since no intervening object is created by the imagination in cases 
of optical illusions and mirror-gazing.211 Ockham uses the example of the mirror, also 
used by Aureol, to demonstrate that the esse apparens is unnecessary: 
Sed ad hoc nihil imaginabile requiritur nisi res quae intelligitur et 
speculum et ceterae res exsistentes realiter et ipsum iudicium exsistens 
subiective in anima quod nec intentionaliter nec realiter est infra 
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speculum. Et isto modo si sensus haberet iudicium distinctum a 
sensatione, posset sine medio iudicare rem esse in speculo, nihil causando 
nec intentionaliter nec realiter nisi illud iudicium.212 
 
Ockham argues that the judgment existing subjectively in the soul (“ipsum iudicium 
exsistens subiective in anima”) of the mirror image is all that is needed for the intellect to 
process it. No intervening object formed by the imagination is necessary. The judgment 
may occur without any mediator (“sine medio”). All that exists in this case is the 
judgment itself (“nisi illud iudicium”). For Ockham, no formulation of an object in space, 
viewed by the individual as a real object in nature and impressed upon the eye as such, is 
required to process optical illusions such as a mirror reflection. Ockham’s rejection of the 
mediator, the “intelligible species,” stirred a significant amount of debate in fourteenth-
century England.213 
 In the 1330s in Oxford, another figure, William Crathorn, sided with William of 
Ockham against Peter Aureol’s esse apparens.214 Crathorn agrees with Ockham that the 
way in which a memorialized image once seen in nature but now absent can be seen 
again by an impression made upon the imagination that is intuitively viewed by the soul, 
without any creation of an intermediary material image by the imagination. Crathorn 
explains how this “generated cognition” (“notitia genita”) occurs: 
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Dico igitur quod notitia genita vel verbum mentale differt realiter a 
specie conservata in memoria; est enim una qualitas genita a specie 
conservata in memoria simillima sibi. Quantum mihi videtur imprimitur 
medie cellule, ubi impressa intuitive videtur ab anima cogitantis.215 
 
The middle cell (“medie cellule”) is the imagination, on which the image 
generated by the memory of something once seen in nature is impressed. The 
imagination creates nothing at this point but instead the soul sees this image 
intuitively (“intuitive”) and hence intellective cognition of the image occurs.  
 In fourteenth-century Oxford, Adam de Wodeham was responsible both for 
introducing a much more detailed account of Aureol’s optical theory to England than the 
English had been exposed to before and for introducing a detailed and studied critique of 
the concept of the esse apparens. As Tachau has pointed out, the accuracy and detail with 
which Wodeham presents Aureol’s claims in his Lectura secunda indicate a much keener 
awareness of Aureol’s texts than other contemporary or slightly older Oxford optical 
theorists.216 Thus Wodeham’s readings and transmission of Aureol’s work are reliable 
and generally not filtered through contemporary Oxford philosophers such as Chatton, 
who discuss Aureol but in far less detail. Wodeham dwells on Aureol’s esse apparens, 
recognizing all of Aureol’s synonyms for the term.217 Wodeham presents a skeptical view 
of the esse apparens, claiming that it is unnecessary as a concept to explain the 
perception of absent or non-existent objects or images. He is, furthermore, skeptical of 
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the existence of an entity which basically functions as an intramental mediator cloaking 
direct cognition of an extramental reality, and he questions whether it is possible for such 
an illusion, or “apparent being,” to be fully indistinguishable from the extramental object 
it supposedly represents.218  
 Wodeham instead believes that there is no mediation of any “apparent being” but 
that the imagined sight may directly become an abstract universal. This abstract universal 
gains new properties and new intuition and immediately presents itself to an intuitive 
form of cognition that does not depend upon an illusionistic perception of something 
absent: 
Est igitur secunda conclusio quod per notitiam abstractivam 
propriam immediate sequentem notitiam intuitivam, obiectum talis 
actus non causat aliquod esse diminutum vel apparens quod mediat 
inter cognitionem et cognitum.219 
 
This “notitiam intuitivam” renders the claim that the “obiectum talis actus” must be 
“diminutum vel apparens quod mediat inter cognitionem et cognitum” unnecessary. In 
other words, Wodeham seems particularly averse to two claims about the esse apparens: 
the notion that it is possible to “see” directly something which is actually absent or non-
existent; and the need to posit a mediating factor between the thing perceived and the 
perceiver in such situations, for this is the function of intuitive cognition and the 
perception of abstract universals. 
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 As Wodeham points out, imagination is caused in any case by an initial sensory 
perception (“est motus factus a sensu”) and it functions in order to remain in the place of 
an object now absent (“nata est manere in absentia obiecti”). Wodeham then continues to 
apply this view of the imaginative faculty’s role in sensory perception of an absent object 
to the perception of a non-existent object, like the image of oneself in the mirror:  
Aliter forte posset dici secundum istam viam quae ponit speciem 
videri in speculo, quod species ibi derelicta in organo repraesentat 
ita magnitudinem et distantiam et non tantum rem talem, sicut 
imago in speculo. Et ideo visa species ita apparet res videri, sicut 
visa specie in speculo apparet quod una facies videatur. Sed istam 
viam non teneo nec nego modo, quia assumptum in argumento de 
magnitudine et distantia non multum concordat experientiae 
meae, etsi sic esset. Prima via est mihi probabilior.220 
 
The “prima via” which to Wodeham (“mihi”) seems more probable (“probabilior”) is that 
the force of a strong imagination creates the subjective image of a non-existent thing, 
such as an image in a mirror, rather than that the perceiver sees something with material 
existence. For Wodeham, the imagination produces no material substance, even if it is a 
“weaker” form of real materials, but an image that remains in the mind and produces 
nothing with weight or substance.  
 Although we cannot know for certain whether Chaucer knew Aureol and 
Wodeham directly, it is relatively well-established that he was familiar with Ockham’s 
writing, and Ockham, as we have seen, was active in this optical debate, embedding 
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much of Aureol’s arguments about the esse apparens into his own work.221 Moreover, 
there is some evidence that Chaucer knew something specific about the esse apparens 
debate between Aureol and Wodeham. Optics in general exploded as a topic of 
intellectual fascination in fourteenth-century England, as perspectiva, which 
encompassed the psychology of perception as well as the transmission of light and the 
physiology of the eye, was assimilated into the broader scientific and intellectual 
milieu.222 There is general evidence that Chaucer developed a familiarity with optical 
writings of various sorts. His Treatise on the Astrolabe bespeaks an engagement with 
Latin science, and perspectiva may have reached him through encyclopedic and homiletic 
literature, with which he was certainly familiar.223  
 It is also possible to trace some similar concerns about optics and imagination in 
Chaucer’s work and in Aureol’s and Wodeham’s philosophical debates. In particular, 
Chaucer uses examples of mirror-gazing that seem to reflect upon similar examples used 
by Aureol and Wodeham to ponder the esse apparens. A direct expression of the fact that 
mirrors produce no actual “impression” in one of Chaucer’s early poems, “Against 
Women Unconstant,” provides some proof that Chaucer may have known something 
about Wodeham, his response to Aureol, and general debates about mirror gazing and its 
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relationship to the perception of non-existent objects. In this poem, Chaucer compares the 
lack of impression produced by the mirror with the inconstancy of a woman: 
Madame, for your newefangelnesse,  
Many a servaunt have ye put out of grace,  
I take my leve of your unstedfastnesse,  
For wel I wot, whyl ye have lyves space,  
Ye can not love ful half yeer in a place;  
To newe thing your lust is ay so kene;  
In stede of blew, thus may ye were al grene.  
Right as a mirour nothing may impresse,  
But, lightly as it cometh, so mot it pace,  
So fareth your love, your werkes beren witnesse.224  
 
The very expression of the opinion that “a mirour nothing may impresse” is a paramount 
claim, even though it might be buried in a larger metaphor about female fickleness.  
 The idea that vision is caused by an impression upon the eye was well-established 
by Ockham, who proposed that first the object impresses upon the eye something that 
soothes or irritates; then it impresses upon the eye a likeness of itself; and finally this 
impression is the cause of the phenomenon of seeing.225 For sight to occur, there needs to 
be some form of impression upon the eye. Although Aureol never claimed that seeing 
one’s image in the mirror is the result of an image impressed upon the eye, his positing of 
the esse apparens, and the manner in which the mirror gazer believes to see his reflection 
by means of the visual faculty, necessitates the inclusion of such a possibility. Wodeham 
attacks this opinion, arguing that the claim for such an impression of a non-existent 
object upon the eye unnecessarily excludes the possibility of the functioning of the 
imagination in such cases:  
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Dicendum est quod illud non est verum secundum primam 
responsionem, quia ‘unus alius videns illud sensibile impressum 
isti’ non haberet imaginationem vehementem obiecti principalis.226  
 
He furthermore rejects the claim that looking “in speculo” produces the sense that “sicut 
si illa species imprimeretur oculo meo proprio.”227 Wodeham’s major objection is that 
there is not any illusion that an actual impression occurs, since the imaginative faculty 
produces the mirror image, and the imaginative faculty cannot create material images. 
The language is laden with terms about impression (“impressi,” “impressum,” 
“imprimetur”), so that when Chaucer introduces the term “impresse” within the specific 
topic of mirror gazing, the connection of his writing to this contemporary philosophical 
debate seems increasingly likely.  
 Several other examples of “imaginary” or “conjectured” mirror images strengthen 
this point about Chaucer’s suspicious mirror discourse and the manner in which it relates 
to contemporary conjectures about the non-existence of the mirror image. The “mirror” 
of the imaginary marketplace in The Merchant’s Tale is particularly apt here. The 
introduction of this particular image is associated with Januarie’s suspicions and “heigh 
fantasye” about his wife’s faithfulness:  
Heigh fantasye and curious bisynesse  
Fro day to day gan in the soule impresse  
Of Januarie aboute his mariage.  
Many fair shap and many a fair visage  
Ther passeth thurgh his herte nyght by nyght.  
As whoso tooke a mirour polisshed bryght,  
And sette it in a commune market-place,  
Thanne sholde he se ful many a figure pace  
By his mirour; and in the same wyse  
Gan Januarie inwith his thoght devyse  
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Of maydens whiche that dwelten hym bisyde.  
He wiste nat wher that he myghte abyde.228  
 
Here, the introduction of the mirror is explicitly associated with non-reality, related to 
Januarie’s “heigh fantasye and curious bisynesse” about his marriage. The conjectured, 
but not actual, image of the mirror “polisshed bryght” and “sette…in a commune market-
place” relates to the manner in which Januarie “Gan…inwith his thoght devyse.” As 
Akbari notes, Januarie’s “heigh fantasye” denotes his imaginative faculty, and the 
“commune market-place” may be a reference to his sensus communis, which is 
responsible for passing the sensible species to the imagination.229 The mirror, then, is 
explicitly connected here with the manner in which the imaginative faculty absorbs and 
represents the visual data from the sensus communis. Furthermore, the entire mirror-
sequence in this case is imaginary, since Januarie does not really set up a mirror in a 
market-place nor does anyone represented look into this conjectured mirror. Thus this 
representation of mirror gazing is highly reminiscent of Wodeham’s argument that the 
perception of any mirror image is dependent upon the imaginative faculty. Mirror gazing 
here is conjectural and provisional; it does not represent the process of actually seeing 
one’s own image in a mirror, but suggests instead that the functioning of the imagination 
produces no substantial image. Here, Chaucer’s associations of the mirror with the non-
sight of one’s image and with the imaginative faculty recall Wodeham’s arguments 
against Peter Aureol’s esse apparens.  
 The philosophical milieu in which Chaucer writes The House of Fame and with 
which he actively engages throughout his career is, then, one of intense questioning of the 
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imagination and the mechanisms of its functioning. An influx of optical theory produced 
questioning about optical illusions that necessarily implicated the imagination because of 
its role in sensing objects that are not truly there. Imagination’s capacity for falsehood in 
these cases was certainly feared, but these philosophers were primarily interested in 
mechanical questions about how this sort of sensation occurs. The thrust of the debate 
became essentially a question about embodiment, on the one hand proposing that the 
imagination produced physical objects to be interpreted by the individual just as he or she 
would sense real objects in nature, and on the other hand positing the existence only of a 
subjective judgment sent from the imagination directly to the intellect. This focus on the 
question of mediation had consequences for theories of imagination more generally, since 
the imagination may be viewed as the ultimate mediator, always relaying information 
between the senses and the intellect.  
 
Geffrey’s Uncertain Weight and the Dreamer as Imagination  
 In The House of Fame, Chaucer displays an extensive engagement with the 
imaginative debate in contemporary Oxford by formulating the dreamer Geffrey as an 
encapsulation of the question of whether imagination’s products have substance and 
weight. Throughout his dream, Geffrey’s body wavers between having substance and 
material weight and being weightless, thus aligning him with contemporary debates about 
the substance of imaginative production. At the same time, when Geffrey approaches 
images, he processes them using both sense perception and prior knowledge or memory, 
resulting in an enactment of the imagination, which exists between vision and 
understanding. In a similar manner, his dream is an actualization in imagistic form of 
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texts and images already seen or read, once again enacting the work of the imagination. 
In this way, the dreamer himself may be viewed as an embodiment both of the 
imagination and of its imagistic productions.  
 Discussions of uncertain embodiment in The House of Fame have proposed that 
such ambiguous corporeality represents the concept of poetry as existing in a realm 
between “body” and “intellect,” between the abstraction of the idea and the “particularity 
of the embodied.”230 Yet suggestions that this ambiguous corporeality may represent the 
ambiguous corporeality of objects produced by the imagination have not been posited. 
Unlike the introduction to the dream in the Roman de la Rose, the introduction to the 
dream in The House of Fame does not account for the dreamer’s body. The dreamer is 
suddenly transported from his bed to the “temple ymad of glass” without any mention of 
the state of his body as this transition occurs:  
But as I slepte, me mette I was 
Withyn a temple ymad of glas, 
 In which ther were moo ymages 
Of gold, stondynge in sondry stages...231 
 
Immediately before this, he relates that he had a “wonderful drem” on “the tenthe day 
now of Decembre” and that he will “tellen everydel” as much as he can “remember.”232 
Yet this introduction leads immediately into the depths of sleep with no mention of the 
dreamer’s position in bed, his falling asleep, his getting out of bed, his travel to this 
“temple,” or any other form of bodily engagement. Susanna Fein has gestured toward this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
230 See Stephen F. Kruger, “Imagination and the Complex Movement of Chaucer’s House of 
Fame,” Chaucer Review 28 (1993), 117-18; see also Sheila Delaney, Chaucer’s House of Fame: 
The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1972), 44.  
 
231 Chaucer, The House of Fame, I. 119-127.  
 
%&%!Ibid., I.62-65. !
$&+!
!
sense of bodily crisis in the travel to the temple of glass, suggesting that, although the 
proem, with its extensive cataloguing of dream-theory, casts aside the notion of “actual 
travel” in dreams, Geffrey’s dream posits that he has traveled somewhere specific.233 
How he gets there is left unexplained, and invokes questions of whether his body exists 
and how it might move in the dream.  
Yet for a poem that leaves such a lacuna at the primary moment of the onset of 
the dream, the remainder of the dream-vision is quite concerned with the condition of the 
dreamer’s body. The question of the presence of a body for the dreamer becomes more 
complex when he recounts how an eagle took hold of him and carried him off to Fame’s 
house: 
And with hys grymme pawes stronge, 
Withyn hys sharpe nayles longe, 
Me, fleynge, in a swap he hente, 
And with hys sours ayen up wente, 
Me caryinge in his clawes starke 
As lyghtly as I were a larke…234 
 
There is some equivocation about whether or not the dreamer has bodily weight here. It is 
possible that the line “As lyghtly as I were a larke” refers to the dreamer’s bodily 
lightness but it may also refer to the “light” manner in which the eagle grips and bears the 
dreamer. The eagle has a potent bodily presence which contrasts with the dreamer’s 
lightness or even disembodiment – the dreamer mentions the eagle’s “grymme pawes 
stronge,” his “sharpe nayles longe” and his “clawes starke.” In the context of such vivid 
corporeality, the dreamer seems to lack bodily presence. There is no mention of 
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component body parts, no suggestion of the eagle gripping the dreamer’s flesh, or even 
the detail of by what body part the eagle grasps him. At this moment, it seems likely that 
the dreamer has no body, no fleshly, corporeal substance.  
 Despite the appearance of the dreamer’s disembodiment in this passage, another 
moment of flight with the eagle suggests the opposite, when the eagle comments that the 
dreamer is “noyous for to carrye.”235 At this moment, the dreamer must exist in some 
palpable, bodily form, despite the equivocations of previous passages.236 Has the dreamer 
suddenly become embodied or has he been embodied all along? Where was his bodily 
weight in previous passages? In light of this equivocation, it becomes problematic to 
know how to read the dreamer’s accounts of his physical exertions in the dream. He 
relates how he sees the “hous and site”237 “That stood upon so hygh a roche,/ Hier stant 
ther non in Spayne”238 and relates how he struggled to “clomb with alle payne,/ And 
though to clymbe it greved me,/ Yit I entetyf was to see.”239 Bodily presence seems a 
certainty here, as the dreamer laments his own weight and the body which he is obliged 
to carry along with him as he ascends the rock to the “hous.” Yet this is still the same 
dreamer whose body was carried as “lyghtly” as if he were a “larke.” This uncertainty 
provokes a question about corporeality: is bodily presence so tenuous that the body can 
have weight in one moment and be insubstantial in the next?  
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 Perhaps most significant is Geffrey’s comic repetition of Paul’s question in II 
Corinthians 12: “Thoo gan y wexen in a were,/ And seyde, ‘Y wot wel y am here,/ But 
wher in body or in gost/ I not, ywys, but God, thou wost.’”240 Significantly, this 
pondering is immediately followed by the Eagle’s exclamation: “‘Lat be,’ quod he, ‘thy 
fantasye!/ Wilt thou lere of sterres aught?’”241 “Fantasy” signifies the imagination here.242 
The text makes an explicit connection between confusion about bodily weight and the 
working of the imagination, engendering a broad association between thoughts about 
materiality and the workings of “fantasye.” This association brings Geffrey’s uncertain 
weight in yet closer alignment with philosophical questions about the materiality of 
imagination’s products.  
 Questions about the tenuousness of bodily presence are thus not unrelated to 
anxieties about the tenuousness of material presence in both imagistic products of the 
imagination and in images more generally. This equation makes sense in terms of 
Augustine’s concept of images as somewhere between “corporeal” and “intellectual,” 
between “that which is truly a body and that which is neither a body nor like a body.”243 
The dreamer’s first encounter with images in the “temple ymad of glas” provides the 
most concise point of entrance for observing the ambiguity about the materiality of 
images in this dream. The dreamer’s recounting of these narrative images in the temple 
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alternates between statements which assert “There saugh I grave” and “There saugh I.” 
This alternation is consistent throughout descriptions of images in the temple of glass, but 
one example in particular, in which a “saugh I” is literally caught between two “there 
saugh I grave” formulations, is particularly telling. First, the dreamer relates “Thoo 
sawgh I grave how to Itayle/ Daun Eneas is goo to sayle,”244 then “And also sawgh I how 
Sybile and Eneas”245 and finally a return to the “graven”: “Tho saugh I grave al the 
aryvayle/ That Eneas had in Itayle.”246 “Graven” emphasizes the objectification of these 
images, referring specifically to the act of carving, engraving, or incising.247 Perceiving 
their “gravenness,” the dreamer pays considerable attention to their material condition, as 
images carved in wood. The implicit question in this case is one of how essential the 
“graven” aspect of these images is. How present (and continuously present) are their 
materials?  
 Just as the dreamer seems at moments to have considerable weight (and therefore 
to be in corpora) and at other moments to be weightless (and thus to be ex corpora), the 
images he sees at moments are ostentatiously “graven” (and therefore ostentatiously 
“material” or “embodied”) and at other times not “engraved” (and therefore immaterial or 
“disembodied”). The same form of ambiguity seems inherent in considerations of the 
“embodiment” of both the dreamer and the images he describes.248 Furthermore, this kind 
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of questioning of the embodiment of the dreamer and its explicit alignment with the 
images of which he takes inventory aligns the dreamer’s body with contemporary debates 
over the materiality of imagination’s products, which are indeed images. Geffrey’s body 
represents the entirety of this debate about the imagination, at once thought to produce 
images with no weight and to produce material substances. In this sense, Geffrey’s body 
becomes a locus for reflecting upon a current debate about imagination; the dreamer 
himself becomes an enactment of this very imagination. In the process, it can be said that 
Geffrey, the dreamer in the poem, is a form of imagination personified.  
 Geffrey’s association with the imagination is strengthened by the way in which he 
interacts with and describes the images seen in the dream. Several moments in the text 
associate Geffrey with the traditional functioning of the imagination as a mediator 
between initial sense perception and understanding. Geffrey’s approach to images in the 
Temple of Venus is a perpetual negotiation between initial sight and understanding that 
suggests constant use of the imagination.249 If Geffrey’s modus operandi is one of 
mediation between sight and understanding, then he can be said to be enacting the work 
of the imagination. For example, upon first entering the temple, Geffrey describes what 
he sees: 
In which ther were moo ymages 
Of gold, stondynge in sondry stages, 
And moo ryche tabernacles, 
And with perre moo pynacles, 
And moo curiouse portreytures, 
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And queynte maner of figures 
Of olde werk, then I saugh ever. 
For certeynly, I nyste never 
Wher that I was, but wele wyste I 
Hyt was of Venus redely, 
The temple; for in portreyture 
I sawgh anoon-ryght hir figure 
Naked fletynge in a see, 
And also on hir hed, pardee, 
Hir rose garlond whit and red, 
And hir comb to kembe hyr hed, 
Hir dowves, and daun Cupido 
Hir blynde sone, and Vulcano 
That in his face was ful broun.250 
 
Geffrey begins by simply describing what he sees: “ymages of gold…stondynge in 
sondry stages” and “ryche tabernacles…with perre moo pynacles” and “curiouse 
portreytures” and “queynte maner of figures of olde werk.” Yet after this initial reporting 
of objects seen, Geffrey goes on to identify what these images represent and to combine 
understanding with initial sight in his description of Venus. Geffrey describes seeing (“I 
sawgh anoon-ryght”) a “Naked fletynge” image with a “rose garlond whit and red” on her 
head. While describing this initial sight, Geffrey simultaneously conjures the workings of 
memory and understanding to identify this as an image of Venus and subsequently to 
identify “daun Cupido” and “Vulcano/That in his face was ful broun.” What begins as a 
confused barrage of sight becomes organized according to an understanding that this 
place is Venus’ temple. This processing of images in the interstices of the sense of sight 
and the understanding and reason is precisely the realm of the imagination. Geffrey here 
not only enacts the mediating function of the imagination but also exists in a text that 
presents itself as embodying the milieu of the imagination, between sight and 
understanding.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
250 Chaucer, The House of Fame, I.121-139. 
$''!
!
 The imaging of the story of Dido and Aeneas also puts Geffrey in the position of 
enacting imaginative function.251 Geffrey begins simply by describing the sights of the 
story of Dido and Aeneas, with alternating “saugh I” and “sawgh I graven.” The 
repetition of “saugh I” places emphasis on the visual component of this experience. 
Although Geffrey begins by suggesting a form of the first few lines of the Aeneid text 
written on a “table of bras,” he quickly reverts to a purely visual description. He 
describes how he “sawgh” the “destruction/Of Troye thurgh the Grek Synon”252 and the 
literal image of “how Venus,/Whan that she sawgh the castle brende,/Doun fro the heven 
gan descende.”253 In describing Juno’s vengeful storm, Geffrey notes “Ther saugh I such 
tempeste aryse/That every herte myght agryse/To see hyt peynted on the wal.”254 If there 
was any doubt before about whether Geffrey views a written version or a pictorial version 
of the Aeneid, he here draws attention to the thoroughly visual nature of this experience. 
He proceeds with the entire story of Book IV in a good amount of detail, dwelling 
particularly over Dido’s story. He describes how Dido “gan to wringe hir hondes two” 
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when she senses the stirrings of love upon meeting Aeneas. Particularly detailed and 
visually rich is the description of Dido’s death: 
And when she wiste sothly he 
Was forth unto his shippes goon, 
She into hir chambre wente anoon, 
And called on hir suster Anne, 
And gan hir to compleyne thanne, 
And seyde that she cause was 
That she first loved him, allas, 
And thus counseylled hir thertoo. 
But what! When this was seyd and doo, 
She rof hirselve to the herte 
And deyde thorgh the wounde smerte.255 
 
Geffrey pauses over this visual representation of Dido’s death, detailing the way in which 
she enters her room and calls Anna to her before stabbing herself and dying of a “wounde 
smerte.” This section of the poem pauses over the process of visual perception, engaging 
in rich descriptions of the portraiture in Venus’ temple and repeating the tag “saugh I” 
and “sawgh I graven” to emphasize the primary moment of vision.  
 By the end of this passage, and significantly just after pausing over the visual 
representation of Dido’s death, Geffrey reveals his prior knowledge and memory of what 
he has just seen:  
Whoso to knowe hit hath purpose, 
Rede Virgile in Eneydos 
Or the Epistle of Ovyde, 
What that she wrot or that she dyde; 
And nere hyt to long to endyte, 
Be God, I wolde hyt here write.256 
 
After his description of these primary visual stimuli, Geffrey conjures up memory to 
indicate his prior knowledge of these images from the reading of “Virgile in Eneydos” 
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and “the Epistle of Ovyde.” He even notes that the story is “to long to endyte,” otherwise 
he “wolde hyt here write,” acknowledging a process by which he would retrieve images 
from memory, a functioning of the imagination. Just as in his initial encounter with the 
Temple of Venus, Geffrey here approaches images with a combination of perception and 
understanding. He begins with pure sight, describing everything he sees, then moves to 
apply memory and understanding to these visions. This intermediary role is, once again, 
the work of the imagination, which Geffrey himself enacts.  
 Geffrey’s representation of the imagination as an insecurely weighted body 
reveals Chaucer’s engagement with debates over imagination’s production. Geffrey’s 
insecure weight is a proxy for imagination’s embodiment crisis, as his body becomes a 
locus for fierce questioning of the imagination’s power to create real objects. At the same 
time, it suggests the centrality of the imagination to the imagistic richness of the dream 
vision, since it is the imagination’s functioning that allows the dreamer to make sense of 
images seen in the dream. Geffrey’s enactment of imagination’s functioning in this dream 
vision allows imagination the power to make judgments, insofar as images are interpreted 
not only in a space between sight and understanding but also by using the powers of both 
vision and knowledge simultaneously. This ability of imagination to participate in 
judgment was shunned by Aristotle but forms an important part of Reginald Pecock’s 
fifteenth-century theory of imagination: it was a common question asked by philosophers 
of faculty psychology about the functional capabilities of the imagination.257  
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Imagination, Reason, and Terror 
 If Geffrey represents both imagination and its imagistic products in The House of 
Fame, then his companion and guide, the eagle, represents reason. As Linda Holley has 
suggested, Geffrey has “a fine display of the rational method” on the way to Fame’s 
house. The eagle provides a model, albeit flawed, of scientific and logical reasoning.258 
B.G. Koonce, among others, has posited that Chaucer’s eagle has close affinities with and 
may be meant to signify Virgil’s Mercury, who in turn signifies reason.259 The eagle’s 
affinity with reason is solidified by Chaucer’s allusion to Boethius’ flight and the 
“feathers” of philosophy at the height of the ascent to Fame’s house.260  
 Yet the appearance of the eagle is not a simple appeal to the dreamer’s reasoning 
faculties. The eagle instead represents a conflict between imagination and reason. 
Geffrey’s interaction with reason is actually a crisis moment for the imagination, with the 
imagination suspended between proliferating phantasms and allying with reason to 
promote understanding. This crisis produces a sense of urgency and terror, as imagination 
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becomes equally as likely to behave either as an arbiter of false images or as a reliable 
intermediary between sense and intellect. The dynamic between imagination and reason 
reveals that in the absence of reason’s guidance, the imagination has the capacity to 
produce terrifying and misleading phantoms, unchecked by understanding, knowledge, 
and rationality.  
 Just before Geffrey is scooped up by the eagle, he experiences a moment of 
profound fear. First he recognizes that he has no knowledge of where he is. Overwhelmed 
by visual sensations, he has no corresponding knowledge or reason to interpret them: 
‘A, Lord,’ thoughte I, ‘that madest us, 
Yet sawgh I never such noblesse 
Of ymages, ne such richesse, 
As I saugh graven in this chirche; 
But not wot I whoo did hem wirche, 
Ne where I am, ne in what contree, 
But now wol I goo out and see, 
Ryght at the wiket, yf y kan 
See owhere any stiryng man 
That may me telle where I am.’261 
 
Geffrey dwells on the visual wonders of Venus’ temple, declaring “Yet sawgh I never 
such noblesse/ Of ymages,” again emphasizing the craft of these images by specifying 
that he “saugh” them “graven” in the “chirche.” Yet his dismay and discomfort as a result 
of this rich visual stimulation is immediately palpable. Geffrey expresses discomfort 
about his lack of knowledge about these images, unaware of “where I am” and “in what 
contree” and “whoo did hem wirche.” The pure stimulation of images in the absence of 
knowledge about them produces a form of discomfort and urgency, conveyed by the 
quick succession of “ne” and “but,” producing an alarming focus on what is not known. 
If Geffrey is the imagination, then we can see how imagination without reason and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
261 Chaucer, The House of Fame, I.470-479. 
$',!
!
knowledge confronts numerous visual stimuli with no ability to process them. As an 
intermediary between sense perception and understanding, imagination seeks knowledge 
after being exposed to visual stimuli. Chaucer’s Geffrey dramatizes this process.  
 The desire to know more about this primarily visual experience prompts Geffrey 
to “goo out and see.” Yet this exit from Venus’ temple results in a moment of profound 
fear. Flailing in the interstices between visual stimulation and reason, imagination loses 
its way: 
Whan I out at the dores cam, 
I faste aboute me beheld. 
Then sawgh I but a large feld, 
As fer as that I myghte see, 
Withouten toun, or hous, or tree, 
Or bush, or grass, or eryd lond; 
For al the feld nas but of sond 
As small as man may se yet lye 
In the desert of Lybye. 
Ne no maner creature 
That ys yformed be Nature 
Ne sawgh I, me to rede or wisse.262 
 
As Sheila Delaney notes, the desert is unusual in medieval dream vision, in which the 
“traditional locus” is usually a “luxuriant garden or wood.”263 Here instead a desolate 
landscape confronts Geffrey, who can see nothing “but a large feld” that seems to extend 
endlessly, “as fer as that I myghte see.” The lack of the usual dream-vision luxuriant 
garden locus is emphasized by the fact that the desert lacks “tree,” “bush,” “grass” or 
“eryd lond.” The comment that there is “no maner creature/ That ys yformed be Nature” 
in the desert may either mean that the land is completely desolate or that Geffrey sees 
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indescribable, unusual figures, of the sort created by the imagination but not existing in 
nature.  
 This second interpretation makes sense in terms of Geffrey’s sheer terror in the 
next few lines, as he exclaims: “‘O Crist,’ thoughte I, ‘that art in blysse,’/Fro fantome and 
illusion/Me save!’ And with devocion/Myn eyen to the hevene I caste.”264 “Fantome” 
here has most commonly been interpreted as referring to Macrobius’ dream-type 
phantasma, but the word has clear associations with a particular form of imaginative 
functioning.265 For Aristotle, “phantom” was part of imaginative functioning, an image 
serving as an intermediary between perception and understanding. Stoic philosophers 
created a separation between “fantom” and “fantasy,” with “fantasy” representing the 
imagination’s storage and recapitulation of images once seen in nature and “phantom” as 
a faculty producing optical illusions and visual delusions, usually in the space of 
dreams.266 By the time Chaucer writes, “fantome” has developed its own set of meanings, 
including “that which deludes the senses or imagination; illusion (as of dream or 
hallucination).”267 Thus “fantome” maintains an interesting relationship to the 
imagination, both as a type of its functioning and also as something that abuses it. Here, 
Geffrey, a form of imagination, fears being taken over by a darker form of the 
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imagination, an “illusion” or “delusion” in the form of phantoms that typically harass the 
imagination. Chaucer thus suggests that an imagination overloaded with strange sensory 
images without the intervention of reason and understanding may be overcome by 
terrifying phantoms and illusions that lead the functioning of the imagination, and thus of 
the mind, astray. The fragility of the imagination is enacted with particular urgency and 
depth here.  
 No sooner does Geffrey face this fear of phantoms then the eagle comes soaring 
down to protect him. Just as he casts his eyes toward heaven, he sees the eagle flying 
toward him: 
Thoo was I war, lo, at the laste, 
That faste be the sonne, as hye 
As kenne myghte I with myn yë, 
Me thoughte I sawgh an egle sore, 
But that hit semed moche more 
Then I had any egle seyn. 
But this as sooth as deth, certeyn, 
Hyt was of gold, and shon so bryghte 
That never sawe men such a syghte, 
But yf the heven had ywonne 
Al newe of gold another sonne; 
So shone the egles fethers bryghte, 
And somwhat dounward gan hyt lyghte.268 
 
The eagle appears as a saving grace in a moment of distress for Geffrey, the imagination 
suspended between phantoms and an understanding of images provided by reason. At this 
moment, the imagination is provided with a guide figure, a figure regular to the dream-
vision genre, who lifts him up and carries him away from the threats of illusion and 
phantom. Without reason, the imagination, it seems, tends toward deception and 
frightening delusions.  
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 In Book II, the eagle becomes yet more identifiably a representation of reason, 
repeatedly enacting its function. When Geffrey questions Fame’s ability to know all, the 
eagle quickly disputes with the help of reason: 
‘…For hyt 
Were impossible, to my wit, 
Though that fame had alle the pies 
In al a realme, and alle the spies, 
How that yet she shulde here al this, 
Or they espie hyt.’ ‘O yis, yis!’ 
Quod he to me, ‘that kan I preve 
Be reson worthy for to leve, 
So that thou yeve thyn advertence 
To understonde my sentence.’269 
 
As Geffrey doubts the eagle’s words, the eagle reiterates that he will enact the work of 
reason to prove himself right (“that kan I preve/ Be reson worthy for to leve”). By 
contrast, Geffrey’s disbelief of the eagle’s line of argument casts him in an irrational 
light. The image of the eagle struggling to carry a heavy Geffrey thus takes on a slightly 
different meaning. No longer is it simply a joke on Chaucer’s possible portliness but it is 
a more serious recognition of the difficulty the imagination faces in obeying reason. 
When the eagle exclaims that Geffrey is “noyous for to carrye,” he in part recognizes 
imagination’s tendency toward the irrational, resisting the firm grip of reason. Geffrey is 
inclined to fall back toward the earth and to land right back in the desert from which the 
eagle saved him in the first place, prone to frightening delusions and phantasms. The 
dialogue between Geffrey and the eagle exhibits this tension between imagination and 
reason, as Geffrey is inclined to disbelieve the eagle’s supposedly reasonable claims and 
the eagle retorts with more, and more urgent, appeals to reason.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
269 Ibid., II.701-710.!
$(&!
!
 At times, the eagle even reprimands Geffrey for becoming too embroiled in 
“fantasy.” As Geffrey contemplates the weight of his body, recognizing that “wher in 
body or in gost/ I not,” the eagle struggles to bring him back to the discourse of reason, 
exclaiming “ ‘Lat be,’ quod he, ‘thy fantasye!/ Wilt thou lere of sterres aught?’”270 In 
addition to bridging the gap between contemplation of material substance and the 
imagination, as discussed above, the eagle’s outburst indicates reason’s dismay at the 
imagination’s natural inclinations. Geffrey, as the imagination, yields perpetually to 
“fantasye” that is devoid of the work of reason, and the eagle’s exasperation is another 
attempt to ally the imagination with reason. Learning of the “sterres” represents a 
reasonable discourse, something to be proven by logic and observation, and a movement 
away from the distracting meanderings of the imagination.  
 Yet the eagle, as reason, ultimately fails to set Geffrey on the right path. Reason is 
not well-incorporated into the imagination in this text, and the suggestion remains that 
reason may be outside the confines of the dream. One of the first commands the eagle 
gives the dreamer is that he “Awak,” at which point Geffrey claims that “My mynde 
came to me ageyn,/For hyt was goodly seyd to me…” Yet by the end of Book II, there is 
no sense that Geffrey has learned how to incorporate reason into the workings of the 
imagination. Rather, Geffrey continues to challenge the eagle until the eagle simply 
disappears, like Virgil at the end of Purgatorio. Geffrey is left with “wonder,” not 
understanding, upon the eagle’s departure, as the eagle explains the mechanism by which 
voices from the House of Fame are heard: 
Whan any speche ycomen ys 
Up to the paleys, anon-ryght 
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Hyt wexeth lyk the same wight 
Which that the word in erthe spak, 
Be hyt clothed red or blak; 
And hath so verray hys lyknesse 
That spake the word, that thou wilt gesse 
That it the same body be, 
Man or woman, he or she. 
And ys not this a wonder thyng?271 
 
The eagle still speaks from a position of reason, attempting to explain rationally the way 
in which the voices of the House of Fame are heard. Yet, in describing the inhabitants of 
the House, the eagle essentially describes the products of imagination, the “lyknesse” of 
people who once lived on earth and “spake the word.” The viewer’s imagination is 
stimulated by these figures, being left to “gesse/That it the same body be,” recalling the 
sight of the actual person, now merely a “lyknesse.” This description of imaginative work 
leaves the eagle, in a sense, speechless. He is unable to explain this phenomenon any 
further except to ask, “And ys not this a wonder thyng?” It is at this moment, a moment 
that perhaps represents the failure of reason in the face of the imagination, that the eagle 
abruptly departs: “And with this word, ‘Farewel,’ quod he…”272 The relationship 
between reason and imagination, in the form of the eagle and Geffrey, remains 
unresolved. Imagination continues to tend toward the irrational, and reason has not 
succeeded in implanting its way of thought into imagination’s functioning. Instead, it 
might be said that reason is at last overtaken by the wonder of the imagination.  
 In Guillaume de Lorris’ portion of the Roman de la Rose, Reason begins to take 
control of Nature, often usurping her role. In Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls, a similar 
relationship between Nature and Reason seems prominent, as Nature, despite being the 
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“vicaire of the almyghty Lord,”273 ultimately declares her inadequacy, proclaiming “If I 
were Resoun, thanne wolde I/ Conseyle yow the royal tercel take.”274 Yet recognizing 
that she is not “Resoun,” Nature prolongs the decision by a year and effectively 
announces her inability to resolve natural problems.275 In The House of Fame, Reason 
meets a new and different challenge: imagination. The stunning irresolution that scholars 
have noted in The House of Fame owes much to this challenging relationship between 
imagination and reason.276 Imagination’s dominance over reason seems possible at the 
moment of the eagle’s departure, yet imagination does continue to soar to the House of 
Fame, a place of imaginative wonderment, rather than falling back to the desert of 
terrifying phantasms. Has Reason instructed imagination or has Reason been defeated by 
imagination? Chaucer leaves the question largely unanswered, although the suggestion 
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lurks that imagination’s power has indeed overtaken reason, who has no choice but to 
leave the scene. The existence of imagination unaided by reason is, as we saw earlier, 
potentially frightening. In this text, then, Reason has met a more formidable challenge 
than Nature in the form of imagination.  
 At first glance, The House of Fame seems to be an utterly fragmented poem.277 
This fragmentation has baffled critics and has caused scholars such as Kathryn Lynch to 
divide the poem into parts, Book I an exploration of imagination, Book II an exploration 
of reason, and Book III an exploration of memory.278 Other critics, such as Ann Astell 
and B.G. Koonce, have divided the poem according to the ascent signaled by Dante’s 
Commedia, from the lowly corporeal vision in Inferno to the lofty contemplative vision in 
Paradiso.279 Yet, although The House of Fame does represent three separate episodes, the 
Temple of Venus, the flight with the eagle, and the House of Fame, and although it does 
end incompletely with the appearance of a mysterious man of authority, the poem itself is 
unified around the figure of Geffrey as a personification of imagination. Although the 
poem may not represent a progressive narrative that witnesses the imagination moving 
from the depths of sensory perception to the heights of reason and intellectual 
understanding, the text is still unified in its consistent and persistent questioning of the 
nature of both imagination and its imagistic products.  Picking up a struggle between 
Reason and Nature in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, The House of Fame presents a 
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new and perhaps more troubling challenge to Reason in the form of imagination. 
Imagination’s “dark” side is momentarily revealed as it becomes subject to the 
harassment of phantoms and delusions and as it so easily slips from the firm grip of 
reason. At the same time, this imagination is somewhat forward-looking, beginning on a 
path toward firm internal division in the fifteenth century, as it navigates the question of 
its own materiality and its ability to create anything with substance. Once seemingly 
fragmented, Chaucer’s dream-vision now not only converges on the central question of 
the nature of the imagination but also belongs in a narrative of struggle among Nature, 
Reason, and imagination that precedes it in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and 
follows it in the fifteenth.  
 Chaucer’s House of Fame shows certain strong affinities with surrounding optical 
theory and imaginative philosophy. At the same time, the ambivalence of the figure of 
imagination, as represented by Geffrey, is still much more palpable in the literary milieu 
than in the purely philosophical. Most importantly, the narrative details of the 
relationship between the eagle and Geffrey, namely reason and imagination, allow for a 
kind of “play space” in which we can view imagination actively trying to work out its 
role in relation to reason. This kind of dialectical, relational definition of the imagination 
would be much harder to convey with such nuance in a philosophical text that discusses 
these faculties separately and one at a time. While the fourteenth-century imagination 
cannot be said to be strictly divorced from its philosophical counterparts, we can still 
once again see that literary form allows for a much richer and often more conflicted 
imagination, especially vis-à-vis its allegorical companions.  
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Chapter 4 
The Divided Imagination: Imagination’s Personification Crisis 
 
 The philosophical story of the imagination in the fifteenth century reveals a 
faculty of the mind becoming ever more powerful, usurping the roles of judgment and 
reason. Yet much of the literature of the fifteenth century evokes an imagination with 
quite a different profile. A group of three texts all composed in the last few decades of the 
fifteenth century witness the imagination confronting a crisis of personification. As the 
personification of the imagination becomes increasingly divided and ultimately collapses, 
the imagination becomes more internalized as a psychological force. The resulting 
personification crisis produces an imagination that is repeatedly shown to be an unnatural 
forger of delusions, a part of the brain that causes terror.  
In the fourteenth century, Chaucer left us with an imagination in the midst of a 
crisis about its very being: what can it produce and of what does it consist? The potential 
for a deceptive and frightening force becomes clear in Chaucer’s work as the imagination 
is deluged by dangerous phantoms and delusions. Imagination, in Chaucer’s view, tends 
toward the irrational, a victim of unnatural and unwanted images. Fifteenth-century texts 
resume the story where it left off, as imagination becomes increasingly divided and 
unstable. The fifteenth-century literary imagination may be most akin to Jean de Meun’s 
thirteenth-century Genius, who, caught in a perpetually transformative state, inevitably 
calls the notion of personification into question. The fifteenth-century literary 
imagination, by displaying the collapse of a particular personified figure, also asks larger 
questions about the nature and process of personification.  
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If imagination has changed from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries from a 
usurper to a protean figure to an irrational figure, in the fifteenth century we are 
confronted with a figure divided against itself. Using Hickscorner, The Court of Sapience 
and The Palis of Honoure as case studies, this chapter argues that imagination is at once a 
locus of contentious, internal division and a site of reflection upon the process and nature 
of personification in the fifteenth century. Nervous questions about personification seem 
to converge on the figure of the imagination in these texts. By the time we reach The 
Palis of Honoure, imagination has been internalized to the extent that its personification 
is no longer possible.  
The imagination as a divided figure facing a crisis of personification poses a 
challenge to an accepted narrative about fifteenth-century developments in psychological 
theories of imagination. Historians of science argue that the fifteenth century witnessed a 
new “eclecticism” in faculty psychology and Aristotelian science in general.280 As 
William Wallace contends, by the fifteenth century, this tendency toward eclecticism is 
perpetuated by an inclination for commentators to “pick […] and choos[e] theses that 
suited their purposes and seemed most consistent with their own experiences.”281 Wallace 
admits that the history of the diffusion of developments of Aristotelian science from the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is still a highly 
under-researched topic. Yet he contends that, although the “diversity of schools and 
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movements continued,” this diversity continued with “a noticeable relaxation of the fierce 
partisan loyalties that had characterized debates in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries.”282  
The literary imagination in this century demonstrates, by contrast, a contentious 
division of the faculty into two parts: the personified imagination and the internalized 
psychological faculty. So far from being eclectic, the imagination is contentious and self-
defeating. The division of the imagination detectable in these texts does, however, make 
sense in light of faculty psychology’s via moderna. As Katharine Park notes, in the 
period between 1400 and 1520, psychological theory “fragmented into a number of rival 
approaches grouped under the two main rubrics of via antiqua and via moderna.”283 
Faculty psychology’s via moderna, a movement that began gaining ground in around 
1350, replaced the pre-existing Galenic splitting of the brain into three parts with a 
scheme of five cognitive parts. The partitioning of the three-pronged Galenic model into 
five parts had consequences for the imagination, as it split the imagination into two parts, 
one with the traditional function of storing images and the other with a more creative 
function of formulating new combinations of stored images. This firm division is 
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detectable in contemporary philosophical texts by individuals such as Reginald Pecock, 
who delineates the separation between “imagination” and “fantasy.”  
The three texts explored in the chapter represent heightening consequences of this 
division of the imagination. Hickscorner (1497-1512) presents an unstable imaginative 
figure that can easily transform and convert; The Court of Sapience (mid-fifteenth 
century) introduces a personified form of imagination that has nothing to do with the 
natural world or the natural occurrence of the non-personified imagination; and The Palis 
of Honoure (c. 1501) demonstrates how the naturally occurring, internalized 
psychological imagination has the capacity to produce terror and ultimately renders 
personification of the imagination impossible.  
  Significantly, the imagination becomes a locus for consideration of the process of 
personification. This fragmentation of the imagination results in larger, uncomfortable 
questions about the ability of personification to reflect upon nature and the ability of the 
imagination to reflect upon the natural world. Through the exploration of the personified 
figure of imagination as prone to conversion and internally fragmented, these texts all ask 
a fundamental question: what exactly does the personified figure represent? This literary 
collapse of the personified imagination represents an important counter-history to an 
imagination that seems increasingly powerful in contemporary philosophical theory. I 
will thus first explore the fifteenth-century philosophical imagination before broaching 
the three texts investigated in this chapter. 
 
Reginald Pecock’s Imagination 
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 How does the representation of the imagination in these allegorical texts relate to 
concurrent developments in faculty psychology? A brief look at the case of Reginald 
Pecock suggests that the view of imagination as a psychological entity was undergoing 
significant change in the fifteenth century. Pecock writes at a time when the imagination 
is in the process of being divided into multiple parts, as the via moderna takes hold of 
scholastic philosophy. Once just one entity, the imagination now splits into two parts: one 
part recalls images previously seen and one part invents new images. At the same time, 
imagination has considerable, and new-found, powers, and particularly the ability to 
assume the capacities usually assigned to judgment and reason. If Chaucer subtly 
signaled the possibility of imagination’s triumph over reason in The House of Fame, 
Pecock and some of his literary counterparts seem to explore this possibility with 
renewed vigor.  
 Pecock was born in Wales in around 1390 and educated at Oxford. He studied 
theology at Oriel College Oxford from 1416 until 1424. He was made Master of 
Whittington College in 1431, appointed Bishop of St. Asaph in 1444 and Bishop of 
Chichester in 1450. Pecock had scholastic training but worked to make his technical 
knowledge accessible to lay readers. As Kirsty Campbell argues, Pecock’s “educational 
corpus” may be viewed as an attempt to “transfer the rudiments of a university education 
in the arts to the vernacular, through his instruction on terminology, on rules of logic, and 
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on the syllogism.”284 This translation of academic material to vernacular readers is in 
keeping with the contemporary trend in Oxford’s faculty of theology.285  
 Pecock’s Donet, probably written between 1443 and 1449, is meant as an 
introduction to philosophy, religion and theology for a lay audience.286 His philosophy is 
mainly “the Aristotelian, scholastic type of mind that reverences Reason and the 
syllogism.”287 In the Donet, the faculties of the inward wits are split into five different 
types: “Comoun witt, ymaginacioun, fantasye, Estimacioun and mynde.”288 Pecock’s 
explanation of the work of the imagination is only part of what we see in thirteenth-
century Aristotelian commentaries. By Pecock’s fifteenth century, the work of the 
imagination as conceived in the thirteenth century is split across the common wit, the 
imagination and the fantasy. The “comoun witt” is not only the conglomeration of the 
external senses but it “perceyueth alle suche thingis in her absence whiche mowe be 
knowun of outwarde wittis in her oonli presence.”289 The idea of perceiving something in 
its absence is normally the vocation of the imagination, but here a piece of imaginative 
function is relegated to the work of the “comoun witt.”290 The comoun witt has the ability 
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to distinguish between different sensory perceptions, a standard feature of the common 
sense in Aristotelian philosophy:  
And also he iugith and deemeth bitwix tho thinges, whiche thingis 
noon oon outward witt may knowe, and therfore noo oon outward 
witt may iuge and deeme bitwix hem: as ben whitnes and 
swetenes, he mai not discrive and juge the diuersite bitwix hem. 
And sithen touche mai not knowe and perceyue to gider bothe 
hardnes and sourenes, He mai not discryue and iuge the diuersite 
bitwix hardnes and sourenes.291  
 
The comoun witt may therefore discriminate among different types of sensory input and 
provide the brain with categories that characterize sensory input such as “whitnes” and 
“swetenes.”  
 The imagination includes the work of the “commune witt” (“it is al the same 
whiche is seid of commune witt”) and additionally has a storing function: “kepe[s] in 
store alle the same now seid knowingis with her fundamentis, whiche ben called 
‘similitudis,’ ‘liknessis,’ or ‘ymagis’ of thingis, that thei falle not soone aweie.”292 Thus 
the imagination encompasses the common wit, with a suggestion of a hierarchical 
structure of the faculties in which faculties located farther back in the brain encompass 
the functions of those farther forward in the brain and add greater levels of sophisticated 
cognitive capacity to them. The notion that the imagination “kepe[s] in store” all the 
images “that thei falle not soone aweie” is a traditional description of the imagination 
with a commemorative capacity. The memory of images that are no longer present 
incorporates the traditional Aristotelian memorial capacity of the imagination. 
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 Pecock’s description of the imagination is highly image-focused, reiterating that 
the imagination stores not only images but also “similitudis,” ‘liknessis” and “ymagis,” a 
repetition that emphasizes the imagination’s involvement in the human brain’s affinity 
for image-making and cognition with images. “Similitudis” means both a pictorial 
representation or image and also a mental image. “Mental image” implies the specific 
work of the imagination in Pecock’s writing. This meaning of the term is much in 
keeping with a tradition of contemplative writing in fourteenth-century English, including 
Treatise of the Perfection of the Sons of God (1370s), which urges a form of 
contemplation rising above the use of mental images, arguing that “if that we wille taste 
god…it is necessary…that…we intende god, abydynge ther ydle, that is to saye frome 
alle ymagynacioun and feynynge of alle erthly symylitudys, lyftynge vp be loue oure 
mynde into the manyfeste barnesse.”293 Here, as in Pecock’s text, “ymaginacioun” and 
“symilitudys” are nearly synonymous, but “symilitudys” emphasizes the prerogative of 
the imagination to have the capacity to make images. “Liknessis” also focuses heavily on 
the imagistic capacity of the imagination, traditionally meaning both a “visual image,” 
the process of vision by which an object makes an impression on the eye, and the visual 
image that is retained in the imaginatio. Therefore we can see how Pecock’s definition of 
imagination is highly focused on the most traditional sense of the faculty as a part of the 
brain that can retain and even form images.  
 Pecock’s account of imagination’s judgment and discretion is striking and 
unusual. Since imagination involves all the faculties of common wit, it too integrates the 
ability to distinguish between “whitnes and swetnes” or “hardnes and sourenes” as 
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sensation alone cannot. This faculty of discrimination is unusual in earlier, Aristotelian 
descriptions of imagination, which would normally assign these capacities to the 
estimative or cognitive faculty.294 Again, the suggestion that imagination is used 
exclusively for particular knowledge, inevitably inferior to the generalizing abilities of 
the intellect, is not fully espoused here. Pecock’s account of the imagination, then, 
affords it more power than it might otherwise have in traditional thirteenth-century De 
anima commentaries.  
 Pecock’s description of “fantasie” summarizes what might be called 
recombinative imagination. Much debate arose beginning in the thirteenth century over 
whether “fantasie” and “imagination” comprised the same faculty or whether they were 
two separate cognitive functions. In general, models that followed the via antiqua kept 
“imagination” and “fantasy” together as one faculty under the rubric phantasia, while the 
via moderna, after an Avicennan model, separated them, sometimes into imaginatio and 
sensus communis, sometimes into imaginatio and fantasia, as we see in Pecock.295 
Pecock again follows the via moderna in his separation of imagination and fantasy, an 
important and complex division of the imaginative faculty. 
 Pecock’s “fantasie” has a generative function, capable of creating new images out 
of combinations of stored images from the imagination: “Sone, it is to forge and 
compowne, or to sette to gedir in seemyng, thingis whiche ben not to gedir, and whiche 
maken not oon thing in kynde: As if a man feyn a beest to be made of an horsis heed and 
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of a kowys body and of a lyouns taile, and so forth of othire masis whiche bifallen in 
dreemys, whilis a man slepith. For in tyme of sleep a mannys inward bodily wittis ben 
breemest [wondrous] and to wirche rediest, and her worchingis ben to be perceyued 
sunnest.”296 Pecock’s “fantasie” refers to a recombinative imagination that has a creative 
aspect, capable of forging new images out of the components of images once observed in 
reality. The resulting images are often hybrids, such as a “beest…made of an horsis heed 
and of a kowys body and of a lyouns taile.”297 This ability to “forge and compowne… 
thingis whiche ben not to gedir” is regular to dreams, “whilis a man slepith.” The work of 
“forging” certainly suggests a way in which imagination or “fantasie” now subsumes the 
work of Nature, who is typically associated with the “forge.”  
 At the same time that fantasie takes on the work of Nature, it also engages in 
producing markedly unnatural products. Fantasie combines different components of 
creatures observed in nature to create new hybrids that could never be fathomed in the 
natural world and represent distortions of nature’s work. Fantasie has a capacity to create 
new, abnormal and highly unnatural creatures that can haunt and terrify the mind in the 
course of a dream. At the same time, Pecock’s description of imagination as exercising 
the capacity for judgment and discrimination affords the faculty a new kind of intellectual 
ability that was never its prerogative in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century faculty 
psychology. Even in Pecock’s short treatment of the imaginative faculty, and one that 
seems relatively “conservative” and true to its Aristotelian sources, it is possible to detect 
a battle between the unduly powerful imagination and the imagination as a respected 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
296 Pecock, The Donet, 10. 
 
297 Pecock, The Donet, 10. 
$)+!
!
psychological faculty that elevates the cognitive function of the mind over the mere input 
of the senses.  
 Pecock’s affinities with fifteenth-century thought involve not only this 
assumption of the imagination’s power over nature but also, as Campbell notes, a form of 
writing steeped in a kind of heterogeneity characteristic of fifteenth-century thought as a 
whole. Campbell’s study of Pecock attempts to shed light on the “plurality” of fifteenth-
century thought and culture through a close look at the various allegiances of Pecock 
himself.298 Pecock’s own “vernacular theology” is derived from the university setting, 
teachings in pastoral theology extending back to Lateran IV, and has some similarities to 
the Lollard “intellectual terrain.”299 Jeremy Catto further notes that “most of what Pecock 
taught is the standard orthodox teaching of the schools.” Pecock, then, begins to appear 
as a fifteenth-century scholastic thinker, “drawing upon authoritative traditions.”300 
Pecock’s writing can thus be taken as representative of contemporary fifteenth-century 
university thought on the faculties of the mind.  
 The power that Pecock at times affords the imagination is also prominent in 
medical texts newly translated into English in the fifteenth century. A translation of a 
fourteenth-century French surgery manual, Guy de Chauliac’s Inventarium, appears in 
English in the fifteenth century under the title The Cyrurgie of Guy de Chauliac. More 
than 30 manuscripts of the original Latin Inventarium written in Avignon in 1363 
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survive. The English translation was similarly popular in the fifteenth century.301  
Another translation of the Inventarium called the Inventorye of Guydo de Chauliac also 
circulated in fifteenth-century England, and the two translations together formed a 
significant presence in this century’s scientific output.302 Chauliac draws upon an 
Avicennan theory of imagination that remained controversial throughout the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries in Europe. This view of the imaginative faculty affords it the 
capacity to exert control over the body.303 This imagination’s power to change the state of 
the body is also well-represented in the writing of another influential fourteenth-century 
philosopher, Nicole Oresme, who concedes that the condition of the body can change 
according to the work of the imagination: “Ex ymaginatione etiam appetitus mutatur quia 
quidam evomunt cibum pro sola ymaginatione, et quidam appetunt comedere unum 
cibum si et cetera, et quidam sudant ex ymaginatione et cogitatione forti circa aliquid et 
cetera, et aliqui oscitant videntes alios et cetera, et quidam appetunt mingere ex 
cogitatione, et genitalia moventur ex et cetera.”304 For Oresme, one may vomit, sweat, 
yawn, urinate or have an erection by imagining alone (“pro sola ymaginatione”). 
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 Chauliac uses this potential strength of the imagination as a method of healing 
medical problems. He recommends for the healing of “a wounde and of flowynge of 
blood of the veynes and of the arteryes” that  
…the eyen of the pacient be schette, or stonde he in a derk place 
that he may noght se his owne blood, ne thathe byholde no rede 
thinges, but say hym always that it bledeth no more and that, if it 
blede, it is for his profit. And so is the natural vertu conforted by 
the contrarie ymaginacioun.305  
 
In this surgical manual, the work of the “contrarie ymaginacioun” is proposed as an 
antidote to a physical ailment such as excessive bleeding. All the patient need do is 
imagine that he is not bleeding in order to overcome the physical fact of his bleeding. 
Chauliac explicitly mentions Avicenna’s view on the power of the imagination to 
overwhelm the physical condition of the body:  
And therfor Auicen saith that movynge of the blood and folwynge 
therof is of the kynde of the accidentes of bestes that moven her 
ymaginacioun, the whiche is redy therto when it is mykel 
purposed to consider rede thinges.306 
 
Avicenna’s account of the strong imagination, condemned and distrusted by many 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century European commentators, is a major source of authority 
for Chauliac’s explanation of the power of the imagination to overcome the body. 
Chauliac depends upon Avicenna’s explanation of the fact that the “ymaginacioun” may 
move the “blood” in order to justify his own use of imagination as a cure for serious 
wounds and excessive bleeding. This fifteenth-century translation of a fourteenth-century 
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text, circulating widely in fifteenth-century England, indicates the exposure a figure like 
Pecock would have had to a set of scientific texts that fully embrace the power of the 
imagination over the body.  
 Yet even as the imagination may be a powerful cure for illness, Pecock’s own 
theological writing suggests a deep concern over an overly powerful and potentially 
dangerous imagination. Despite Pecock’s defenses of image viewing and the imagination, 
implications that the imagination may have an uncontrollable nature abound. Orthodox 
conflicts over images and imagination in fact come to seem standard in the fifteenth 
century, as James Simpson has observed. In some cases, orthodox anxieties about images 
come “perilously close” heretical positions.307 Pecock explains that viewing images is 
advantageous, especially for the frail, sick or old, because it works to stabilize the 
viewer’s own imagination. In describing the process of viewing images in a church, 
Pecock writes that: 
…bi biholding upon ymagis or upon such peinting his witt schal be 
dressid and lad forthe euener and more stabili and with myche 
lasse peyne and labour, than forto wrastle withinneforth in his 
owne ymaginaciouns withoute leding withouteforth had bi 
biholding upon ymagis; as experience vndoutabili wole schewe.308  
 
Pecock worries that, “as experience vndoutabili wole shewe,” imagination has the 
capacity to lead people astray, and that viewing images directed at a certain kind of 
thought or contemplation is much safer than “forto wrastle withinneforth in his owne 
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ymaginaciouns.”309 As Shannon Gayk observes, Pecock here expresses how images can 
“direct and stabilize the viewer’s ‘ymaginaciouns,” which may sometimes be incapable 
of forming proper images from the input of a sermon since their imaginative faculties 
may be too feeble.310 Ironically, in a 1457 letter from Viscount Beaumont to Henry VI, 
Pecock was himself accused of using his “ymaginatiff wittes” to bad effect to “sett all 
[his] studes to hurt our faith.”311 Yet even though Beaumont’s letter serves to condemn 
Pecock, there is a surprising similarity between Beaumont’s language and Pecock’s on 
the subject of the imagination: both admit the possibility of the imagination’s deleterious 
effect and the way in which it can be crafted for dangerously unorthodox outcomes.  
 
Imagination’s Conversion: Hickscorner 
 The morality play Hickscorner, written in the late fifteenth century, at first 
represents imagination as an arbiter of Vice but then involves the figure in a dramatic and 
troubling conversion. This conversion immediately, and uncomfortably, signals the 
divided nature of the imagination and the instability of its personification. Hickscorner 
was probably composed between 1497 and 1512 and was printed in 1512 by Wynkyn de 
Worde. It also appears in a fragment printed in 1520 and was printed again by John 
Waley sometime between 1546 and 1586.312 The play begins with a lament by Pity, 
Contemplation and Perseverance about the lack of morality in their time. Freewill and 
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Imagination soon enter to recount to these three allegorical virtues their recent pranks and 
battles against the law. Hickscorner, a traveler, appears on the scene and promptly 
provokes an argument with Imagination. When Pity returns to keep the peace, 
Imagination and Freewill imprison him and leave the scene. Pity is released by 
Perseverance and Contemplation and sets out in search of Imagination and Freewill. 
Perseverance and Contemplation finally convert Imagination and Freewill to the side of 
virtue.   
 As Blair Hoxby points out, a major difference between dramatic allegory and 
narrative allegory is that dramatic allegory “makes its meaning in part by imputing 
allegorical significance to the performance space in which the actors will move and their 
audience will watch.”313 Indeed, as Hoxby notes, performances of these plays often made 
extensive use of dramatic space in order to create a spiritual map of the struggle between 
Vice and Virtue.314 Imaginacioun’s conversion may have an immediacy that it would not 
have in a narrative allegory such as the Roman de la Rose, in which the imaginative 
Genius figure is also in a state of flux. 
 There is no question that Imaginacioun is at first portrayed unequivocally as a 
thief and criminal in Hickscorner. Upon entering, Imagination immediately details his 
tactics for tricking authorities into releasing thieves and other criminals:  
And yet I can imagine things sublte 
For to get money plenty. 
In Westminster Hall every term I am; 
To me is kin many a great gentleman; 
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I am known in every country. 
And I were dead the lawyers’ thrift were lost, 
For this will I do if men would do cost; 
Prove right wrong, and all by reason, 
And make men leese both house and land; 
For all that they can do in a little season. 
Peach men of treason privily I can, 
And when me list, to hang a true man. 
If they will me money tell, 
Thieves I can help out of prison. 
And into lords’ favours I can get me soon...315 
 
Imagination’s own use of the word “imagine” here, in terms of being able to “imagine 
things subtle/For to get money plenty,” indicates a less frequently expressed concept of 
imagination that has to do with the ability to plan toward certain goals or ends. Often, this 
sense of imagination conveys the notion of planning for a particularly deceitful goal, 
although this is not always the case.316 “Subtle” came to mean “deceitful” through 
exaggerations of the definition “cunning.” However, most of its definitions are not related 
to outright trickery but have more to do with intelligence, perspicacity and 
inventiveness.317 A nearly identical phrase, “sotill ymaginacioune,” appears in the 
fifteenth-century Tale of Beryn. This tale details the legal entrapment faced by the 
merchant Beryn upon traveling to a foreign land. The people of the foreign town, who 
eventually persecute Beryn, are initially described as of “sotill ymaginacioune”: “In al the 
world wyde, so fals of hir lyvyng/ Was no pepill under sonne, ne noon so dessyvabill/ As 
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was the pepill of this town, ne more unstabill,/ And had a cursed usage of sotill 
ymaginacioune.”318 The Tale of Beryn, similarly composed in the fifteenth century, uses 
the word “imagination” in the context of crafty scheming to win legal battles.319 The 
word appears to have this meaning in Hickscorner as well, and the common use of the 
phrase in these two texts suggests a somewhat popular equation of imagination with 
trickery in the fifteenth century.  
 Significantly, this passage enacts a process of personification, as the imagination 
appears on stage and steps into his own self-described role. Imagination draws attention 
to his ability to “imagine,” which may mean both “imagine” and “produce images.” This 
self-awareness of his own enactment of a particular mental function draws attention to 
the process of personification. The narration of repeated action also suggests a form of 
self-awareness on the part of this personified figure. When Imagination relates that “In 
Westminster Hall every term I am;/To me is kin many a great gentleman,” he describes 
personified figures that extends back those on the outside wall of the Garden of Pleasure 
in the Roman de la Rose. He describes himself as a static figure. The repetition of the 
word “can” draws attention to the fact that Imagination here describes himself in general 
terms, as a personification of an idea rather than as an individual. Exploration of 
imagination and exploration of personification have become inextricably intertwined.   
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 Given the inextricable connection between the concept of imagination and of 
personification in this text, imagination’s subsequent internal division is troubling. The 
first signs of internal rupture appear when Contemplacion enters the scene. 
Contemplacion and Mercy free Pyte from the chains with which Imaginacioun has bound 
him. Perseverance turns to Contemplation to help him convert Free Will and Imagination: 
“I think they will come hither again,/ Free Will and Imagination, both twain./ Them will I 
exhort to virtuous living,/ And unto virtue them to bring/ By the help of you, 
Contemplation.”320 Imagination is here thoroughly divided against itself. Contemplation 
may be a primarily religious form of thought, but it is traditionally a kind of 
“imagination.” It involves a kind of thinking with images that may escalate into an 
ecstatic vision but nonetheless has its basic roots in imaginative function. Traditionally 
defined, “contemplacion” is simply “reflection” or “thinking” that involves the visual 
senses and may be “divine.”321 While “contemplacion” is in a different category of visual 
thought than pure “imagination,” they are not essentially polarized psychological 
activities but part of the same overall imaginative functioning. Yet here a firm distinction 
arises between Contemplacion and Imagynacyon so rigid that they exist on opposite sides 
of a moral battle. They are nothing short of polar opposites, one on the side of virtuous 
living and honesty, the other on the side of vice and deception.  
 More troubling is Imagination’s conversion at the end of the play. Frightened by 
Perseverance and Contemplation about the horrors of hell, Imagination repents on stage:  
No thing dread I so sore as death; 
Therefore, to amend I think it be time. 
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Sin have I used all the days of my breath, 
With pleasure, lechery and misusing, 
And spent amiss my five wits; therefore I am sorry. 
Here of all my sins I ask God mercy.322 
 
In a scene that evokes the “miraculous” conversion of the Jews at the end of the Croxton 
Play of the Sacrament, Imagination is in an unusual position. The spending “amys” of the 
five wits suggests an imagination that has the capacity to deceive the senses. The 
immediacy of the conversion is emphasized by the use of the word “Here” and the 
reference to “time,” drawing attention to this very moment and the act of conversion. 
Imagination is suspended for a moment in a divided state, between his identity before 
conversion and after. At this moment, he is two completely opposed beings.   
 Imagination’s first appearance suggests his representation of the process of 
personification. In this opening scene, Imagination dramatically enacts the process of 
personification. Yet the imagination’s stability is clearly called into question at the 
equally dramatic moment of the conversion, and thus, simultaneously, personification 
itself seems to crumble. A locus for contemplating personification, imagination’s 
instability causes allegory to enter into crisis.  
 
Imagination in the Natural World vs. Imagination Personified: The Court of Sapience 
 In Hickscorner, Imagination suddenly divides against itself at the closing moment 
of conversion. In The Court of Sapience, however, the imagination is already firmly 
divided from the start. In this text, there are in fact two imaginations: one existing in the 
natural world and one existing as a personification inside Sapience’s court. It is almost as 
though The Court of Sapience picks up where Hickscorner left off, providing an 
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exploration of the personification of a figure that is already firmly divided. This particular 
division between the natural world and the “allegorical” world results in questions about 
both the process and nature of personification and its ability to represent the natural 
world, always posing the question: what exactly does personification represent? The 
valorization of nature in this text suggests a discomfort with the unnaturalness of both 
personification allegory and the imagination.  
 The Court of Sapience is an anonymous fifteenth-century allegorical poem written 
in rhyme royal stanzas that enjoyed significant popularity in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. The date of the poem is difficult to establish. The terminus ad quem can be 
surmised from Caxton’s printed edition dating from 1480 to 1483.323 References to 
Chaucer and Gower in the poem suggest a date after Gower’s death in 1408, and Robert 
Spindler argues that linguistic features point to a date later than Lydgate, who died in 
1449.324 On the basis of linguistic and historical evidence, E. Ruth Harvey proposes that 
the most precise dating for the text is the middle third of the fifteenth century.325 
 The Court of Sapience survives in three manuscripts: British Library Harley 2251, 
Trinity College Cambridge ms R 3 21, and Columbia University Library Plimpton ms 
256. The poem was attributed to Lydgate in the sixteenth century probably by Stephen 
Hawes, although Spindler has refuted this attribution through analyses of versification, 
language and meter.326 The poem begins with a narrator imagining himself playing chess 
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with the World and Dame Fortune. Reason, scolding him for his youthful folly, prays to 
God to lead him to Sapience. The dreamer then promptly falls asleep. After dreaming that 
he is lost in an unforgiving wilderness, he meets Sapience, Intelligence and Science 
beside a river. In a diversion that occupies the entirety of the first book, Sapience tells the 
dreamer the story of the four daughters of God. In the second book, Sapience leads the 
dreamer to her castle, and on the way they pass a broad range of natural wonders, which 
the dreamer catalogues in detail. In the castle live seven virtues and Dame Philosophy. 
The dreamer is led through the courts of Science, Intelligence and Sapience and finally 
meets Theology and the seven liberal arts. The poem ends abruptly and unfinished shortly 
after this point. 
 In The Court of Sapience, Nature and Imagination are equally valorized as parts 
of philosophical learning in Sapience’s court but are treated differently in the natural 
world outside the allegorical house. Once inside Sapience’s court, the pure realm of 
Aristotelian philosophy suggests equal respect for Imagination and Nature as part of the 
discipline of natural philosophy. However, on the way to Sapience’s court, the dreamer’s 
interaction with the “real” natural world indicates an actual suspicion of imagination and 
fantasy. Thus the imagination of the “natural” world and the imagination of the 
“allegorical” world are two separate figures. The non-correspondence of Imagination 
personified and imagination as an entity in the world represents a problem for the very 
concept of personification, in which Imagination with a capital “I” has no other function 
than to represent “imagination” with a lowercase “i.”  
The dreamer meets Nature personified in Sapience’s Court, who, along with her 
sisters Dame Ethica (or Morality) and Dame Logyca (or Reason), acts under the 
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jurisdiction of Dame Phylosophye. Nature as an allegorical figure in this poem is 
Aristotelian, represented primarily as natural philosophy, with her twins moral 
philosophy and logic. Dame Phylosophye may be viewed as a figure for Aristotle 
himself, while the three branches under her jurisdiction may stand for Aristotelian texts 
on the mind, ethics and logic. Nature as a form of natural philosophy teaches about “the 
cause of every thyng,/ His propre kynd, his kyndely properte”; Dame Ethyca gives 
“Knowlege of vertues and of honeste”; and Dame Logyca represents “resoun” in a 
somewhat moral sense, helping individuals distinguish between “evyl and good.”327 
Sapience’s companions, Dame Intellygence and Dame Scyence, represent intellect and 
imagination and the common senses respectively, with Intellygence conveying 
knowledge of “creatures in heven and erthe” while Dame Scyence has exclusive 
knowledge of “thynges temporal.” Both of them, heavenly knowledge and “temporal” 
knowledge gained through the senses, have a place in Sapience’s court. Here, Scyence 
keeps company with natural philosophers, many of whom wrote commentaries on the 
faculties based on De Anima, including Aristotle himself, Averroes, Avicenna and 
Alhazen.  
In Sapience’s court, the dreamer meets three figures who may be said to represent 
senses and imagination, contemplation, and intellect. “Scyence,” associated with 
knowledge gained through experience, is presented as the purely sensual realm but also 
encompasses the work of the imagination.328 Thus Scyence knows about “eche thyng 
temporal” as well as what man is “in body and in bloode.” Intellygence, the second figure 
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in the triumvirate of Scyence, Intellygence, and Sapience, can be viewed as a type of 
contemplation. Intellygence is associated with knowledge that goes just beyond the 
senses:  
Oure wyttes fyve when they begyn to fayle, 
As in eche invysyble creature, 
Intellygence must yeve us than counsayle— 
By her we have parfyte knowlege and pure; 
When eye, nose, ere, mouthe, hand eke is unsure, 
And we by them may gete no pure scyence, 
Than must us renne unto Intellygence.329 
 
Intellygence is explicitly associated with the “contemplatyve,” a type of imaginative 
thinking taken to an extreme.  
Scyence, in contrast, is defined as general knowledge or the knowledge acquired 
through memory. More importantly, it has the sense of knowledge gained through 
experience or contained in an individual person’s mind.330 “Scyence” therefore relates to 
specific knowledge based on the actual experience of the senses, a precise definition of 
the work of the imagination, especially insofar as it relates also to memory and the 
retaining of images. On the other hand, “sapience” means wisdom or understanding on a 
broader level, and “intellygence” is associated with contemplation and the ability to 
understand general truths.331 Therefore it is possible to view a form of Aristotelian faculty 
psychology taking shape among these allegorical figures: “Scyence” performs the 
functions of the senses and imagination and “Intellygence” denotes contemplation and 
universal understanding, as well as knowledge of heavenly things.  
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“Scyence,” which encompasses imagination, is by no means exiled from 
Sapience’s court but is fully integrated into the greater scheme of Sapience and her 
subordinates. Dame Scyence’s court represents the knowledge gained through natural 
philosophy and the functioning of the senses. Importantly, the philosophers in Dame 
Scyence’s court, including “Arystotyl, Averous, Avycenne,” are all associated with 
complex theories of the senses and the imagination circulating at the time The Court of 
Sapience was written. The philosophers in Intellygence’s court, such as Bonaventure, are 
instead associated with religious contemplation. Scyence, a figure for the senses, 
imagination, and cognition, is by no means exiled from Sapience’s court but instead 
integrated as a valuable member of the allegorical house’s long list of illustrious 
personifications.  
 While Scyence is valorized as an allegorical figure in Sapience’s court, 
imagination in the natural world is held in suspicion. A long section on the stones viewed 
on the way to the Court provides a detailed explanation of each one’s medicinal value. 
The descriptions are all derived from Bartholomeus Anglicus’ De Proprietatibus Rerum 
(1240).332 Here, the dreamer encounters a particular kind of stone called the “grene 
smaragde,” known to be “right medicynable/ Ayenst tempest, sykenes, and fantasye.”333 
“Fantasye” translates Bartholomeus Anglicus’ phrase “phantasmata daemonum,” so 
“fantasye” here is nearly synonymous with the kind of delusion resulting from demonic 
possession. The other stones work against veritable ailments such as “eyen sore,” “wit 
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lost,” and general “infyrmyte.”334 Still others work against demons, including the 
“precyous crisolyte,” which “fendes fleen and holden in despyte.”335 The “grene 
smaragde” combines these different remedies, being effective against both “sykenes” and 
the “fantasye” possibly perverted by demonic influence. The “fantasye,” as a figure for 
the imaginative faculty, which creates and stores images or “phantasmata,” here becomes 
synonymous with illness.336 While a place for the imaginative faculty exists within the 
realm of Aristotelian natural philosophy in Sapience’s Court, the poem includes another 
realm in which imagination and its subsequent phantasmata are suspicious signs of 
illness that must be eliminated. Interestingly, the personified figure of Intellygence 
reveals absolutely no overlap with the imagination as it exists in the natural world. 
Although Sapience and her minions, Intellygence and Scyence, accompany the dreamer 
along this route on the way to Sapience’s court, mention of them is conspicuously absent 
in this long section detailing the marvels of nature. The split between the imagination of 
the natural world and the personified imagination is absolute. 
 This rift between the personified Imagination and the natural imagination presents 
a problem for the concept of personification: if Imagination does not represent 
imagination, what does it personify? The idea that personification confronts a crisis in 
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fact precedes the introduction of the problem of Intellygence versus imagination in the 
text. The story of the four daughters of Wisdom that Sapience repeats to the dreamer 
upon her arrival functions as a frame setting up the personification crisis. Although the 
story itself is borrowed from Grosseteste and Bonaventure, with elements, particularly 
the introduction of Sapience as judge, attributed to Deguileville, the author of The Court 
of Sapience takes considerable liberties.337 Moreover, the choice of this story as a frame 
indicates a wider concern with the stability of personified figures. The story of the four 
daughters of Wisdom presents a contentious fight among allegorical figures that threatens 
each and every one of them. At the center of the story lies the question of who among 
Pees, Mercy, Trouth, and Ryghtwesnes should rule. When Pees decides that all should 
obey Mercy, an argument immediately arises among the allegorical figures. First Trouth 
dissents: “‘Late be,’ quod Trouth, ‘to yow I nyl assent.’” Then Ryghtwesnes refuses to 
follow Pees’ injuction: “‘No more wyl I, ywys,’ quod Ryghtwysenes.”338 This dissent 
causes mayhem for Pees and Mercy. Pees is exiled, and Mercy lies in a swoon. At this 
point, in an outpouring unique to this version of the story, Sapience voices an outburst 
about concepts that are stripped of their essences:  
Woo worth debate that never may have pees! 
Woo worth penaunce that asketh no pyte! 
Woo worth vengeaunce that mercy may not cees! 
Wo worth jugement that hath none equyte! 
Wo worth that trouth that hath no charyte! 
Woo worth that juge that may no gilty save! 
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And wo worth ryght that may no favour have!339 
 
Sapience laments a world deprived of these allegorical figures and concepts, particularly 
Pees and Mercy. In the process of this lament, Sapience exclaims “Woo worth penaunce 
that asketh no pyte!” The essence of penance is to ask for pity, and the fear that penance 
may be emptied of this essence suggests a conscious fear about the threat to allegory and 
personification posed by the battle among allegorical figures. As a frame for the text, the 
story of the Four Daughters of Wisdom seems to exhibit some of the text’s central 
problems with personification. Personified figures, and personification itself, are 
perpetually on the verge of collapse.  
 While the inklings of the divided imagination appear in Hickscorner, The Court of 
Sapience presents a more alarming situation in which the imagination is irreparably split 
into two completely opposing parts. The Palis of Honoure, written two decades after The 
Court of Sapience, expands upon this terrifying representation of the naturally occurring 
imagination, except now the personified figure, having collapsed irreparably, disappears 
entirely.  
 
Imaginative Terror: The Palis of Honoure 
 The “smaragdane” stone fighting the ill effects of imagination and fantasy 
reappears in Gavin Douglas’ dream vision The Palis of Honoure, a “rewriting” of 
Chaucer’s House of Fame. By the time we reach this poem, the imagination has become 
an arbiter of fear. At this point, the imagination’s “allegorical” figure has disappeared, 
and all that remains is the imagination as a faculty of the mind. This non-allegorical 
imagination proves a terrifying figure that the dreamer manages to purge from his mind 
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by the end of the text. After collapsing as a personified figure in both Hickscorner and 
The Court of Sapience, the imagination has become entirely internalized and non-
allegorical. 
 The Palis of Honoure, completed in 1500 or 1501, is addressed to King James IV 
of Scotland. David Parkinson suggests that the poem is a mirror for princes, presenting to 
a “noble personage” the rules of “proper comportment.” The “uncomprehending 
dreamer” serves “as a foil to the noble reader for whom the poem is intended.”340 The 
theme of “honor” was popular in contemporary French dream visions, including Jean 
Molinet’s Trosne d’Honneur (1467), Octavien de Saint Gelais’s Sejour d’Honneur 
(1490-95), and Jean Lemaire de Belges’ Le Temple d’Honneur et de Vertus (1503).341 
The poem begins with the poet walking in a beautiful garden when he falls into a trance 
(or dream) and the beautiful garden transforms into a terrifying wilderness. The dreamer 
makes a complaint to Fortune and pledges allegiance to Nature and Venus. After a 
procession featuring Diana, Venus and Minerva, the dreamer sings a ballad criticizing 
Venus and is tried in Venus’ court for his blasphemy, found guilty and awaits 
punishment. Calliope intercedes on behalf of the dreamer, who is released on the 
condition that he compose poetry in praise of love. Douglas ascends to Honour’s palace, 
situated on top of a mountain made of marble.  
 The Palis of Honoure seems to evoke The Court of Sapience several times, 
making the absence of a personified figure of imagination all the more keen. As the 
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dreamer wanders in a “desert” similar to the place from which the eagle rescues Geffrey 
in The House of Fame, he is met by a splendid queen who turns out to be Sapience 
herself. This meeting mimics the dreamer’s meeting Sapience and her two minions 
Intelligence and Science in The Court of Sapience. At least one medieval reader made 
this connection, writing the words “The quen of sapyence with hyr court” in the margin 
next to the identification of the queen as Sapience.342 Once inside the Palis of Honoure, 
the dreamer meets Sapience once again. This time she appears alongside Science, but 
Intelligence, who was aligned with the imagination in the Court of Sapience, is nowhere 
to be found. The specific omission of Intelligence, an intermediary between the senses 
and the intellect, suggests that the personification of imagination has become impossible 
in this text.  
 Moreover, the presence of the “smaragdane,” which fights the imagination, as a 
fundamental part of the structure of the Palis of Honoure suggests an expulsion of the 
imagination from the allegorical realm. The Palis of Honoure is populated by allegorical 
figures and presents itself as an allegorical structure, just as in the Court of Sapience. 
Only here, the smaragdane forms an intrinsic part of the structure of the allegorical house, 
suggesting that the imagination must be expelled from the allegory. The “smaragdane” 
appears among a long list of “prectius stonis” seen hanging on the roof of the palace: 
“Hang full of plesand lowpyt saphyrs clere./ Of dyamantis and rubys, as I ges,/ Wer all 
the burdis maid, of mast riches./ Of sardanus, of jaspe and smaragdane/ Trestis, formys 
and benkis wer, pollist plane.”343 Embedded in the fabric of the construction of the Palis, 
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then, is a stone used to fight the “illness” of the fantasy or imagination. The 
personification of the imagination is no longer a possibility in this text. 
 Instead, the imagination becomes increasingly internalized in the psyche and is 
repeatedly identified as a source of terror. The dreamer attempts to appeal to Nature, who 
seems to have entirely abandoned the natural world:  
“O Nature Queen and O ye lusty May,” 
Quod I tho, “Quhow lang sall I thus forvay, 
Quilk yow and Venus in this garth deservis? 
Reconsell me out of this gret affray 
That I maye synge yow laudis day be day. 
Ye that al mundane creaturis preservis 
Confort your man that in this fanton stervis 
With sprete arrasyt and every wit away, 
Quakyng for fere, baith puncys, vane and nervis.”344  
 
The dreamer is stuck in a battle between Nature and Venus (“Quhilk yow and Venus”), 
which seems a kind of recapitulation of the development of these two allegorical figures 
between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. In the twelfth century, Venus must be 
chastised for her disastrous disobedience of Queen Nature. By the fourteenth century, in 
Gower’s Confessio Amantis, Genius has become subordinate to Venus alone and Nature 
is nowhere to be found. By the time The Palis of Honoure is written in the late fifteenth 
or early sixteenth century, an argument has developed about the allegorical dominance of 
Venus and Nature. To whom is the dreamer subordinate? To whom is Imagination or 
Genius a servant? Not only do the answers to these questions seem unclear but the 
conflict is voiced much more prominently than it was in the fourteenth century, a 
reflection of the divided and nearly “psychomachian” nature of fifteenth-century debates 
over imagination and its allegorical status.  
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 Furthermore, the experience of visions, phantoms and phantasms, the work of the 
imagination in a dream, is immediately cast as a form of terror in this text. The dreamer 
calls upon Nature to “Reconsell me out of this gret affray”345 and to “Confort your man 
that in this fanton stervis/ With sprete arrasyt and every wit away,/ Quakyng for fere, 
baith puncys, vane and nervis.”346 The “fanton,” which the dreamer begins by calling a 
“vision,” makes the dreamer to seek “comfort,” since it causes his “sprete” to be “arrasyt” 
and his “wit” to disappear. He is utterly terrified, “quaking for fere.” Part of his fear 
arises from the way in which “fanton” harasses the normal function of the imagination. 
The “fanton” implies some form of deception—a specter, apparition, illusion, or even 
hallucination. It is associated with nightmares and delirium but also implies something 
that attacks or deceives the imagination and senses.347 In this dream vision, we witness a 
view of the imagination gone wrong: its capacity for utter deception and terror is made 
clear by its ability to be infiltrated by deceptive images and illusions such as the “fanton.” 
The construction of the line “Confort your man that in this fanton stervis” suggests the 
intertwined nature of the dreamer and the “fanton.” This “fanton” arises from within the 
dreamer and not in the form of an externalized personification.  
 Further descriptions of the contents of the dream provoke a form of terror in the 
dreamer. He calls his dream a “dreidfull dreme with grysly fantasyis” and exclaims 
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directly about his fear “But now God wate quhat ferdnes on me lyis!”348 Later, when the 
dreamer reaches the entrance to the palace with his nymph guide and views a series of 
engravings on the outside, he becomes afraid to go inside, expressing further possibilities 
of the dangers of fantastical marvels of the imagination:  
Wondrand here on, agane my wyll but lete 
My Nymphe in grif schot me in at the yet. 
“Quhat devil,” said scho, “hes thou not ellis ado 
Bot all thy wyt and fantasy to set 
On sic dotyng?” and tho for fere I swet 
Of her langage, bot than anone said scho, 
“List thou se farlyes, behald thaym yondir, lo; 
Yit study not ovir mekil a dreid thow vary, 
For I persave the halflyngis in a fary.”349  
 
The nymph first chastises the dreamer for his hesitation, shoving him inside the entrance 
to the palace and demanding that he leave behind his trance and “sic dotyng.” However, 
even as she dismisses the dreamer’s fears and relentlessly pushes him inside the palace of 
which he is momentarily terrified, she simultaneously warns him of inspecting 
engravings and images inside the palace too closely, advising he “study not ovir mekil a 
dreid thow vary” for fear that he may fall into an irretrievable trance (“halflygis in a 
fary”). The nymph here admits a fear about the power of images and the work of the 
imagination to overwhelm the physical body and reduce a person to a state of paralyzed 
trance. Similarly, earlier on when the dreamer is reflecting upon his delivery from 
punishment, he describes his previous feelings of dread, noting that the “intercessioun” 
on his part has dismissed all his “imagination”:  
Lo, thus amyd this hard perplexité 
Awaytand ever quhat moment I suld de 
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Or than sum new transfiguration, 
He quhilk that is eternall verité, 
The glorious Lord ryngand in personis thre, 
Providit has for my salvation 
Be sum gude spretis revelation 
Quhilk intercessioun maid, I traist, for me. 
I foryet all imagination.350  
 
Here, “imagination,” meaning something like “fanciful notions,” is certainly negative, 
associated with feelings of dread upon awaiting a possible punishment such as execution. 
The dismissal of “imagination” is associated with the concomitant flight of terror and 
fear.  
 As in Court of Sapience, Douglas’ poem presents an imagination that may be 
viewed as an illness requiring “medicine” to be cured and expunged. Yet unlike in the 
Court of Sapience, which produces two imaginations, one personified and one occurring 
naturally, The Palis of Honoure has no option of personification of a force that proves 
terrifying. The dreamer’s delivery from a possible death sentence in The Palis of 
Honoure is associated with a purgation of the imagination. This purgation indicates not 
only obvious distrust of the imagination but also an attempt to expel the imagination from 
the dreamer’s psyche as a key to psychological health. The internalized force of the 
imagination is presented as a frightening, destructive figure, but, at the same time, its 
ability to be externalized as a personification has been eliminated. The only way the 
dreamer may find safety is to attempt to expel the psychological force of imagination 
from his own brain.  
 As imagination divides against itself and collapses as a personified figure in the 
fifteenth century, it may symbolize a larger crisis for allegory as a genre. In her study of 
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Skelton’s Bowge of Court, Helen Cooney argues that allegory came under attack in the 
fifteenth century, in part because of the dissemination of humanist texts, proclaiming that 
there was “a fundamental conflict between humanism and allegory.”351 The humanist 
philologist, Cooney notes, is never concerned with the abstract quality of language but 
with the individual situation of the speaker and the “adaptability and instantaneousness of 
the word.”352 Cooney locates allegory itself as a site of urgent questioning in the late 
fifteenth century, when this dominant form of literary expression was beginning to face 
the challenge of philological humanism.353  
 A general crisis about allegory may be seen enacted in the troubles of 
personifying the imagination in the three fifteenth-century texts examined in this chapter. 
Yet a few other reasons may explain why the imagination as allegorical figure in 
particular collapses in the fifteenth century. In the wake of Wycliffism and Arundel’s 
Constitutions, fifteenth-century English authors confronted an environment increasingly 
hostile to images. The collapse of the externalized, allegorized imagination may have 
something to do with contemporary suspicion of both the worship of images and of 
images themselves. Externalized representations of images, like the personified 
imagination, were not to be trusted. At the same time, increasing emphasis was being 
placed on the internal, individual interpretation of images. As Shannon Gayk observes, 
Wyclif argued that the reception of images was as important as their form. This meant 
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that image-viewers were responsible for the way in which they worshipped images and 
whether their mode of worship was idolatrous.354 At the same time, lay learning and 
devotion was becoming more prominent, and clergymen like Pecock insisted that 
laypeople had the means to learn by themselves with the help of images.355 These factors 
created an environment in which internal processing of images was emphasized over the 
value of external, actual images, which were the target of much suspicion. In this 
environment, then, it makes sense that the externalized allegorical imagination might fall 
in prominence while the internalized psychological form of the imagination might rise in 
prominence. As the personified imagination becomes increasingly internally divided and 
collapses on itself, a new form of psychologized imagination comes to the fore as a 
deceitful and terrifying force that is nevertheless entirely integral to the mind. This 
seemingly fragile figure arises anew as a powerful one not only in fifteenth-century 
philosophy but also in its psychologized, non-allegorical literary form. Nonetheless, once 
again, literature develops a much more nuanced imagination than philosophy, starkly 
dividing the personified imagination from the internal, psychologized force of 
imagination. Fifteenth-century literary texts advance a weakened form of personified 
imagination that seems to run counter to a philosophical history of an increasingly 
powerful imagination, one that is even capable in some instances of healing. The idea of 
an imagination that harasses an individual’s psychology will be picked up again by 
Spenser in a yet more frightening display of the imagination’s capacities almost an entire 
century later.  
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Chapter 5 
The Fragmented Imagination: Historical Rupture and Shattered Self in The Faerie 
Queene 
 
 The late fifteenth century left us with a personified imagination in the midst of 
depletion. Over the course of the fifteenth century, the imagination became increasingly a 
source of internalized psychological terror and decreasingly an externalized personified 
figure. In the sixteenth century, in the wake of the Reformation, the imagination 
continues to become more of a terrifying psychic force; while the fifteenth-century 
imagination was prone to self-division, the sixteenth-century imagination is now a source 
and driver of external fragmentation. A divided and suspicious figure, Spenser’s 
imagination resonates with Alan of Lille’s twelfth-century Genius, a simultaneous source 
of good and evil creation. At the same time, the imagination is a locus for considering 
historical fragmentation and the separation of the early modern moment from the 
medieval. The sixteenth-century imagination thus comes to represent a major historical 
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break, even as its personification recombines ongoing concerns common to the 
representation of the imagination since the twelfth century.  
 In his Allegorical Epic, Michael Murrin suggests that Spenser’s Faerie Queene 
demonstrates a troublesome fear and suspicion of the imagination.356 Murrin notes the 
problematic nature of this suspicion for Spenser, whose imaginative, monumental work 
cannot comfortably embrace the imagination. Murrin further observes Spenser’s 
suspicion of the human imagination based on three main figures: Archimago, Phantastes, 
and Genius, the porter of the Bower of Bliss.357 Murrin argues that Spenser’s suspicion of 
the imagination is a product of an apprehensive Renaissance attitude toward the 
faculty.358 
 Yet Spenser’s imagination in many ways continues the medieval literary 
imagination that precedes it. Spenser’s imagination, a fragmented figure who also comes 
to represent fragmentation of the self, body, and historical rupture, is a stark descendent 
of the divided imagination of the fifteenth century. Indeed, the Bower of Bliss’ 
destruction of imagination is similar to the fifteenth-century Palis of Honoure’s attempt 
to expel and erase the personified figure of imagination. Imagination’s “divorce” from 
reason, as Murrin points out, is also a prominent feature of Chaucer’s fourteenth-century 
imagination. Even fragmentation is a feature of the imagination that extends back to Alan 
of Lille, whose imagination creates good with his right hand and evil with his left. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
356 Michael Murrin, The Allegorical Epic: Essays in Its Rise and Decline (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), 134. 
 
357 Ibid., 134.  
 
358 Ibid., 134-5. See also Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, On the Imagination, ed. and trans. 
Harry Caplan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 50-53, 56-7, 60-61. See also Michael 
Murrin, “The Varieties of Criticism,” Modern Philology 70 (1973): 342-356.!!
$,)!
!
Imagination in the sixteenth century is poised at and conscious of an extreme kind of 
historical rupture. Yet even this feature of Spenser’s imagination has precedents in the 
thirteenth-century literary imagination. This same feature is true of Jean de Meun’s 
Genius, who remains permanently suspended between a forward-looking Aristotelian 
recombinative imagination and a past-looking Silvestrian and Alanian imagination. 
Furthermore, Archimago is explicitly a protean figure, constantly changing clothing and 
disguises, challenging the premise of easily identifiable allegorical figures, much like 
Jean de Meun’s Genius. Spenser’s sixteenth-century imagination represents a culmination 
of the medieval literary imagination and unexpectedly signals a form of continuity within 
rupture. Spenser’s imagination, however, has been taken to an extreme of division and 
fragmentation and has been rendered more explicitly dangerous against the backdrop of 
iconoclastic vigor in his milieu.  
 The key concept at the center of Spenser’s representation of the imagination is 
fragmentation. The imagination in the guise of allegorical figures Genius, Archimago, 
and Phantastes is itself fragmented, just as it is in medieval literature. The novelty of the 
sixteenth-century imagination is its capacity for producing fragmentation. The 
imagination is not only itself under attack as an allegorical figure, as it often is in 
medieval literature, but it also now has an explicitly sinister capacity as an agent of 
fragmentation. In the House of Alma episode, the imagination disrupts the body and is 
even aligned with historical rupture. For a number of scholars, Spenser supposedly offers 
an illustrious example of the emergence of the self in the Renaissance. Redcrosse 
Knight’s and Guyon’s aventures spanning the first two books of the epic are considered 
processes of self-establishment, as each hero emerges as a fully formed and 
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psychologically unified individual by the end of the book.359 Genevieve Guenther 
contends that the workings of the imagination depend upon the presupposition of a fully 
formed subject who has some kind of internal desire for the images presented in the 
imagination.360 In their focus on the early modern period’s establishment of the “self” and 
its emphasis on introspection, these accounts tend to occlude the extent to which 
Spenser’s epic bears the burden of both psychic and historical fragmentation at every 
turn. As much as the early modern period attempts to build a stable, introspective subject, 
the period is equally invaded by iconoclasm, rupture from the medieval past, and an 
upsurge in medical explorations of the dissected body. The period’s attack on images also 
resulted in an attack on the psychological faculty of the imagination and a growing 
concern about its independent ability to formulate images ad infinitum. A closer look at 
the figure of Archimago, the Bower of Bliss episode, and the House of Alma indicates 
that psychological unity and the emergence of the self do not occur so assuredly in these 
first two books of Spenser’s epic. Specifically, the imagination becomes a locus for 
contemplating fragmentation of both the self and of history.   
 Indeed, even as the Renaissance is traditionally figured as a moment of self-
recognition and self-development, many scholars have duly noted an increasingly 
fragmented view of the self and body in this period. As Michael Schoenfeldt argues, the 
renewed attention to Galenic physiology and humoral theory resulted in an “introspection 
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whose focus was physiological as well as psychological.”361  Spenser’s “self” is “fragile 
and unstable,” according to Schoenfeldt, a being “assailed on all sides” and “eternally 
under construction.”362 This theory of the imagination’s control over the body as a 
powerful force working out of tune with the body may be viewed in a wider context of a 
culture that externalized the workings of the mind and fragmented the body. Jonathan 
Sawday has termed the early modern period a “culture of dissection” due to a significant 
fascination with the body in parts as well as the increasing prevalence of the actual 
practice of dissection.363 Although dissection was common in Italy and southern France 
from the late thirteenth century, the phenomenon did not appear in northern Europe until 
the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.364 The medical and scientific culture of 
dissection certainly made its way into literary culture as well. As Katharine Park has 
observed, human dissection was not limited to colleges and universities but also took 
place in private homes and religious institutions. The average person in Spenser’s milieu 
would have had ample exposure to human dissection.365  
 The allegorized figure of the imagination, Archimago, as a locus for the 
representation of this form of fragmentation makes sense in light of the Reformation’s 
concern about the power of the imagination to invent images. As Reformation thought 
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urged the destruction of images in worship, a campaign to demonize and externalize the 
natural functioning of the imagination in the mind emerged. The effects of this campaign 
are well-represented by Archimago’s thought-inserting techniques. It is my contention 
that the imagination in Spenser’s epic becomes a central component in a crisis about self-
fragmentation and historical rupture. This divided self, rather than the fully-formed 
introspective self sometimes posited by early modern scholarship, comes to the fore in 
Spenser’s epic. The exact nature of this fragmentation is necessarily altered according to 
the historical context in which Spenser writes, but the character of the imagination 
remains surprisingly continuous from the medieval period.  
 This process of psychological externalization and fragmentation occurs within the 
context of a text that laments a dramatic form of historical rupture. Spenser uses the 
figure of the imagination to depict a world in which paranoia and fragmentation, both of 
the self and of the historical moment, are rife. Phantastes’ chamber contains tomes of 
British history, suggesting an alignment of imagination with the past and with historical 
rupture and fragmentation. Yet Guyon’s discovery of the tomes disrupts the description 
of Phantastes and thus suspends imagination in a space between the present and the past.  
 Even as Spenser’s imagination indicates some key continuities with its medieval 
counterparts, the historical circumstances that produced more extreme suspicion of the 
imagination in the early modern period might help account for the scale of paranoia about 
the faculty in The Faerie Queene. Problems with the imagination are ubiquitous in 
Spenser’s milieu in part because of pervasive political and religious debates over images. 
Churchwardens’ accounts indicate a constant putting up and taking down of religious 
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images between Henry VIII’s and Elizabeth’s reigns.366 Altars were systematically 
removed, and iconoclastic activity was common in London.367 The year 1559, during 
Spenser’s lifetime, witnessed especially brutal and widespread iconoclasm.368 Tudor 
homilists attacked the imagination in particular, often suggesting that idolatry is just as 
much a preoccupation with mental images as with real images.369 Despite widespread 
iconoclasm, it should be noted that the attitude toward images during Elizabeth’s reign 
was decidedly ambivalent. As Margaret Aston has noted, Elizabeth was often opposed to 
the actions of some of the fiercest iconoclasts.370 At the same time, Elizabeth was herself 
capable of considerable imagistic destruction.371 Fear and destruction of images also 
resulted in considerable fear and destruction of the mind’s image-making capacity, the 
imagination. As will be discussed in this chapter, the surrounding cultural and religious 
ambivalence about images can also be seen in Spenser’s ambivalence toward the 
imagination. The imagination is both a powerful externalized force that has the potential 
to terrorize and fragment and a necessary arbiter of history and cultural memory. 
Elizabeth’s ambivalence about images resulted in a kind of suspension between the 
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medieval past’s celebration of images and the Reformation’s destruction of them. In a 
similar manner, imagination in Spenser’s epic remains poised and suspended between the 
medieval past and the early modern present.  
 I first examine the figure of Archimago as an imagination fragmented from its 
place inside the mind and equally as an arbiter of internal self-fragmentation. Then I 
discuss Phantastes and the House of Alma as a testament to Spenser’s suspicion of the 
imagination and its role in the fragmentation of the body. Next I investigate the Bower of 
Bliss episode, arguing for its emphasis on the destruction of the imagination, an extreme 
and more explicit version of what happens to the allegorical imagination in the fifteenth 
century. Finally, I demonstrate how Phantastes and thus allegorical imagination is aligned 
with melancholy over historical rupture and desire for the past. In imagination’s 
suspension between the past and the present, Spenser’s allegorical character is still very 
much the transformative figure we saw especially clearly in the Roman de la Rose and De 
planctu Naturae.  
 
Archimago and the externalized imagination: psychic fragmentation  
 Archimago’s name has stirred considerable debate in Spenser scholarship, since 
the combination of terms “arch” and “imago,” with the embedded term “mage” results in 
a variety of possible meanings.372 As Harry Berger has pointed out, Archimago’s name 
may be divided in a variety of ways, including “Archi-mage” and “Arch-imago.” The two 
different divisions result in divergent meanings. “Archi-mage” means “arch-magician,” 
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while “arch-imago” means the “arch-image.”373 As the “arch-image,” Archimago 
represents the psychological faculty of the imagination.374 His dwelling place, a “hidden 
cell,” is not only a ruse to deceive Redcrosse and Una into believing he is a holy hermit 
but also a reference to the cellula phantastica, the imagination’s dwelling place in the 
human brain.375 Many Spenser scholars have attempted to reconcile Archimago’s 
“imaginative” function with his “magician” identity. Some, such as A. Bartlett, have 
taken the magician-aspect of Archimago’s name combined with his imaginative function 
to indicate that Archimago is the representation par excellence of the illusory poetic 
imagination and even an embodiment of Spenser’s own mind.376 Others, such as James 
Nohrnberg and D.P. Walker, claim that Archimago is primarily a magician, but his ability 
to induce illusory images within human imaginations reveals the “idolatry of the natural 
imagination.”377 
 Yet these attempts to “unify” Archimago may be somewhat misguided. The 
tension between Archi-mage and Arch-imago can in fact be seen as essential to Spenser’s 
personification of the faculty of the imagination. The imagination is a faculty integral to 
the human mind, dwelling in the “hidden” cellula phantastica; yet it is also, by virtue of a 
play on words, an externalized magical force, a magician with strong and secret powers. 
The imagination, in this view, abuses itself. It is both agent and patient. As Berger points 
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out, “archimago” is simultaneously the “strongest of the strong,” a magician with 
supernatural abilities, and the weakest of the weak, a passive and sometimes abused 
imagination.378 Archimago’s “dual” nature solidifies the idea of the aesthetic of 
fragmentation in Spenser’s poem in general. Much like the fifteenth-century imagination, 
Spenser’s imagination has split into two parts, one internal and one external to the human 
psyche. The imagination in this text is also responsible for fragmenting other individuals. 
As Harry Berger suggests, Archimago both divides Redcrosse from himself and splits 
Una into two.379  
 Our first vision of Archimago, as a disguised hermit fetching dreams from 
Morpheus, fashions him not only as a deceptively protean figure but also as a figure 
exterior to Redcrosse’s psyche. The precise process by which Archimago obtains the 
dream to “abuse” Redcrosse’s imagination is depicted as a detailed chain of events that 
highlights the extent to which the dreaming process originates outside the mind of the 
dreamer. Archimago sends a “Sprite” to visit Morpheus in the hopes of obtaining dream 
material: 
Hether (quoth he) me Archimago sent, 
He that the stubborne Sprites can wisely tame, 
He bids thee to him send for his intent 
A fit false dreame, that can delude the sleepers sent. 
The God obayde, and calling forth straight way 
A diuerse dreame out of his prison darke, 
Deliuered it to him, and downe did lay 
His heauie head, deuoide of careful carke, 
Whose sences all were straight benumbd and starke. 
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He backe returning by the Yuorie dore, 
Remounted vp as light as chearefull Larke, 
And on his little winges the dreame he bore, 
In hast vnto his Lord, where he him left afore.380 
 
The fact that Archimago sends a messenger to Morpheus to fetch a dream to then place in 
Redcrosse’s mind suggests the myriad steps between the imaginative thought and its 
manifestation in the mind of the dreamer. The very process of imaginative thinking seems 
fragmented here, as the number of figures intervening between Archimago and Redcrosse 
multiplies. The dream itself also entails a notion of multiplicity. Morpheus is said to 
present Archimago’s Sprite with a “diuerse dreame.” “Diuerse” most immediately means 
various, different, or not alike in some fashion. Yet it may also imply endless 
multiplication and multiplicity. While “diuerse” may simply mean “several” or “sundry,” 
it may also encompass the sense of “an indefinite number.”381 Already the work of the 
imagination and its contents are figured as detached, externalized, and, most importantly, 
fragmented. The detail of the messenger carrying the dream on his wings (“And on his 
little winges the dreame he bore”) only further emphasizes the distance between the 
imaginative content and the psyche of the dreamer whose mind will soon be inhabited by 
this imaginative content.  
 The work of the imagination has become an externalized, physical object, able to 
be carried on the spirit’s wings. The sense of imaginative thought as physical object 
becomes more prominent in the description of the origin of Redcrosse’s dream: 
Now when that ydle dreame was to him brought, 
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Vnto that Elfin knight he bad him fly, 
Where he slept soundly void of euil thought, 
And with false shewes abuse his fantasy, 
In sort as he him schooled priuily: 
And that new creature borne without her dew, 
Full of the makers guyle with vsage sly 
He taught to imitate that Lady trew, 
Whose semblance she did carrie vnder feigned hew.  
 
Thus well instructed, to their worke they haste, 
And comming where the knight in slomber lay, 
The one vpon his hardie head him plaste, 
And made him dreame of loues and lustfull play, 
That nigh his manly hart did melt away, 
Bathed in wanton blis and wicked ioy: 
Then seemed him his Lady by him lay, 
And to him playnd, how that false winged boy, 
Her chaste hart had subdewd, to learne Dame pleasures toy.382  
 
Just before Archimago’s messenger inserts the dream material into Redcrosse’s head, 
Spenser reminds the reader of Archimago’s image-making capacities. We are reminded 
that Redcrosse sleeps beside the false Una, a “new creature” who is “Full of the makers 
gyle.” This Una, an imitation of the original (“He taught to imitate that Lady trew”) is a 
mere feigned “semblance.” False Una is herself described as an image here, with the use 
of the word “semblance” and the concept of imitation. It is no coincidence that Spenser 
emphasizes Archimago’s role as imager moments before describing the process by which 
the dream Redcrosse is about to have originates in his mind. This description of 
Archimago solidifies his role as “imagination.” 
 Yet if Archimago is truly Redcrosse’s imagination, a figure of a faculty inside his 
psyche, the process by which the dream comes to be in Redcrosse’s mind is 
uncomfortably foreign. Spenser highlights the extent of Archimago’s agency here by 
rendering the origin of Redcrosse’s dream a highly physical process. Archimago does not 
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simply influence Redcrosse’s thoughts. He physically places the dream inside his head: 
“The one vpon his hardie head him plaste.” The use of the preposition “vpon,” paired 
with the highly corporeal term “plaste,” suggests that Archimago literally inserts the 
dream into Redcrosse’s mind. This clear delineation of the imagination placing the 
imaginative material into the mind of the dreamer, who then is forced to experience a 
certain fantasy, not only suggests a particular form of paranoia about the external world’s 
control over the mind’s image-making capacities but also results in a profound 
fragmentation of the psyche. Redcrosse’s imagination is in many ways not his own, and 
this “outsider” status of what should be an integral psychic power speaks to a form of 
subjective severing. 
 Archimago inherits certain terms that were often paired with imagination in the 
medieval period. In his pursuit of Una, Archimago is described as “subtill,” a term 
aligned with “imagination” in many fifteenth-century English allegories and poetic 
works, including the pseudo-Chaucerian Tale of Beryn and Hickscorner.383 In his battle 
against Redcrosse in Book 2, Archimago is said to utilize his “subtile engins.” The use of 
the word “engin” recalls a long medieval tradition of the association of imagination with 
genius as well as specific passages in the Roman de la Rose in which both Nature and 
Genius are said to utilize their “engins.”384 The medieval tradition of ingenium is an 
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ancient one, extending back to at least Isidore of Seville in the sixth century.385 These 
references to the medieval tradition of the personified imagination suggest a form of 
continuity for the figure. Archimago, a fragmenting and fragmented figure, is, however, 
more explicitly threatening and terrifying than his medieval counterparts. He does not 
perhaps represent a complete severing from the medieval imagination but a continuation 
of a fragmented figure who now also has the frightening power to induce division in 
others. 
 Archimago may be even more explicitly connected to certain medieval iterations 
of the allegorical imagination. In particular, Archimago’s protean nature is reminiscent of 
Jean de Meun’s Genius. When we first meet Archimago, he is dressed like a hermit, and 
he routinely changes clothes, a key characteristic of Genius in the Roman. This veiled 
presentation of an allegorical figure is striking in the context of other Book I figures such 
as Sans Joi, Sans Loy, and Sans Foy, who display their identities prominently. Upon his 
first entrance, Archimago is already the slippery, difficult-to-identify figure that Genius is 
in the Roman. Spenser explicitly aligns Archimago with Proteus in Canto 2: 
He then deuisde himselfe how to disguise; 
For by his mighty science he could take 
As many formes and shapes in seeming wise, 
As euer Proteus to himself could make: 
Sometime a fowle, sometime a fish in lake, 
Now like a foxe, now like a dragon fell, 
That of himself he ofte for feare would quake, 
And oft would flie away. O who can tell 
The hidden powre of herbes, and might of Magick spel?386 
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Archimago is capable of assuming a multitude of disguises, accompanied by frequent 
changes of clothing. Spenser’s list of the various “formes and shapes” that Archimago 
might assume, including “fowle,” “fish,” “foxe,” “dragon,” necessitates a pause in the 
text in which Archimago occupies a completely transformative state. This transformative 
capacity, and especially the way the text pauses over and relishes it, is reminiscent of 
Genius in Jean’s Roman. Archimago has inherited a feature of the medieval personified 
imagination. This particular feature, transformability, upsets the ease with which 
personified figures are normally identified and once again questions the stable nature of 
allegorical figures. At the same time, this allegorical transformability, while not explicitly 
frightening in Jean de Meun’s text, is an immediate source of terror in Spenser’s epic. 
Archimago’s changing costumes often cause even him “for feare” to “quake.” The final 
line of this particular characterization of Archimago encapsulates the urgent fear this 
personified imagination figure evokes. Archimago uses his protean nature to deceive with 
the “might of Magick spel[s].”  
 What begins as a clear alignment with the medieval transformative imagination 
becomes much more explicitly sinister and terrifying in Spenser’s text than it ever was in 
Jean de Meun’s. While Spenser’s personified imagination may recombine elements of the 
medieval imagination, it is nevertheless more explicitly threatening and capable of 
effecting real damage. In particular, while the medieval imagination may be 
transformative and internally divided, Spenser’s imagination is not only internally 
divided but also capable of producing fragmentation. Archimago is himself a divided 
figure, existing simultaneously as Archi-mage and Arch-imago, and functioning both 
inside and outside of Redcrosse’s psyche. At the same time, Archimago produces 
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fragmentation by creating false Una and thus dividing Una into two figures. Imagination 
in this text is thus more explicitly an agent of destruction than we found in medieval 
texts. Not surprisingly, then, in the Bower of Bliss episode, the imagination, not external 
images, becomes the true great evil that must be expunged and destroyed.  
 
Phantastes, the House of Alma, and the Imagination’s Attack on the Body 
 The double fragmentation of the imagination from the psyche and from itself 
observed in Archimago resonates strongly with the fragmentation of the body that occurs 
in the House of Alma. All of this fragmentation relates to the culture of dissection 
identified by Jonathan Sawday, particularly well illustrated by the House of Alma’s 
representation of the body in parts.387 Importantly, the House of Alma represents not only 
a terrifying and suspicious imagination in the form of Phantastes but also suggests that 
the imagination may itself engender fragmentation of the body. The House of Alma is 
attacked by various hybrid figures that mimic the inventions of the imagination, 
demonstrating how an externalized psychological figure such as Archimago might come 
to attack and fragment the body. The imagination is thus both itself fragmented, as it 
often is in medieval literature, but can also, in a new twist, engender fragmentation.  
 The fragmentation of the body inherent in Archimago’s fragmentation from 
Redcrosse’s body is heightened in the vivid dissection that occurs in the House of Alma 
episode. As Leonard Barkan has noted, a “major component” of Spenser’s work is “the 
image of wholeness,” and yet “an equally strong vector is a fragmentation of the 
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wholeness into a multitude of component parts.”388 This is partially and necessarily the 
work of allegory, with its representation of fragmented concepts as individual 
abstractions. Nowhere is this “strong vector” of fragmentation more potent than in the 
House of Alma. The House of Alma at once represents a fully formed human body and 
yet at the same time depicts a body in pieces, as Guyon and King Arthur explore its 
component parts. Most significant in any exploration of the imagination is Guyon and 
Arthur’s wanderings in Alma’s brain and particularly the figure of Phantastes:  
His chamber was dispainted all with in, 
With sondry colours, in the which were writ 
Infinite shapes of thinges dispersed thin; 
Some such as in the world were neuer yit, 
Ne can deuized be of mortall wit; 
Some daily seene, and knowne by their names, 
Such as in idle fantasies doe flit: 
Infernall Hags, Centaurs, freendes, Hippodames, 
Apes, Lyons, Aegles, Owles, fooles, louers, children, Dames. 
 
And all the chamber filled was with flyes, 
Which buzzed all about, and made such sound, 
That they encombred all mens eares and eyes, 
Like many swarmes of Bees assembled round, 
After their hiues with honny do abound: 
All those were idle thoughtes and fantasies, 
Deuices, dreames, opinions vnsound, 
Shewes, visions, sooth-sayes, and prophesies; 
And all that fainted is, as leasings, tales, and lies. 
 
Emongst them all sate he, which wonned there, 
That hight Phantastes by his nature trew, 
A man of yeares yet fresh, as mote appere, 
Of swarth complexion, and of crabbed hew, 
That him full of melancholy did shew; 
Bent hollow beetle browes, sharpe staring eyes, 
That mad or foolish seemd: one by his vew 
Mote deeme him borne with ill disposed skyes, 
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When oblique Saturne sate in the house of agonyes.389 
 
Much is unsurprising about this depiction of the imagination, here named Phantastes and 
occupying the middle ventricle of the brain. He is responsible for “dreames,” “visions,” 
and “prophesies.” He creates “idle fantasies” as his name implies. This description of 
Phantastes takes for granted that imagination can create anew, a debate that occupied 
many medieval allegories including De planctu and Roman de la Rose. While the 
question of whether Genius or Nature was responsible for new creations vexes both Alan 
of Lille and Jean de Meun, Spenser seems to assume confidently that Phantastes can 
create “Some such as in the world were neuer yit,/Ne can deuized be of mortall wit.” The 
notion that Phantastes brings to life creatures that “were neuer yit” in the world implies a 
capacity to invent anew.  
 Phantastes’ most significant inventions are the hybrids reminiscent of characters 
in Spenser’s epic, such as Duessa and Errour. Phantastes creates the material of “idle 
fantasies,” including “Infernall Hags, Centaurs, freendes, Hippodames,/Apes, Lyons, 
Aegles, Owles.” These hybrids invade the brain like ‘flyes” buzzing “all about,” in a 
similar manner in which Archimago inserts thoughts and fantasies into Redcrosse’s mind. 
The work of the imagination is depicted as a series of perpetual and, significantly, 
unwanted thoughts, like a burden that “encombred all mens eares and eyes.” This view of 
the imagination as a perpetually harassing force resonates with Calvin’s description of the 
imagination as a “perpetual workshop of idols.”390 Thoughts provoked by the imagination 
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are so frequent and harassing that they are compared to “many swarmes of Bees” 
surrounding “hiues with honny.”  
 E. Ruth Harvey dismisses this constant “buzzing” as a faithful representation of 
the work of the sensus communis. Yet Spenser’s multiplicity of images describing this 
constant bombardment is not a simple reiteration of the traditional sensus communis.391 
This unpleasant image of the imagination in fact recalls Archimago’s thought insertion 
techniques in Book I. Even as the imagination is here somewhat discounted as “leasings, 
tales, and lies,” the unremitting stream of thought resulting from its activity suggests not 
only its inevitability but also its power. Here we learn too of the imagination’s prophetic 
power, as Phantastes is said to be able to “things to come foresee.” While Phantastes may 
harass the minds of men with swarms of images and false fantasies, he is still credited 
with “a sharpe foresight” and “working wit.” The idea of the prophetic imagination is a 
notion that Avicenna developed and appears in a certain fashion in William Langland’s 
Piers Plowman, which Spenser knew.392 Perhaps Spenser is just placing Phantastes in the 
context of the “memorial” portion of the brain, but the assignation of prophetic power to 
the imagination does function as an admission of the imagination’s strength, even amidst 
attempts to discredit it as mere “tales” and lies.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
391 Spenser Encyclopedia, s.v. “psychology”: “The first impression of Phantastes’ chamber is one 
of confusion: a vast multiplicity of sense impressions pours continually into the front ventricle 
during waking hours—impression which, for the most part, are not sorted or recorded but simply 
received. This is the function philosophers called sensus communis, where the evidence of all the 
five senses is collected together.” 
 
 
392 Michelle Karnes, “Will’s Imagination in Piers Plowman,” Journal of English and Germanic 
Philology 108 (2009), 6; Ernest Kaulbach, “The ‘Vis Imaginativa Secundum Avicennam’ and the 
Naturally Prophetic Powers of Ymaginatif in the B-Text of Piers Plowman,” Journal of English 
and Germanic Philology 86 (1987), 501-2. See also Judith H. Anderson, The Growth of a 
Personal Voice: Piers Plowman and The Faerie Queene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1976), 2-3.  
%$&!
!
 At the same time, the idea of the imagination as releasing images to attack and 
harass an unsuspecting brain is not only reminiscent of Archimago’s Book I antics but 
also indicates a form of psychic fragmentation, as the imagination works against and on 
the exterior of the human mind.  Even more importantly, the separation of the mind into 
its component parts and particularly the extremely detailed narration of Guyon’s and 
Arthur’s travels through the anatomy of the mind evokes a profound sense of 
fragmentation. As Archimago attacks and abuses Redcrosse’s mind in Book I, in Book 2 
the ability of the imagination to fragment the body becomes apparent. As Sawday has 
pointed out, the entire House of Alma episode may be viewed as an example of Freud’s 
unheimlich. Sawday calls Alma’s house a depiction of the human body at once entirely 
known and entirely unknown, an “entrance into the unfamiliar familiar.”393 This body is 
both a vision of the self and an alien object needing extensive exploration, explanation 
and detailed narration, all of which Spenser provides. This idea of bodily fragmentation 
certainly makes sense in light of growing Renaissance interest in dissection of the human 
body.394 As Nancy Siraisi observes, an increased interest in anatomy and the practice of 
dissection in the sixteenth century led to the first Latin translations of Galen’s dissection 
manual On Anatomical Procedures.395 Soon thereafter, in 1543, Andreas Vesalius’ 
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original anatomical work On the Fabric of the Human Body was published.396 This surge 
of interest in the component parts of the imagination may have resulted in a widespread 
cultural attitude toward the body as disjointed and even incoherent.  
 This sense of the anatomical fragmentation of the body coincides with a sense of 
the body’s extreme permeability. The permeable body is also a frighteningly vulnerable 
one, liable to be influenced and invaded by any number of external factors, including 
detrimental ones such as Archimago’s destructive fantasies. The vulnerability and 
permeability of the body is nowhere more clear than in the attack on Alma’s castle, a 
representation of the attack of external forces on the body. Significantly, Alma’s castle is 
attacked primarily by a series of hybrid figures who bear considerable resemblance to the 
products of fantasy. It might be said that the imagination, here presented as an entirely 
external force, attacks and fragments the body:  
The first troupe was a monstrous rabblement, 
Of fowle misshapen wightes, of which some were 
Headed like Owles, with beckes vncomely bent, 
Others like Dogs, others like Gryphons dreare, 
And some had wings, and some had clawes to teare, 
And euery one of them had Lynces eyes, 
And euery one did bow and arrowes beare: 
All those were lawlesse lustes, corrupt enuyes, 
And couetous aspects, all cruel enimyes. 
 
Those same against the bulwarke of the Sight 
Did lay strong siege, and battailous assault, 
Ne once did yield it respitt day nor night, 
But soone as Titan gan his head exault, 
And soone againe as he his light withhault, 
Their wicked engins they against it bent: 
That is each thing, by which the eyes may fault, 
But two then all more huge and violent, 
Beautie, and money they against that Bulwarke lent.397 
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 Alma’s castle is attacked by hybrids and unusual creatures that almost seem akin to 
products of the imagination, including “fowle misshapen wightes.” These creatures have 
heads, bodies, and wings that do not all match each other, some with heads of “Owles,” 
others with heads of “Dogs,” and still others with heads of “Gryphons.” Along with their 
heads of various different animals, many of them have wings and “Lynces eyes.” The 
description of each body part in a piecemeal fashion suggests that these creatures are not 
simply “dogs” or “owls” but complex hybridizations of several animals. They themselves 
and the description of them are highly fragmented in the process, appearing first as heads, 
then heads with wings, then heads with eyes, and so on. The scattered description of these 
monstrous figures results in an ekphrastic-like passage, in which each is reduced to its 
component parts. Yet here, instead of producing the erotic delight that ekphrasis of a 
female figure in a romance often does, the ekphrastic treatment of the monstrous beasts 
attacking Alma’s castle produces fright and disgust. Immediately following their 
“ekphrastic” description, the creatures are depicted as “cruel enimyes” and as “huge” and 
“violent.” Significantly, the creatures’ “wicked engins” are thought to be the major 
source of their attack against Alma’s castle. The word “engin” not only relates to genius 
and the imagination but it is also used in Book I in explicit reference to Archimago and 
his abuse of Redcrosse’s fantasy. The attack on Alma’s castle thus represents not only the 
vulnerability and permeability of the body but also reiterates the imagination’s particular 
danger and externalizes it as an alien force that attacks the body. The imagination’s 
power over the body has been established in a manner that fragments mind and body and 
scatters psychic function into a myriad of disparate and monstrous creatures. As we shall 
see, this fragmentation is ominously connected with rupture from the past at the end of 
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the House of Alma episode and suggests a way in which Spenser’s obsession with the 
fragmented, vulnerable body attacked by the external forces of the imagination is just one 
part of a large-scale lament over the lost past.  
 
Iconoclasm and the Bower of Bliss: Imagistic Fragmentation 
 If Spenser’s text expresses some amount of discomfort with the “iconoclasm” of 
the human imagination encapsulated by the figure of Archimago, then it might seem that 
the destruction of the Bower of Bliss at the end of Book 2 can be nothing short of a fully-
fledged attack on the culture of images. Spenserian critics have argued endlessly about 
the meaning of Guyon’s destructive act, particularly because he is supposed to represent 
temperance and yet his parting action in Book 2 is “notably intemperate.”398 Many 
Spenser scholars view this episode as predominantly “morally, psychologically, or 
spiritually justified.” In this view, Guyon becomes a cleansing force, restoring the natural 
to the decidedly unnatural and perverse state of affairs predominant in Acrasia’s bower. 
Guyon can, in this interpretation, be viewed as a Christ-like figure, coming to harrow 
hell, or a “cleansing force of Nature.”399 Clearly these explanations remain unsatisfactory, 
as “students and the common reader continue to find the stanza disturbing.”400  
 What can this destruction of the Bower possibly mean? James Knapp has argued 
that, while most of Spenser’s epic involves a “meditation on the proper creation of 
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internal images,” the destruction of the Bower of Bliss entails a moment in which this 
internalization cannot be the only focus. In this moment the problem of external images, 
rather than the problem of internal images, comes to the fore.401 No doubt Guyon’s 
rampage represents on some level an act of iconoclasm eerily resonant with the kind of 
erasure of the medieval past encompassed by actual Reformation acts of iconoclasm. Yet 
this episode also contains the equally horrifying and uncomfortable attempt to damage 
the workings of the human imagination. As Paul Alpers has argued, Spenser is interested 
in the internal, psychological effects of images.402 Guyon’s act in fact does violence to 
the images that arise not so much in the external world but in the mind as a product of 
fantasy and the imagination. His seemingly “intemperate” act is in fact an attack on the 
intemperate imagination. In a strange turn of events, this abuse of the imagination aligns 
Guyon with Archimago. The destruction of the Bower of Bliss presents a threat to the 
imagination that involves the internalization of a threat at first perceived to be external. 
The dangerous nature of images is shown to be present in the internal workings of the 
mind. After the fragmenting, destructive agency of the imagination has been established 
by the figure of Archimago and by the House of Alma episode, imagination must be 
destroyed. This destruction is a more explicit version of what happens to the allegorical 
imagination at the end of the fifteenth century, as it silently disappeared from allegorical 
literature. 
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 When Guyon destroys the Bower of Bliss “with rigour pitilesse,” he not merely 
decimates a physical location but also ruins a place in which the dreamer’s fantasy comes 
to life. In his destructive rampage, Guyon stops to remind us of Acrasia’s transformative 
work in the Bower and the presence of monstrous and hybrid beasts in its environs:  
The way they came, the same retourn’d they right, 
Till they arriued, where they lately had 
Charm’d those wild-beasts, that rag’d with furie mad. 
Which now awaking, fierce at them gan fly, 
As in their mistresse reskew, whom they lad; 
But them the Palmer soone did pacify. 
Then Guyon askt, what meant those beastes, which there did ly. 
Sayd he, These seeming beasts are men indeed, 
Whom this Enchauntresse hath transformed thus, 
 
Whylome her louers, which her lustes did feed, 
Now turned into figures hideous, 
According to their mindes like monstruous. 
Sad end (quoth he) of life intemperate, 
And mournefull meed of ioyes delicious: 
But Palmer, if it mote thee so aggrate, 
Let them returned be vnto their former state. 
Streight way he with his vertuous staffe them strooke, 
And streight of beastes they comely men became; 
 
Yet being men they did vnmanly looke, 
And stared ghastly, some for inward shame, 
And some for wrath, to see their captiue Dame: 
But one aboue the rest in speciall, 
That had an hog beene late, hight Grylle by name, 
Repyned greatly, and did him miscall, 
That had from hoggish forme him brought to naturall.403 
 
The conversation between the Palmer and Guyon marks a transition between two portions 
of the destruction of the Bower of Bliss episode and perhaps also between an “external” 
iconoclasm and the “internal” iconoclasm of damaging fantastic images. The destruction 
opens with several lines of intensely violent action and then comes to a sudden pause 
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with the line beginning “Then Guyon askt.” Although the men have been fully 
transformed into beasts and are not hybrids of the sort seen elsewhere in the Faerie 
Queene, they are suspended in a transition between beast and man that renders them truly 
hybrid. The Palmer’s proclamation that “These seeming beasts are men indeed” portrays 
each figure as simultaneously man and beast, even if they have been transformed into 
beasts and have the appearance or “seeming” of purely non-human beings. Similarly, the 
realization that the men were turned to the beasts that already resided in their minds 
(“Now turned into figures hideous,/ According to their mindes like monstruous”) 
suggests man’s propensity to transform into a beast at any time, particularly as a function 
of thoughts and fantasies gone awry.404 Even when Guyon transforms the beasts back into 
men, they still present as somewhat beastly: “Yet being men they did vnmanly 
looke,/And stared ghastly, some for inward shame.” The hog called “Grylle” in particular 
is shown not to have truly made the transformation from “hoggish forme” to “naturall.” 
Even in their transformation back to a natural state, these men exist as hybrids, both 
hoggish and human in form. The idea of a “natural state” has in fact been frustrated by 
this scene, revealing that “naturalness” might better be viewed as a state of hybridity.  
 The attempt to expunge the internal images created by the human faculty of 
imagination is clearly frustrated by Guyon’s failed effort to transform man into beast. 
Importantly, the particulars of the description of the beasts Guyon attempts to transform 
depicts them as the hybrids regular to imaginative thought, the sort of dream-image that 
particularly fascinated and terrified early modern thinkers. The fact that the Bower entails 
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such representation of a form of imaginative or fantastic thinking suggests that Guyon’s 
destruction of it is also an act of violence against the imagination itself. As Stephen 
Greenblatt has noted, the art Guyon destroys “does not pretend to image holy things.” 
Although Greenblatt may overstate the case in suggesting that there “could be no charge 
of idolatry” against the art Guyon demolishes, this episode suggests not that art is 
idolatrous, as Greenblatt argues, but that the imagination is idolatrous.405  
 The presence of Genius as the gatekeeper to Acrasia’s Bower solidifies the notion 
of this space as representative of imaginative function. Genius is synonymous with 
Imagination throughout the medieval period, and Jean de Meun is especially aware of this 
association in his representation of Genius in the Roman de la Rose, a text whose 
influence is keenly detectable in Spenser’s epic allegory. Genius in Book 2 of The Faerie 
Queene is introduced as a benevolent gatekeeper, a force of life and creation in the 
universe: 
All this, and more might in that goodly gate 
Be red; that euer open stood to all, 
Which thether came: but in the Porch there sate 
A comely personage of stature tall, 
And semblaunce pleasing, more then naturall, 
That traueilers to him seemd to entize; 
His looser garment to the ground did fall, 
And flew about his heeles in wanton wize, 
Not fitt for speedy pace, or manly exercize. 
 
They in that place him Genius did call: 
Not that celestiall powre, to whom the care 
Of life, and generation of all 
That liues, perteines in change particulare, 
Who wondrous things concerning our welfare, 
And straunge phantomes doth lett vs ofte forsee, 
And ofte of secret ills bids vs beware: 
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That is our Selfe, whom though we doe not see, 
Yet each doth in him selfe it well perceiue to bee. 
 
Therefore a God him sage Antiquity 
Did wisely make, and good Agdistes call: 
But this same was to that quite contrary, 
That foe of life, that good enuyes to all, 
That secretly doth vs procure to fall, 
Through guilefull semblants, which he makes vs see. 
He of this Gardin had the gouernall, 
And Pleasures porter was deuizd to bee, 
Holding a staffe in hand for more formalitee.406 
 
Genius in Spenser’s allegory is split across two figures, one who is the creator of life and 
appears as the guardian of the Garden of Adonis and one who is responsible for death, the 
Genius here in the Bower of Bliss. Unlike the sprightly and transformative Genius of 
Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose who flies about with ease, this Genius languishes, 
“Not fitt for speedy pace, or manly exercize.” In an interesting twist on an ongoing power 
struggle between Genius and Nature that occupies many medieval allegories, Spenser’s 
“evil” Genius of the Bower of Bliss is described as “more then naturall.” This Genius is 
somehow out of the realm and jurisdiction of nature and seemingly supernatural. As a 
representation of imagination, this Genius is insistently and persistently full of guile. The 
detail that Genius is of “semblaunce pleasing, more then naturall” suggests that his 
“semblaunce,” a word inextricably associated with the concept of the image, is not only 
pleasing to behold but also, and perhaps more importantly, extraordinary in a potentially 
dangerous and unnatural way. Interestingly, this “evil” Genius is also necessarily part of 
the self, as Spenser delineates that “each doth in him selfe it well perceiue to bee.” This 
detail refers to the theory of the daemon, or each person’s essential being, which each of 
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us perceives within. We might recall the idea of Genius, a form of imagination, as a kind 
of personal conscience or guide-figure from Bernard Silvestris’ Cosmographia.  
 After many lines of description, Spenser returns to this insistence on Genius’ 
guile by explicating how Genius makes us “fall” by means of “guilefull semblants, which 
he makes vs see.” The very same “guilefull semblants,” products of an imagination gone 
awry, are now aligned with the deceptive figure of Genius himself, who is described as 
having a “semblaunce pleasing.” The repetition of the particular word “semblaunce” to 
describe both Genius’ appearance and the untrustworthy images he creates suggests that 
Genius not only produces dangerous and deceptive imaginative illusions but also may 
himself be a dangerous and deceptive image. The fact that this creator of imaginative 
illusions is the figure who represents and introduces the Bower of Bliss suggests that 
Guyon’s destruction of it is an assault on the powers of the imagination. 
 The splitting of Genius’ character into two entities, a “good” Genius called 
Agdistes and the evil Genius who guards the Bower of Bliss, is not only a “problematic” 
treatment of this allegorical figure but also reiterates a form of fragmentation that is 
central to Spenser’s epic as a whole.407 At the same time, this fragmentation of 
imagination recalls both the fifteenth-century imagination and even Alan of Lille’s 
twelfth-century Genius, simultaneously benevolent and evil. In Spenser’s allegory, the 
fragmentation is more explicit and more complete. An entirely different form of Genius 
reappears in Book 3, Canto 6 as the porter of the Garden of Adonis: 
Old Genius the porter of them was, 
Old Genius, the which a double nature has. 
He letteth in, he letteth out to wend, 
All that to come into the world desire; 
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A thousand thousand naked babes attend 
About him day and night, which doe require, 
That he with fleshly weeds would them attire: 
Such as him list, such as eternall fate 
Ordained hath, he clothes with sinfull mire 
 
And sendeth forth to liue in mortall state, 
Till they agayn returne backe by the hinder gate.408 
 
Not only does Genius reappear as a different figure, old, benevolent and life-sustaining, 
but also Spenser here specifically alludes to his “double nature” on the basis of his ability 
to both give and take away life. He both “letteth in” and “letteth out,” initiating “naked 
babes” into the world of the living and allowing the dead to “returne backe by the hinder 
gate.” This is in fact the second instance of Spenser’s focus on Genius’ “double nature,” 
the other being the description of the evil Genius in Book 2. In the case of the Genius 
guarding the Bower of Bliss, his description is in many ways more governed by what he 
is not than what he is. Between the description of his appearance and the description of 
his abilities to beguile and fool mankind with strange and illusory images is an extensive 
excursus on this Genius’ antithesis. The passage operates as an extremely complex 
subordinate clause beginning with “Not” and ending ten lines later when Spenser finally 
delineates the characteristics of Agdistes’ “contrary.” The description of Genius serves 
not so much to dwell on his specific characteristics as to linger on the subject of his other 
half, from whom he has been severed.  
 Guyon’s destruction of imaginative thought as a corollary to his decimation of 
idolatrous images has a certain precedent in the religious thought and rhetoric of 
sixteenth-century England. Concern with the idolatry involved in worshipping external 
images was quickly extended to anxiety about the idolatry of the human imagination in 
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Reformation thought. A sermon by Stephen Gardiner in 1546 entitled “A Detection of the 
Deuills sophistrie” illustrates this phenomenon well. Even though Gardiner was a 
defender of Catholicism, suspicion of imagination in his milieu seems to have been 
enough for him to cast the faculty in an extremely negative light.409 In this sermon, 
Gardiner argues against the use of images to stir up the memory of the passion or to incite 
spiritual feelings in the minds of pious people. Instead, he argues that the real presence of 
Christ’s body and the church itself should more readily evoke spiritual feelings than the 
psychic results of viewing an image of a holy scene:  
If the hearing of christes death, entringe at a mannes eares, or the seyng of 
a picture or image grauen, representing christes deathe to the bodely eyes, 
doth styrre vp mans memory to haue remembraunce of that is done by 
christ for hym: how moche more doth the liuely presence of christes 
natural body styr such as perfytely beleue the presence of the same, to the 
remenbraunce of christes passion?410  
 
Gardiner’s comments here represent a form of distrust of the psychic processes by which 
images are processed. The associational memory stirred up by viewing an image refers to 
the memorial functions of the imagination, which may recall absent images. For 
Gardiner, direct contact with some form of material presence is superior to the conjuring 
of images once seen or the reliance on memory. In other words, Gardiner is deeply 
suspicious of mental imaging processes and psychic processes of all kinds.  
 This distrust of psychic processes is supported by the subsequent ways in which 
Gardiner uses the term “imaginacion.” The imagination is capable both of abusing and 
being abused:  
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There resteth now to open the deuils sophistrie, in the peruerse, croked & 
craftie expositions of dyuers places of scripture, the saienges of holy 
writers, and of such wordes, as be attribute to signifie and name that moost 
blessed sacrament vnto vs, wherin hathe ben moche paine taken, & moch 
craftie imaginacion deuised, to abuse the simple vnlerned wyttes, and 
vpholde in errour, the maliciouse, arrogant and newe fangled 
iudgemenetes.411  
 
The “craftie imaginacion” is here “deuised” in a scheming manner in order to mislead 
and “abuse” the “simple” minds of “vnlerned” people. The “craftie imaginacion” refers to 
entirely invented expositions of scripture, suggesting that commentary on Biblical text is 
devised falsely and invented anew, spreading false ideas among uneducated believers. 
Strangely, even as the imagination works to abuse simple people’s minds it is also abused 
by these scheming commentators. Gardiner reveals that the false commentators attempt to 
deny transubstantiation: “But againste this truth, the deuyll striueth, and fyghteth by his 
ministers, & lewde apostles, with sophistical deuyses, wherwith he troubleth the grosse 
imaginacions of the symple people.”412 The danger of the “craftie imaginacion” of the 
commentators is deception of the “grosse imaginacions” of the unlearned masses.  
 Not only Gardiner feared the workings of the imagination. A 1544 sermon by 
Alexander Alesius, a Lutheran theologian and reformer, indicates a similar concern with 
the abilities of the imagination to deceive.413 For Alesius, imagining is akin to 
blaspheming scripture: “For euery man that hath any witt at all may plainly perceyue that 
Peter wrote his second pistle against such blasphemers as do imagine a new word of god 
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besyde that which is writton.”414 Similarly, for Thomas Lever, a Church of England 
clergyman, the imagination leads to erroneous interpretation of scripture:415  
Now I heare some saye that thys errour is the fruyte of the scripture in 
englyshe. No, neyther thys, nor no other erroure commeth because the 
scripture is set forth in the englyshe tonge, but because the rude people 
lackynge the counsell of learned menne to teache theim the trewe 
meanynge when they reade it, or heare it, muste nedes folowe theyr owne 
Imaginacion in takynge of it.416  
 
The religious reformer John Knox goes so far as to define blasphemy as a form of 
imagining: “But what blasphemie is, may some perchance dout…To depart from the true 
honoring, & religion of God, to the imagination of mans inuentions.”417 Even Nicholas 
Sander, religious controversialist, in a 1566 sermon defines the belief that Christ’s body 
in the Eucharist is the body of a man rather than the body of a divinity as a “grosse 
imagination.”418  
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are conteyned certen disputacyons had in the parlament howse betwene the bisshops a bowt the 
nomber of the sacramennts and other things, very necessary to be known, made by Alexander 
Alane Scot and sent to the duke of Saxon, EEBO STC (2nd ed.) / 292, 35.  
 
415 Oxford Dicionary of National Biography, s.v. “Lever, Thomas.”  
 
416 Thomas Lever, A fruitfull sermon made in Poules churche at London in the shroudes, the 
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nomber of blasphemous cauillations written by an Anabaptist, and aduersarie to Gods eternal 
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 Imagination has thus become both an agent of deception and the passive faculty 
receiving those delusions. The imagination itself has been fragmented into the sort of 
“good” and “evil” Genius described in The Faerie Queene. If Archimago illustrates how 
imagination has been severed from the psyche of the subject Redcrosse, the Bower of 
Bliss episode demonstrates the fragmentation of the imagination itself. Guyon’s 
destruction of imaginative functioning in the Bower of Bliss episode represents an 
attempt to rid the mind of idolatrous thinking, in tune with Reformation anxiety about the 
threat not only of external idols but also of internal ones. Yet the lingering hybrids 
supposedly transformed back into human beings by Guyon suggest the far greater 
difficulty of destroying the idols of the imagination. The images in Acrasia’s Bower can 
be decimated, but the kind of fantasy produced by a figure such as Genius, carefully 
guarding the Bower and the imaginative thoughts it represents, is not so easily ruined. 
The destruction of the imagination in the Bower of Bliss is a more explicit version of 
various fifteenth-century attempts to expel the imagination, both as a personified figure 
and as part of the dreamer’s psyche. In this way, the sixteenth-century imagination 
hearkens back to its medieval predecessor. Yet the destructiveness of the imagination has 
become much more extreme. 
 
The lament for the medieval past: historical fragmentation  
The discovery of historical tomes in Phantastes’ chamber begins a foray into 
history that aligns imagination with historical rupture. At the same time, the focus on 
historical texts reveals a panic over textuality not usually commented upon in Spenser 
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scholarship.419 Phantastes’ chamber becomes the locus of melancholy over the past, and 
imagination becomes a figure poised on the cusp between the past and the present. The 
link among psychic, bodily and historical fragmentation is made explicit in the House of 
Alma episode in the transition between the encounter with Phantastes and the discovery 
of the Moniments of Britain. The externalization of the imagination suggested by 
Archimago’s thought insertion in Book I indicates the removal of the imagination from 
the mind and body of the individual. This removal implies a form of fragmentation in 
which the imagination is no longer part of the body but becomes dislocated in an act 
similar to dissection. By the time we reach the House of Alma at the end of Book II, the 
imagination has not only been dislocated but now becomes an agent of fragmentation 
itself. Guyon explores the role and the realm of Phantastes when he is suddenly 
interrupted by the discovery of the ancient book of British history. An explicit connection 
between psychic and historical fragmentation is made and at the center of it all is the 
personified imagination  
 Spenser’s melancholy over the loss of historical materials pervades much of The 
Faerie Queene, rendering Phantastes’ association with history an implicit association 
with historical rupture. Imagination becomes a proxy for considering history. Insofar as 
history in Spenser’s text is, as we shall see, necessarily associated with the Reformation’s 
rupture from the medieval past, imagination in Alma’s house comes to be associated with 
actual historical rupture produced as a result of the Reformation. Even as Phantastes 
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419 Spenser’s attitude toward images is more frequently discussed than his attitude toward text. 
There are innumerable discussions of Spenser’s representations of iconoclasm, but two prominent 
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becomes a tool for exploring historical rupture, continuity still lurks in the background, 
since Phantastes becomes suspended between past and present, much like Jean de Meun’s 
Genius. Nevertheless, in the midst of this continuity, Spenser’s imagination reflects a 
form of violent rupture that was never so explicitly an element of the medieval allegorical 
imagination. There is no question then that the fragmented Spenserian personified 
imagination maintains its continuity with its medieval precursors. At the same time, the 
association of Phantastes with the rupture of the Reformation reminds us that the early 
modern imagination was also severed in some essential ways from its forebears. It is this 
simultaneous continuity and severing that so fascinates us in understanding the history of 
the personified imagination.  
 This historical rupture is directly related to the fragmentation of the body and the 
alienation of the imagination from the body in the House of Alma episode. Indeed, 
Michael O’Connell has identified the House of Alma as “man’s cultural memory” and 
Phantastes, whose chamber serves as an introduction to Guyon and Arthur’s history 
lesson, as “pure imagination.”420 In the chamber of Phantastes, Guyon and Arthur 
encounter Anamnestes and Eumnestes. In the midst of their awe at Eumnestes’ “tossing 
and turning,” they are distracted by the library in his chambers: 
The knightes there entring, did him reuerence dew 
And wondred at his endlesse exercise, 
Then as they gan his Library to vew,  
And antique Regesters for to auise, 
There chaunced to the Princes hand to size, 
An auncient booke, hight Briton moniments, 
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420 Michael O’Connell, Mirror and Veil: The Historical Dimension of Spenser’s Faerie Queene 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 69. See also Michael Murrin, The Veil of 
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That of this lands first conquest did deuize, 
And old diuision into Regiments, 
Till it reduced was to one mans gouernemente.421 
 
Importantly, history appears within the confines of imagination’s chambers, as Phantastes 
reigns over Eumnestes and Anamnestes. The imagination thus becomes a locus for 
considering English history, especially medieval English history and its rupture from the 
present.  
 The association of history with deterioration, destruction and rupture is well-
supported by Guyon’s confrontation with historical “rolls” and documents (or 
“moniments”) in Phantastes’ chamber. The House of Alma is furnished, quite like a 
monastic house, with chronicles:  
The yeares of Nestor nothing were to his, 
Ne yet Mathusalem though longest liu’d; 
For he remembred both their infancis: 
Ne wonder then, if that he were depriu’d 
Of natiue strength now, that he them suruiu’d. 
His chamber all was hangd about with rolls, 
And old records from auncient times deriud, 
Some made in books, some in long parchment scrolls, 
That were all worm-eaten, and full of canker holes.422  
 
The antique quality and deterioration of the “rolls,” “books,” “old records” and “long 
parchment scrolls” may simply be meant to convey an image of antiquarianism or 
historical authenticity. However, the “worm-eaten” parchment scrolls and the books “full 
of canker holes” may not be such an innocuous depiction of old historical books. This 
image of books, with essential historical information no less, decaying and fragmented, 
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their materials occluded by their deterioration, is evocative of the panic of vast textual 
destruction that pervades the description of Errour’s book-vomit.   
 Spenser’s recognition of this nightmarish quality of history is most readily 
apparent in many of the monstrosities, particularly the fertile female ones, in The Faerie 
Queene. Of these monstrosities, Errour in Book I provides an apt case study of Spenser’s 
vision of historical development out of fragmentation and rupture. In Errour’s case, the 
discourse of anxiety surrounding images, idolatry and iconoclasm has been transferred to 
the book-as-object and to the representation of specifically monastic reading practices 
which as a concept represent a now-destroyed past. Errour’s vomit encapsulates the 
complexity of the objectified book in this text:  
Therewith she spewd out of her filthie maw 
A floud of poyson horrible and blacke, 
Full of great lumps of flesh and gobbets raw, 
Which stunck so vildly, that it forst him slacke, 
His grasping hold, and from her turne him backe. 
Her vomit full of bookes and papers was, 
With loathly frogs and toades, which eyes did lacke, 
And creeping sought way in the weedy gras: 
Her filthie parbreake all the place defiled has.423 
 
Linda Gregerson reads Errour’s “great lumps of flesh and gobbets raw” as a reference to 
the “Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation,” and the “indigestible body of Rome’s 
‘deformed masse.’”424 In this reading, Errour becomes part of Spenser’s project of 
Protestant propaganda, a monstrous representation of Catholic, Papist “doctrinal error.” 
 However, this reading overlooks the reference to monastic ruminatio also present 
in the representation of book-vomit. This moment encompasses a strange explosion or 
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rejection of theories of medieval reading, which dictated that texts were to be chewed and 
eaten, as is explicitly the case in monastic ruminatio. The Monk of Farne, to take only 
one example, records an elaborate metaphor involving the concept of eating books as a 
form of devotional practice.425 The monster’s vomit suggests a thorough reversal of and 
literal rejection of this theoretical model. Digested books, perhaps devotionally 
consumed, must be rejected from the body in the most violent manner. The bits and 
pieces of old texts in the vomit, insofar as they represent a fragmented representation of 
material which has been destroyed but not wholly discarded, recall the reluctance to 
complete destruction of the relics of the medieval Catholic past in Elizabethan England 
and may be a figure for the manner in which the Elizabethan settlement reintegrated the 
remains of the Catholic past into new, Protestant ritual. Errour represents Papist doctrinal 
error, per Gregerson’s view, but lurking behind this figure is another, diametrically 
opposed reading. If Errour’s book-vomit is a violent rejection of the medieval, Catholic, 
monastic consumption of and rumination of devotional texts, then Errour is a cynosure 
for the Protestant destruction of medieval, monastic texts, Catholic rituals, and reading 
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425 See Karma Lochrie, Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh (Philadelphia: University 
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practices. Errour’s monstrous hybridity, half-female and half-serpent, renders her the sort 
of product of the imagination in its dreamlike state and its capacity to invent new 
combinations out of sights once seen in nature. If Errour is in this way a representative of 
the imagination, then her book-vomit, insofar as it represents a rejection of a medieval 
way of reading, closely aligns the imagination itself with the rupture of the present 
historical moment from its most recent medieval past.   
  Unlike the sheer terror involved in the description of Errour’s relationship to 
textuality, Spenser’s bibliographic melancholy in the depiction of the decaying historical 
tomes in the House of Alma strikingly resembles commentary by the Henrician 
bibliographers John Leland and John Bale. Leland was commissioned by Henry VIII for 
a particularly perverse task to “serche and peruse the Libraries of hys realme…before 
their utter destruccyon.” As James Simpson has suggested, Leland’s project “to make a 
search after England’s antiquities, and to peruse the libraries of all cathedrals, abbies, 
priories, colleges,’ and also ‘all places wherein records, writings and secrets of antiquity 
were reposed” drove him to an early death, in a “heroic yet doomed attempt to seal off 
the ‘medieval’ past.”426 Bale notes that many of the new owners of what were once 
monasteries in England “reserved of those lybrarye bokes, some to serve theyr iakes, 
some to scoure theyr candel styckes, and some to rubbe their bootes. Some they solde to 
the grossers and the sope sellers, and some they sent over the see to the bokebynders, not 
in small nombre, to the wonderynge of the foreyn nacyons.”427 Even more poignantly, he 
comments, referring to the destruction of monastic libraries, that “oure posteryte maye 
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wele curse thys wycked facte of our age, thys unreasonable spoyle of Englandes moste 
noble Antiquytees.”428 Bale was correct in his view of posterity’s reaction to the “spoyle 
of Englandes moste noble Antiquytees,” as can be readily detected in Spenser’s 
inheritance of this lamenting tone.  
 Furthermore, the lament over the destruction of monastic and Catholic texts, 
images and other objects of worship by no means ended under Elizabeth, whose reign 
represented another moment, albeit perhaps less dramatic than Henry VIII’s, of 
destruction. The thoroughness of the divided consciousness of early Protestant 
bibliographers in the wake of the Dissolution of the monasteries was certainly not lost on 
Elizabethan commentators, such as William Lambarde, an antiquary and lawyer, in his 
1570 Perambulations of Kent:429   
little had all these casualties of fire and flame beene to the decay of this 
town, had not the dissolution and final overthrow of the Religious houses 
come also upon it…And therefore, no marvaile, if after wealth 
withdrawne, and opinion of holynesse removed, the places tumbled 
headlong to ruine and decay: In which part, as I can not on the one side, 
but in respect of ye places themselves, pitie and lament this general 
desolation, not only in this Shyre, but in all places in the Realme: So on 
the other side, considering the maine Seas of sinne and iniquities, wherein 
the world (at those dayes) was almost whole drenched, I must needs take 
cause, highly to praise God, that hath thus mercifully in our age delivered 
us.430 
 
Lambarde’s commentary, practically an Elizabethan analogue to Leland’s project, 
evoking a similar image of an antiquarian roaming the English countryside confronted 
with the devastating program of annihilation that engendered the Protestant present, 
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indicates the poignant cultural memory of the Dissolution even 40 years later. The 
anonymous Description of the Rites of Durham of 1593, an exhaustive catalogue of the 
Catholic items of worship, images and books destroyed under Elizabeth, reveals the 
continuity of the nostalgia and melancholy of the earliest Protestant bibliographers and 
antiquarians now roughly 60 years after the Dissolution.431 Spenser’s violently 
fragmented view of history can thus be set against this backdrop.  
 The literary imagination in the sixteenth century is certainly heavily influenced by 
“philosophical,” or more accurately religious, developments in imaginative theory. The 
internalized, psychological imagination becomes more explicitly nightmarish in ways that 
reflect particular fears of the power of the imagination among sixteenth-century 
iconoclasts. Yet once again, literature depicts a richer version of the imagination, in this 
case one that is much more linked with its medieval past than might seem the case in 
religious treatises. In particular, narrative strategies associated with personification 
allegory, particularly the ability to give the personified imagination jurisdiction over 
medieval historical texts in Alma’s castle.  
Even as Spenser’s imagination becomes the pathway through which to 
contemplate history and historical rupture in this text, the imagination Spenser represents 
is continuous with its medieval counterparts. Spenser’s imagination is in many instances 
a suspicious, untrustworthy figure, but this suspicion of imagination and its terror-
producing capacity has been a regular feature of the imagination since the twelfth 
century. Imagination is also always a transformative and divided figure, often 
representing the space of rupture. Spenser’s Phantastes certainly picks up on this theme 
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when the text fragments and ponders the medieval past in Phantastes’ chamber. Most 
importantly, the imagination remains rooted in the past, often resisting the forward 
movement of history in the thirteenth century, in the fifteenth century and again here in 
the sixteenth century. Even in the midst of a dramatic historical break, the sixteenth-
century imagination represents a culmination and even recombination of the development 
of the figure throughout the medieval period. This is not to say that the sixteenth-century 
allegorical imagination is unaffected by extreme events in Spenser’s historical context, 
events that transformed attitudes toward images and imagination. Even so, the literary 
development of the imagination displays striking continuities. In fact, Spenser’s 
fragmented imagination makes manifest sinister capabilities that were always latent in the 
medieval allegorical imagination. The imagination of the twelfth century, perpetually 
dividing into a simultaneously benevolent and evil figure, is in many ways the 
imagination of the sixteenth century, who sits poised and fragmented on the cusp of 
historical rupture, contemplating its very own past.   
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Conclusion 
 Unlike memory, a faculty of the psyche that was of great interest to medieval 
philosophers and scientists, imagination has not been extensively studied by modern 
neuroscientists, and we still know very little about how the imagination actually works. 
The aura and mystery surrounding the imagination has persevered throughout the 
centuries, certainly emerging with particular force among Romantic poets. Most 
unfamiliar to us is the idea that imagination per se is locatable as a concrete entity in the 
brain, and the notion that imagination recombines and recalls images once seen in nature. 
The “memorial” capacities of the medieval imagination are perhaps most distant from our 
modern notion of the concept.  
 Even so, these striking features of the medieval imagination are not entirely lost 
on us. Interestingly, “creativity” has largely subsumed the medieval concept of the 
recombinative imagination in modern thought. While “imagination” is a purely fanciful, 
sometimes derogatorily-regarded, force, as evidenced by phrases such as “Use your 
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imagination” and “You’re just imagining that,” “creativity” has emerged as a concept that 
is potentially both locatable in the brain and also capable of a form of recombination. A 
2012 paper suggests the location of creativity in the front of the brain, functioning as part 
of executive functioning. Even more intriguing, this creativity culls the memory of 
stimuli from the posterior part of the brain.432 A number of psychiatrists furthermore 
believe that creativity derives material from the subconscious and, indeed, recombines 
and refashions this material into something new.433 Although at first glance the medieval 
concept of imagination seems wildly foreign, when we think more closely about a wider 
variety of terms that have come to represent imaginative processes, we see much more 
continuity than we might expect.  
 This kind of continuity has been one of the most important aspects of the 
imagination throughout this dissertation. No longer can we view the imagination’s 
medieval and early modern history as clearly divided into distinct historical periods, 
ranging from the twelfth-century Neoplatonists to the sixteenth-century iconoclasts. We 
have instead seen much more fluidity in the way the imagination is depicted throughout 
this entire five-century period. We have seen that old views of the imagination die hard, 
often creating a diverse, rich, and heterogeneous imagination that culls simultaneously 
from a variety of traditions. Most importantly, we have seen that this kind of 
heterogeneity is no more subtly, carefully, and dramatically depicted than in literature. A 
close examination of the literary-allegorical imagination provides us with a slightly 
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different, perhaps more continuous and more continuously conflicted, view of the 
imagination than philosophy alone. This investigation of the literary imagination also 
suggests that similar examinations of other seemingly purely “philosophical” concepts 
could cause them to emerge as quite different concepts with quite different histories if 
studied instead through a literary lens. 
 Even in times of great schism, such as the Reformation, certain continuities can 
be detected when particular concepts are examined more closely. This has been the case 
with the literary imagination. There is no doubt that the sixteenth-century allegorical 
imagination bears the weight of Reformation debates about images and surrounding 
iconoclasm and emerges as a considerably more dangerous and frightening figure than its 
medieval counterpart. However, there are a number of key similarities between the 
sixteenth-century allegorical imagination and its medieval forebears. From certain 
perspectives, the sixteenth century may seem entirely divorced from the medieval period. 
Yet isolating particular concepts and figures, such as the allegorical imagination, clearly 
demonstrates more continuities than we might expect. The same could even be said of the 
relationship between the modern and medieval periods. They are, of course, worlds apart, 
but, as we have seen, certain strong tendencies in the definition of the medieval 
imagination still persist today.  
 We have seen that intense questioning of the imagination and fascination with its 
particularly literary capacities is by no means an invention of the Romantics. Fascination 
with the imagination produced simultaneous developments in religious ideology, 
philosophical thought, and literary exploration of the figure in the medieval and early 
modern periods. In a way, then, the medieval imagination is not so far removed from its 
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Romantic counterpart. This dissertation has shown that it is time to abandon a view of the 
medieval imagination as an isolated, negative force that has no correlates in later periods 
in history. When we take a complete look at the imagination, and especially at its literary 
representation, a dynamic, ever-mutating and always fascinating figure emerges, whose 
core elements never entirely disappear. Even in the age of modern neuroscience, we are 
still mystified and delighted by the ungraspable force of the imagination.   
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